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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Kimberly M. Livingstone 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Psychology 
 
September 2012 
 
Title: The Effect of Implicit Theories of Emotion on Emotion Regulation and Experience 
This dissertation examined the effects of implicit theories of emotion—beliefs 
about the malleability of emotion—on emotion regulation and experience. Incremental 
theories involve beliefs that emotions are controllable; entity theories involve beliefs that 
emotions are uncontrollable. I hypothesized that an incremental theory would be 
associated with better well-being, more adaptive emotion regulation, and mastery-
oriented patterns of response to emotion regulation difficulty, compared to an entity 
theory. Study 1 developed a valid and reliable questionnaire to assess trait implicit 
theories of emotion and examined correlations with self-reports of personality, emotional 
experience, emotion regulation, and well-being. A trait incremental theory was associated 
with greater positive emotion and less negative emotion, an effect that was mediated by 
the tendency of incremental theorists to use more active coping and adaptive emotion 
regulation strategies, compared to entity theorists. Incremental theories were also 
associated with greater overall well-being, lower depression, and less stress. Studies 2-5 
manipulated implicit theories of emotion and examined their causal effects on emotion 
and emotion regulation. Although entity and incremental participants did not report 
differences in emotional experience when experiencing emotions naturally (Study 2), 
participants in the incremental group were more likely to regulate their emotions when 
 v 
explicitly asked to do so (Study 3). Specifically, only incremental participants responded 
to instructions to remain objective while rating emotionally evocative images. Studies 4 
and 5 examined differences in reactions to emotion regulation difficulty. After 
completing an “emotional interference” task, all (Study 4) or a random half (Study 5) of 
participants were told that they had done poorly and rated attributions for their 
performance, affect, and motivation to remain engaged versus withdrawing. Although 
hypothesized patterns did not emerge as a whole, participants in the incremental 
condition were more likely to attribute their performance (failure or success) to strategy 
use. This research has implications for the study of emotion regulation, in particular, 
patterns of helplessness and mastery within the domain of emotions. 
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CHAPTER I 
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 
People can have very different beliefs about the nature of emotions. One person 
could see emotions as passions that arise quickly and automatically, that override reason 
and compel (sometimes inappropriate) action, and that leave them helpless and passive. 
Another person could see emotions as dynamic processes that serve essential functions in 
everyday life, from maintaining interpersonal relationships to encouraging personal 
growth, as long as they are managed in an appropriate manner. Such beliefs about 
emotion are likely to influence how people experience emotion. Someone who subscribes 
to the first set of beliefs might try to avoid emotions in general, make half-hearted 
attempts to manage them when they do arise, and experience them in a way that threatens 
well-being. On the other hand, someone who subscribes to the second set of beliefs might 
be able to cultivate a healthy repertoire of ways to flexibly manage their emotions, and 
experience them in a way that promotes general well-being.  
The purpose of this research was to examine how beliefs about emotions 
influence how people experience them. I focused on implicit theories of emotions—
beliefs about the extent to which emotions can be changed or controlled—and the effects 
those beliefs have on emotion regulation—the ways in which people try to change or 
influence their emotions. In investigating this question, I aimed to address why some 
people are more effective at regulating their emotions than others, which has important 
implications for subjective and psychological well-being. 
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In examining these processes, I drew from research on academic achievement, the 
domain that has received the most attention within the implicit theories framework. 
Extensive research has demonstrated that beliefs about the malleability of intelligence 
influence how people interpret and respond to important events and transitions in school. 
I therefore first review the literature on patterns of response to failure in the academic 
domain, and the research that shows how these patterns stem from beliefs about the 
nature of intelligence (see Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988). I then turn to the 
domain of emotions, examining parallels between success and failure in academic 
achievement and success and failure in emotion regulation. I review the existing research 
on implicit theories of emotion, and raise several questions that deserve empirical 
attention. I conclude the introduction by setting four primary goals for this dissertation. 
Helpless- and Mastery-Oriented Patterns of Response 
 In the 1970’s, Carol Dweck identified a subset of schoolchildren who responded 
to academic challenges with utter helplessness: Upon encountering failure, they 
experienced intense distress, withdrew effort, and avoided opportunities to improve their 
skills if it meant that they would continue to perform poorly (Diener & Dweck, 1978; 
Dweck & Reppucci, 1975). In contrast, another subset of children responded to academic 
failure with a mastery-oriented pattern: They maintained task engagement and did not 
experience the intense distress that helpless children did, in part because they did not 
view challenge as a sign of failure, but rather as an indication that they should increase 
their effort or change their strategies (Diener & Dweck, 1978). Dweck found that the 
helpless children were less likely to take personal responsibility for the outcomes of their 
work, and attributed both their failures and successes to uncontrollable factors such as a 
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fixed ability level. In contrast, mastery-oriented children were more likely to take 
personal responsibility for both successes and failures, and attributed academic outcomes 
to controllable factors such as effort (Dweck & Reppucci, 1974).  
These helpless- and mastery-oriented patterns of thoughts, affect, and motivation 
are most influential when a child faces failure or challenge (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). 
Why was challenge so much more powerful for some children than for others? According 
to Dweck’s model, beliefs about the nature of intelligence guide students’ goals and their 
perception of success and failure (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). Poor performance means 
something different, depending on whether a person believes that intelligence is fixed or 
malleable (Molden & Dweck, 2006). 
Implicit Theories: Entity and Incremental Beliefs 
 Implicit theories (sometimes referred to as “mindsets”) refer to personal beliefs 
about the malleability of psychological attributes (Dweck & Leggett, 1988). According to 
an entity theory, the attribute (e.g., intelligence) is fixed and cannot be changed. 
According to an incremental theory, the attribute is malleable and can be changed—
improved or modified—through hard work. These beliefs are implicit because people are 
often not aware of them explicitly, though they influence various aspects of our lives. 
Implicit Theories of Intelligence 
The extensive research on implicit theories of intelligence in children and in 
young adults has demonstrated how pervasive the effects of holding an entity or 
incremental theory can be. Because entity theorists believe intelligence is fixed, they seek 
to prove that they are intelligent, or at least not unintelligent (Elliot & Dweck, 1988; 
Robins & Pals, 2002). Their self-esteem is contingent on performing well: Failure 
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indicates low ability, and introduces a range of cognitive, emotional, and motivational 
deficits that form the helpless pattern (Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 1988; Hong, 
Chiu, Dweck, Lin, & Wan, 1999). Specifically, entity theorists are more likely to 
attribute failure to external, uncontrollable sources, more likely to experience intense 
negative affect in response to failure, and less likely to take action that could improve 
their performance (Hong et al., 1999; Robins & Pals, 2002).  
 In contrast, incremental theorists are more likely to display a mastery-oriented 
pattern. Because their self-esteem is not contingent on success, they show more adaptive 
responses to failure: Incremental theorists are more likely to attribute failure to internal, 
controllable factors such as insufficient effort or an inappropriate strategy (Hong et al., 
1999; Robins & Pals, 2002). They are less likely to experience the intense negative affect 
that entity theorists face upon failure, and are more likely to change their strategy or 
increase effort (Hong et al., 1999; Dweck, 1999). Because they believe intelligence is 
malleable, they are more likely to seek to improve their skills, even at the risk of 
performing poorly for the moment (Elliot & Dweck, 1988; Robins & Pals, 2002). 
These beliefs and response patterns have real-life implications: Whereas entity 
theorists risk declining performance over the course of important academic transitions 
such as to junior high (Blackwell, Trzesniewki, & Dweck, 2007) and to college (Robins 
& Pals, 2002), incremental theorists are more likely to stay engaged, increase their effort, 
and try out new strategies, which ultimately helps them maintain or improve their 
performance. 
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Implicit Theories in Other Domains 
In addition to intelligence, individuals also differ in their implicit theories of 
personality (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997), morality (Chiu, Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997), 
and shyness (Beer, 2002). Beliefs about such attributes are called “self-theories” (Dweck, 
1999), because they refer to beliefs about the malleability of one’s own attributes (e.g., 
whether you can increase your own intelligence or change your own personality). 
The model can also be applied to external phenomena as well. For example, if a 
person views the world as malleable, he or she will be more active in trying to improve it, 
whereas if a person views the world as stable, he or she will try to understand and predict 
it, but not change it (Dweck et al., 1995). In romantic relationships, a destiny belief 
(analogous to an entity theory) is a belief that relationship partners are either compatible 
or not, whereas a growth belief (analogous to an incremental theory) is a belief that 
relationships grow with time and experience (Knee, 1998). People with destiny beliefs 
are oriented toward evaluation. In their constant search for evidence of compatibility, 
relationship difficulties indicate that the relationship may not be viable. People with 
growth beliefs are oriented toward cultivation, and see difficulties are a normal part of 
relationships, offering a chance for improvement (Knee, Patrick, & Lonsbary, 2003). 
Although both beliefs can be adaptive within a relationship, they have different 
implications for how people deal with conflict: Growth beliefs encourage relationship 
partners to work through their problems, whereas destiny beliefs encourage people to 
disengage from problematic relationships or situations (Knee et al., 2003).  
In summary, across several domains, the research on implicit theories suggests 
that if a person perceives an attribute as fixed and uncontrollable, he or she is more likely 
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to experience greater distress upon encountering a challenge and more likely to display a 
helpless pattern. In contrast, if a person perceives an attribute as malleable and 
controllable, he or she is less likely to experience distress and more likely to display a 
mastery-oriented pattern. Applying the implicit theory framework to emotions may 
explain why some people are more active and successful in managing their emotions than 
others. 
Helpless- and Mastery-Oriented Emotion Regulation 
Helplessness and Mastery in Emotion Regulation 
The term emotion regulation refers to the processes by which people influence 
their experience and expression of emotion (Gross, 1998b). Emotion regulation 
encompasses a wide range of goals and methods (Koole, 2009). It can involve increasing, 
maintaining, or decreasing the experience or expression of either positive or negative 
emotions (Parrott, 1993). It can involve maximizing pleasure and minimizing pain, or 
using one’s emotions in such a way as to serve one’s goals (Tamir, 2009b). Strategies 
vary in their effectiveness, and people vary in the strategies they habitually employ (e.g., 
Carver, Scheier, & Weintraub, 1989; Gross & John, 2003, Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). 
One example of a generally effective strategy is cognitive reappraisal, in which a 
person attempts to change the way he or she feels by changing the way he or she thinks 
(Gross, 1998a; Gross & John, 2003). Because it occurs early in the emotion generation 
process, successful reappraisal can prevent a full-blown emotion or reduce its intensity, at 
relatively low cognitive and physiological costs, compared to, for example, suppressing 
one’s expression of emotion, which occurs later in the emotion generation process 
(Gross, 1998a; Gross & John, 2003). Reappraisal is also flexible, in that it can be used to 
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decrease or increase negative or positive emotion. One example of a generally ineffective 
strategy is rumination, in which a person dwells on his or her negative feelings and 
considers the causes and consequences of a negative event, without attempting to actively 
solve the problem (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). Rumination has been linked to depression, 
negative thinking, and inhibition of active problem solving (Nolen-Hoeksema, 
Lyubomirsky, & Wisco, 2008).  
Why would a person use an ineffective strategy for regulating their emotions? I 
propose that relying on ineffective strategies such as rumination reflects a helpless pattern 
that emerges because a person believes that emotions are not changeable. In contrast, a 
mastery-oriented pattern consists of a repertoire of flexible, effective strategies that 
emerges from a belief that emotions are changeable, which encourages effort, practice, 
and development of successful strategies and abandonment of unsuccessful ones.  
Implicit Theories of Emotion 
Initial research shows that people vary in their implicit theories of emotion: Entity 
theorists believe emotions are fixed and unchangeable, and incremental theorists
1
 believe 
emotions are malleable and controllable (Tamir, John, Srivastava, & Gross, 2007). In a 
longitudinal study of the transition to college, Tamir and colleagues found that 
incremental theories of emotion, measured before students started college, predicted more 
positive emotion, less negative emotion, and increasing social support during and after 
the first term of college. At the end of the year, students with stronger incremental 
                                                 
1
 Because individual differences in implicit theories of emotion are measured continuously, when 
describing trait-level implicit theories, the phrase “incremental theorist” refers to someone who scores 
higher on beliefs favoring emotion malleability, whereas “entity theorist” refers to someone who scores 
lower.  
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emotion theories reported fewer depressive symptoms and higher psychological well-
being (broadly defined), compared to those who had stronger entity theories. The 
researchers also found that implicit theories correlated with greater habitual use of 
cognitive reappraisal, and that the relationships between implicit theories of emotion and 
emotional outcomes were mediated by emotion regulation self-efficacy: People who had 
stronger incremental theories were more confident in their ability to regulate their 
emotions, which in turn predicted actual emotional experience (Tamir et al., 2007).  
How can beliefs about emotions influence emotion regulation? One possibility is 
that beliefs about the controllability of emotions are related to the initiation of emotion 
regulation—only those who believe emotions are controllable will be likely to initiate 
emotion regulation, whereas those who believe emotions are uncontrollable do not bother 
to try (Tamir & Mauss, 2011). In modern society, however, emotions rarely go 
unregulated (Cole, Michel, & Teti, 1994). A second possibility is that entity theorists do 
not simply allow their emotions to unfold unregulated, but rather they rely on different 
techniques because they have different ideas about what emotions are and what emotion 
regulation entails. 
For an incremental theorist, emotions are a normal part of everyday life, and 
because they can be changed, they do not necessarily threaten well-being. Emotion 
regulation may mean choosing from among the most appropriate strategies—the ones 
that are most likely to be effective within a given context—and changing emotions (or 
not) in an appropriate way. For an entity theorist, emotions, especially negative ones, 
threaten well-being, and should therefore be avoided. When an emotion does occur, 
rather than trying to change it, an entity theorist may dwell on his or her feelings in an 
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attempt to understand or predict them (see Dweck et al., 1995). In other words, emotion 
regulation may mean something different, depending on a person’s understanding of 
emotions (Molden & Dweck, 2006).  
To date, the study by Tamir and colleagues (2007) is the only published research 
on implicit theories of emotion. Numerous methodological and theoretical questions 
regarding the construct of implicit theories of emotion, and how implicit theories of 
emotion might influence emotional experience and well-being remain unanswered. 
From a methodological standpoint, how should we measure and manipulate 
implicit theories? Tamir and colleagues (2007) used a 4-item questionnaire to assess 
implicit theories of emotions in general. Do these beliefs refer mostly to negative 
emotions, positive emotions, or both? Can we manipulate implicit theories of emotion, as 
researchers have manipulated implicit theories in other domains (e.g., Hong et al., 1999), 
to investigate how implicit theories of emotion influence emotional experience and 
emotion regulation?   
From a theoretical standpoint, we need to better understand implicit theories of 
emotion and how they are related to other constructs. How stable are these theories over 
time? To what extent are they related to implicit theories of intelligence? How closely are 
they related to personality traits and related cognitive-affective constructs such as locus 
of control and optimism? In addition to reappraisal, are implicit theories of emotion 
related to other emotion regulation strategies, including maladaptive ones? To what 
extent can the implicit theory model be applied to the domain of emotions? Do implicit 
theories of emotion predispose people to helpless- or mastery-oriented patterns of 
emotion regulation? Do entity and incremental emotion theorists show the same 
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cognitive, affective, and motivational outcomes as entity and incremental intelligence 
theorists when they encounter difficulty (cf. Hong et al., 1999)? 
In this dissertation, I aimed to further develop a model of implicit theories that 
addresses how they influence emotion regulation and emotional experience. The major 
hypothesis is that beliefs about the controllability of emotions are related to whether and 
how people regulate their emotions, and that this regulation has implications for well-
being. In one individual difference study and five experiments, I address four goals. 
Goals of the Dissertation 
Questionnaire Development and Examining the Nomological Network 
First, I developed a questionnaire to measure individual differences in implicit 
theories of emotion. I expanded on previous research by measuring implicit theories of 
both positive and negative emotions, by examining the temporal stability of implicit 
theories, and by examining the nomological network surrounding implicit theories of 
emotion. Where do they fit within a constellation of cognitive-affective variables related 
to emotional experience and well-being? How are they related to broad personality and 
motivational variables? Are implicit theories of emotion distinguishable from implicit 
theories of intelligence, locus of control, emotion regulation self-efficacy, and emotional 
intensity? 
Individual Differences in Emotion, Well-Being, and Emotion Regulation 
Second, I examined the extent to which implicit theories are related to a range of 
well-being variables. Past research had linked incremental theories of emotion to the 
experience of more positive emotion, less negative emotion, lower self-reported 
depression, greater psychological well-being (broadly defined), and better social support 
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(Tamir et al., 2007). In Study 1, I examined several measures of well-being, replicating 
and extending past findings.  
I also examined the role of emotion regulation in the relationship between implicit 
theories of emotion and well-being. As described above, I hypothesized that the emotion 
regulation strategies a person uses depend upon their beliefs about the changeability of 
emotion. Tamir and colleagues (2007) focused on cognitive reappraisal, a widely 
researched and generally effective emotion regulation strategy, but there is a wide range 
of other—effective and ineffective—strategies available (e.g., Carver, Scheier, & 
Weintraub, 1989; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). I therefore 
expanded on past research by examining a broader range of emotion regulation and 
coping strategies, and examined whether the relationship between implicit theories and 
well-being is mediated by more adaptive emotion regulation.  
The Effects of Implicit Theories on Emotion Regulation and Experience 
Third, I investigated the causal effects of implicit theories of emotion on emotion 
regulation and experience during an emotion-eliciting event in the laboratory. Previous 
work on implicit theories in other domains has shown that although implicit theories tend 
to be stable over time and differ among individuals, entity and incremental theories can 
also be temporarily shifted (e.g., Chiu et al., 1997; Hong et al., 1999). To date, no 
published research has tested the causal relationship between implicit theories and 
emotion regulation and experience. I therefore developed a manipulation of implicit 
theories of emotion and used it to examine the effects on emotional experience (Study 2) 
and emotion regulation (Study 3).  
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In Study 2, I examined whether participants who read evidence supporting either 
an incremental or entity theory would respond differently to emotion-eliciting 
experiences. Specifically, would entity participants react more intensely to negative and 
positive emotional videos, compared to incremental participants? Would incremental 
participants report using more emotion regulation during the experience? In Study 3, I 
examined whether participants who read evidence for either an incremental or entity 
theory would differ in their ability to remain objective (one form of emotion regulation). 
Would incremental participants be more likely to regulate their emotions within this 
situation, compared to entity participants? In Study 3, I used explicit instructions 
regarding emotion regulation and a different set of stimuli than in Study 2 to examine 
emotional experience.  
The Effects of Implicit Theories on Responses to Emotional Challenge 
Fourth, I investigated whether implicit theories of emotion produce helpless and 
mastery patterns—differences in cognition, affect, and motivation—in the face of an 
emotionally demanding task. According to research in other domains, the influence of 
implicit theories is most potent in challenging situations (e.g., Beer, 2002; Dweck, 1999). 
Everyone, regardless of implicit theory, might have confidence in their abilities, feel 
positively, and persist in their efforts, as long as things are going well (Dweck, 1999). 
When people face a challenge, however, what they believe about the malleability or 
fixedness of psychological attributes influences how they think, feel, and behave. Implicit 
theories of intelligence influence how a person acts in the face of an academic challenge 
or failure (Dweck, 1999); implicit theories of shyness influence how a person acts in the 
face of a social challenge or failure (Beer, 2002). Specifically, entity theorists tend to 
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adopt a helpless-oriented pattern in response to challenge, in which they make 
maladaptive attributions for their failure, experience more negative affect, avoid further 
challenge, withdraw effort, and often decline in performance (Blackwell et al., 2007; 
Diener & Dweck, 1978; Hong et al., 1999; Robins & Pals, 2002). Incremental theorists 
tend to adopt a mastery-oriented pattern, in which they make adaptive attributions for 
failure, maintain positive affect, persevere by increasing their effort or changing their 
strategy, and ultimately improve in performance (see also Beer, 2002).  
I hypothesized, therefore, that implicit theories of emotion would influence 
whether a person adopts a helpless or mastery pattern of emotion regulation. In Studies 4 
and 5, I manipulated implicit theories of emotion, and asked participants to perform task 
that required them to regulate their emotions. After this task, I informed all (in Study 4) 
or a random half (in Study 5) of participants that they had performed poorly, and 
examined their attributions for their failure, their affect, and their motivation.  
I hypothesized that in the domain of emotion, entity participants, who were 
provided with evidence that emotions are unchangeable, would attribute their emotion 
regulation difficulty to the strength of the emotions themselves or their own lack of 
ability—factors that are beyond their control. In contrast, incremental participants, who 
were provided with evidence that emotions are dynamic and changeable, would attribute 
their difficulty to lack of effort or use of an inappropriate strategy. I hypothesized that 
entity participants would feel more negative affect regarding their failure, compared to 
incremental participants. Finally, I hypothesized that entity participants would be more 
likely to withdraw from the task (in Study 4) and decrease their effort in a second round 
of the task (in Study 5), compared to incremental participants.  
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A Note on Self-Efficacy. I chose not to focus on emotion regulation self-
efficacy— a person’s belief about their own ability to regulate their emotions. Although 
in Tamir and colleagues’ study, self-efficacy mediated the relationship between implicit 
theories and well-being, I focused directly on emotion regulation. Dweck has shown that 
confidence in one’s academic abilities does not reliably predict performance or reactions 
to failure (Dweck, 1999; Elliot & Dweck, 1988), and confidence in the morality of the 
individuals was not enough to prevent entity theorists from making dispositional 
attributions for single behaviors (Chiu et al., 1997). Dweck (1999) reports that entity 
theorists with the highest confidence are often the ones who decline in class standing, and 
incremental theorists who have the lowest confidence are often the ones who improve in 
class standing. In Study 1, I examined the relationship between implicit theories and 
emotion regulation self-efficacy, but did not focus on it as a mediator. In the experimental 
studies, I focused directly on implicit theories of emotion and on emotion regulation. 
Summary. In one individual difference study and four experiments, I investigated 
the relationship between implicit theories of emotion and emotional experience, emotion 
regulation, and cognitive, affective, and behavioral patterns in response to an emotionally 
challenging situation. I examined relationships among these variables at both the trait and 
state level, by both measuring and manipulating implicit theories of emotion.  
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CHAPTER II 
STUDY 1: INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN IMPLICIT THEORIES OF EMOTION 
Introduction 
Study 1 investigated individual differences in implicit theories of emotion, and 
their relationship to personality, emotion regulation, emotional experience, and well-
being. This study addressed the first two goals of this dissertation: developing a 
questionnaire to measure trait implicit theories of emotion and establishing a nomological 
network, and examining relationships with trait well-being and emotion regulation.  
Developing a Questionnaire to Assess Implicit Theories of Emotion 
The first goal of Study 1 was to develop a questionnaire to measure implicit 
theories of emotion—personal beliefs that individuals have regarding the malleability of 
emotions. Previous research on this topic has used a four-item questionnaire that 
measures implicit theories of emotion in general (Tamir et al., 2007), using items such as 
“No matter how hard they try, people can’t really change the emotions that they have.” 
These items are ambiguous with regard to the valence of emotions, however. When 
people are asked to recall instances of emotion regulation, most produce examples of 
regulating negative emotions (Gross, Richards, & John, 2005), suggesting that leaving 
the valence open-ended implies, but does not definitively refer to, negative emotions.  
Both positive and negative emotions contribute to subjective well-being (e.g., 
Diener, Suh, Lucas, & Smith, 1999). The regulation of positive emotions, though it may 
not be the prototypical example of emotion regulation, is common in everyday life and 
also has important implications for well-being (Livingstone & Srivastava, in press; 
Tugade & Fredrickson, 2004). People have separate (but related) ideas regarding their 
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abilities to regulate positive and negative emotions (Bryant, 1989), which suggests that 
they may also have separate (but related) ideas regarding the malleability of positive and 
negative emotions. I therefore expanded on previous research by including new items to 
address beliefs about positive and negative emotions separately, creating a more 
comprehensive questionnaire to use throughout the following studies.  
I hypothesized that items describing implicit theories of emotion would fall along 
a single bipolar dimension ranging from entity to incremental beliefs, similar to implicit 
theories in other domains (for an exception, see Knee, 1998). I had no specific hypothesis 
regarding whether people would hold different implicit theories of positive and negative 
emotions, but tested this as an exploratory research question. 
Validation of the scale utilized two samples. Participants in the first sample 
completed the initial pool of 24 items; those in the second sample completed the same 
items and series of individual difference questionnaires. A subset of individuals 
participated in both samples, allowing me to examine test-retest stability. Tamir and 
colleagues (2007) found that people tend to see emotions as more malleable than 
intelligence, and speculated that this is because emotions are, by nature, short lived and 
change quickly. I hypothesized that implicit theories of emotions themselves will be more 
susceptible to fluctuation over time than implicit theories of intelligence, but will still 
demonstrate some degree of stability.   
Establishing a Nomological Network 
Study 1 also explored the construct of implicit theories of emotion, especially 
with regard to the degree of overlap with personality traits and cognitive-affective 
individual difference variables.  
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Relationships with Broad Personality Traits. Because research on implicit 
theories of emotion is new, it is helpful to establish how these beliefs are related to 
important personality variables. In particular, I examined the Big Five personality traits, 
the behavioral activation and inhibition systems, and optimism. For these variables, I 
predicted that individual differences in implicit theories of emotion would not be fully 
captured by broad personality traits and motivational systems, but did not make specific 
predictions regarding directions of correlations.  
The personality traits of extraversion, neuroticism, conscientiousness, 
agreeableness, and openness to experience, known collectively known as the Big Five, 
represent personality descriptors at the broadest level (John & Srivastava, 1999). A 
highly extraverted person is energetic, sociable, and assertive (vs. shy and introverted). A 
highly neurotic person has a tendency to feel anxious, sad, and tense (vs. emotionally 
stable). Extraversion and neuroticism are particularly relevant for emotional experience: 
Extraversion is associated with the experience of greater positive affect, and neuroticism 
is associated with the experience of greater negative affect (Costa & McCrae, 1980).  
A highly agreeable person is oriented toward cooperation, trust, and modesty (vs. 
someone who is disagreeable). A highly conscientiousness person is goal-directed, 
responsible, and organized (vs. careless and disorganized). A person who is high on 
openness to experience is oriented toward new experiences, originality, and complexity 
(John & Srivastava, 1999).  
Two other broad dimensions related to the experience of emotion are the 
motivational systems called the behavioral activation system (BAS) and the behavioral 
inhibition system (BIS). The BIS includes vigilance for and sensitivity to negative events 
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(punishments), whereas the BAS includes vigilance for and sensitivity to positive events 
(rewards; Carver & White, 1994). According to one model, the BAS consists of three 
subsystems: fun-seeking (attraction to possibly rewarding experiences), drive 
(perseverance in pursuing a desired end-state), and reward responsiveness (intense 
positive reaction to rewarding stimuli; Carver & White, 1994).  
Finally, I examined an additional personality trait that is not captured well by the 
Big Five or by BIS/BAS, but that could be relevant to implicit theories of emotion. Trait 
optimism—a stable tendency to expect positive outcomes rather than negative ones— is 
associated with coping strategies and a range of well-being outcomes (Scheier, Carver, & 
Bridges, 1994). 
Discriminant Validity. In addition to exploring relationships with other 
constructs, it is also important to distinguish implicit theories of emotion from possibly 
overlapping cognitive-affective variables. 
First, implicit theories of emotion should be distinct from implicit theories of 
intelligence—beliefs about the malleability of intelligence. In most past research, implicit 
theories are domain specific, and have implications for dependent variables only within 
the same domain (Dweck et al., 1995). Tamir et al. (2007) showed that implicit theories 
of emotion are related to, but distinct from, implicit theories of intelligence. I sought to 
replicate this finding, and show that relationships between implicit theories of emotion 
and emotional experience and regulation are due to implicit theories of emotion, rather 
than overarching implicit theories in general.  
Second, implicit theories of emotion should be distinct from locus of control—a 
tendency to view events either as internally caused or externally caused (Rotter, 1966). A 
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person with an internal locus of control believes that outcomes are dependent on one’s 
own actions, whereas a person with an external locus of control believes that outcomes 
are dependent on external factors, such as luck or the actions of others. An entity theory 
of emotions should be related to an external locus of control: If emotions are 
unchangeable and one is helpless to do anything about them, then they should be 
determined by external factors. Locus of control is a domain-general construct, however, 
so the association between these two variables was not expected to be large (see Dweck 
& Leggett, 1988). 
Third, implicit theories of emotion should be distinct from emotion regulation 
self-efficacy—a person’s confidence in his or her ability to regulate emotions (see Tamir 
et al., 2007). Theoretically, an incremental theory of emotions should predict higher 
emotion regulation self-efficacy: If a person believes that emotions are malleable, he or 
she should have more confidence in his or her ability to regulate emotions. The two 
concepts are not redundant, however, and it may be that some people believe emotions in 
general are malleable, but that they are not good at regulating their own emotions. Other 
people may have generally high confidence in their ability to control their emotions when 
they are calm, but when they actually experience them, emotions seem uncontrollable.   
Dweck’s research (1999) has repeatedly shown that confidence in academic 
abilities does not predict how a student responds to challenge. In the domain of emotions, 
I expect that incremental theorists will have higher emotion regulation self-efficacy than 
entity theorists, but that confidence plays only a small role in predicting emotion 
regulation and experience. 
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Finally, implicit theories of emotion should be distinct from emotional intensity. 
Perhaps the people who believe emotions are not controllable have stronger emotions in 
the first place. The strength of their emotional impulses, therefore, may be what is driving 
the relationship between implicit theories of emotion and emotional experience. Thus, I 
will examine whether entity theorists do have more intense emotions, and whether this is 
why they are less likely and able to regulate their emotions.  
Correlations between implicit theories and these variables should be positive, but 
small to moderate in size. In addition, relationships between implicit theories of emotion 
and emotional experience, emotion regulation, and well-being should be significant even 
when controlling for these variables. 
Relationships with Emotional Experience and Well-Being 
In past research, incremental theories of emotion predicted more positive emotion 
and less negative emotion over the first few months of college, and lower levels of 
depression at the end of the first year (Tamir et al., 2007). In Study 1, I examined 
associations with a broader range of variables, including subjective well-being, 
psychological well-being, self-esteem, depression, anxiety, and perceived stress. I 
hypothesized that, consistent with Tamir et al., (2007), incremental theories of emotion 
would be related to more positive emotion and less negative emotion, and more positive 
well-being overall.  
Subjective well-being consists of high levels of positive emotion, low levels of 
negative emotion, and high levels of satisfaction with life, and thus includes both 
cognitive and emotional aspects of what is sometimes called “happiness” (Diener et al., 
1999). These three dimensions can be measured separately, because at the trait level, 
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experiences of negative and positive emotion are somewhat independent (Watson, Clark, 
& Tellegen, 1988), and life satisfaction is a cognitive dimension, rather than an emotional 
one (Diener et al., 1999). 
There are also several dimensions of positive psychological functioning that do 
not necessarily imply a positive affect balance (Ryff, 1989). Ryff has identified six 
dimensions: positive relations with others (having close, trusting relationships and being 
sensitive to others’ needs), autonomy (a sense of independence and a feeling that one is in 
control of one’s own actions), environmental mastery (a sense of competence and control 
over one’s environment), purpose in life (a sense of direction and broad goals), personal 
growth (a sense of self-improvement and development), and self-acceptance (a positive 
attitude toward oneself). In particular, an incremental theory of emotion should be related 
to environmental mastery and autonomy, because it implies a sense of control, and to 
positive relations with others, because incremental theories of emotions should allow 
people to regulate their emotions in such a way as to maintain and improve relationships 
(cf. Tamir et al., 2007). 
In addition to the variables listed above, I examined whether implicit theories are 
related to specific positive emotions such as joy, love, and pride, as well as to self-esteem 
and the expression of positive emotions. To examine negative functioning, I examined 
correlations with specific negative emotions such as anger, sadness, and shame, as well as 
with symptoms of anxiety, depression, and stress. 
Relationships with Emotion Regulation and Coping 
I also examined which emotion regulation strategies entity and incremental 
theorists are most likely to draw upon. If a person believes that emotions are 
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uncontrollable, he or she may not be sure about how to go about managing his or her 
emotions. Emotional experience almost always includes some form of emotion 
regulation, even if it is dysregulation (Cole, et al., 1994). The question remains, then, 
how do entity emotion theorists go about regulating their emotions? 
Helpless Emotion Regulation. Entity theorists in other domains respond to 
challenge with helplessness: They withdraw effort and disengage from the task (Dweck, 
1999). What would helplessness in emotion regulation look like?  First, entity theorists 
may attempt to avoid emotions in the first place. People who find emotions threatening 
generally report trying to avoid them (Maio & Esses, 2001). Although it is possible to 
predict and avoid situations in which you expect to experience negative affect (Gross, 
1998b), it is often counterproductive (e.g., Harmon-Jones, Harmon-Jones, Amodio, & 
Gable, 2011).  
Second, entity theorists might attempt to disengage from an emotional situation 
that threatens their goals, rather than confront the emotions. Behavioral disengagement 
essentially involves giving up on one’s goal and withdrawing effort in the face of a 
stressor (e.g., “I admit to myself that I can’t deal with it, and quit trying”), whereas 
mental disengagement involves trying to distract oneself from the stressor or the goals the 
stressor is interfering with, that is, not thinking about one’s goals or the stressor (e.g., “I 
daydream about things other than this”; Carver et al; 1989). These strategies can be 
adaptive in some circumstances, but when used habitually, are considered maladaptive 
(Carver et al., 1989).   
Third, entity theorists may attempt to target the expression of emotion, rather than 
the experience of the emotion itself. One option is to hide the expression of emotion, a 
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process known as expressive suppression (Gross, 1998a). Although expressive 
suppression results in lower expressivity of negative emotion, it does not reduce the 
experience of the emotion itself, and can result in more intense physiological arousal 
(Gross, 1998a) and cognitive and social impairments (Butler, Egloff, Wilhelm, Smith, 
Erickson, & Gross, 2003; see also Gross & John, 2003). Another option is to vent one’s 
emotions: to express one’s emotions and to “let them out” (Carver et al., 1989). Despite 
the popular idea that venting one’s emotions is associated with a beneficial “release” 
(catharsis), evidence suggests that that deeply feeling and expressing negative emotions 
actually makes things worse (e.g., Kraemer & Hastrup, 1988).  
Finally, entity theorists may simply try to focus on their emotions and their causes 
and consequences in an attempt to understand them—that is, to ruminate on them. 
Rumination involves repetitively and passively thinking about negative events, one’s 
distress, and the causes and consequences of it (Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). It has 
consistently been linked to depression, negative thinking, and poor problem solving (for a 
review, see Nolen-Hoeksema et al., 2008). Entity theories orient people toward 
evaluation and prediction (Dweck et al., 1995; Knee et al., 2003), which suggests that 
entity theorists may turn to rumination rather than active emotion regulation and 
problem-solving.  
Mastery-Oriented Emotion Regulation. The strategies listed above are 
generally maladaptive ones, in the sense that they may be useful within given contexts, 
but when used habitually, are associated with lower well-being. In contrast, habitual use 
of other strategies (including cognitive reappraisal, discussed earlier) is associated with 
more positive well-being.  
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In general, I predict that incremental theorists will be more likely to engage in 
mood repair—actively attempting to reduce negative emotions (e.g., “If I find myself 
getting angry, I try to calm myself down”; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 
1995). Along with attention and clarity, repair is one dimension of meta-mood: the 
approaches that people take to dealing with their emotions (Salovey et al., 1995). Entity 
and incremental theorists may pay equal amounts of attention to their emotions, and may 
even clearly perceive emotions in themselves, but incremental theorists should be more 
likely than entity theorists to try to repair negative moods. 
In addition, I predict that incremental theorists will be more likely to use adaptive 
forms of coping with stress. In particular, they should be more likely to use active coping, 
which involves initiating direct action, increasing effort, and persisting in a systematic 
way—essentially the opposite of behavioral disengagement (Carver et al., 1989). In 
addition, incremental theorists should engage in more positive reframing, which involves 
reinterpreting the situation in a more positive light (Carver et al., 1989), and is 
conceptually related to cognitive reappraisal. Thus, overall, an incremental theory should 
be positively related to the mastery-oriented strategies, and negatively related to the 
helpless-oriented strategies.  
Is the Effect of Implicit Theories on Well-Being Mediated by Emotion Regulation? 
Finally, I tested whether the relationship between implicit theories and well-being 
is mediated by emotion regulation. I hypothesized that the relationship between implicit 
theories of emotion and well-being would be mediated by greater use of mastery-oriented 
emotion regulation and coping strategies, and by less use of helplessness-oriented 
emotion regulation and coping strategies. I examined this mediation model at two levels: 
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general approaches to emotion, and use of specific adaptive and maladaptive strategies. 
Because this is the first study to test this hypothesis, I tested both models to better 
understand the meditational processes. I chose to examine broad approaches to emotions 
(avoidance and mood repair) because they represent general orientations to emotions that 
incremental and entity theorists are likely to differ on. I chose to examine particular 
strategies as well because they represent more concrete approaches to dealing with 
emotions once they have arisen.  
General Approaches to Emotion. First, I examined whether the relationship 
between implicit theories of emotion and well-being is mediated by general approaches to 
emotion. To represent a helpless-oriented approach to emotion, I examined mediation by 
the general tendency to avoid emotions. To represent a mastery-oriented approach to 
emotion, I examined mediation by the general tendency to repair negative moods. These 
two approaches may be correlated with each other, but because they occur at different 
stages of the emotional generation process, it is possible that a person could use both, or 
neither. I predict, however, that incremental theorists will be more likely to use mood 
repair, and less likely to try to avoid emotions, compared to entity theorists, and that 
differential use of these approaches will predict emotional experience. 
Specific Emotion Regulation Strategies. Second, I examined whether the 
relationship between implicit theories of emotion and well-being is mediated by the use 
of two specific emotion regulation strategies. To represent a helplessness-oriented 
emotion regulation strategy, I examined behavioral disengagement, which involves 
giving up on one’s efforts in the face of difficulty, and is conceptually linked to 
helplessness (Carver et al., 1989). To represent a mastery-oriented emotion regulation 
 26 
strategy, I examined mediation by cognitive reappraisal, which is a commonly researched 
strategy that is generally considered flexible and efficient (e.g., Gross, 1998a; Gross & 
John, 2003). Again, I expected that the two strategies would be correlated, but not 
completely overlapping, and that each would mediate the relationship between implicit 
theories of emotion and emotional experience. 
Method 
Sample 1 
Participants. Participants were 278 undergraduate students enrolled in the human 
subject pool at the University of Oregon who participated in a general survey—an online 
survey session consisting of a variety of short (less than 5-minute long) measures.  
Measure and Procedure. Participants rated their agreement with 24 items 
generated to assess implicit theories of emotion, which included the four original items 
used in Tamir et al.’s study, and an additional 20 items, comprised of five incremental 
items regarding positive emotions (e.g., “No matter the situation, you can always 
influence your positive emotions”), five incremental items regarding negative emotions 
(e.g., “You can control your negative reactions to bad situations”), five entity items 
regarding positive emotions (e.g., “Positive emotions are caused by forces beyond your 
control”), and five entity items regarding negative emotions (e.g., “Negative emotions 
just happen to you, and there is nothing you can do about them”). See Appendix A for the 
complete list of items. The response scale for these items ranged from 1 (“disagree 
strongly”) to 5 (“agree strongly”). 
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Sample 2 
 Participants. Participants were 262 undergraduates from the University of 
Oregon human subject pool (183 female, 76 male; Mage = 19.29, SD = 1.79, range 17 to 
35). They signed up for and completed the one-hour long study online.  
Procedure. After reading an informed consent page, all participants completed 
the 24-item implicit theories of emotion questionnaire, then a series of individual 
difference questionnaires. These included measures of personality traits, measures of 
emotional regulation and coping styles, and measures of emotional experience and well-
being.  
There were two versions of the main study. All participants completed measures 
of implicit theories of emotion, academic self-efficacy, emotional expressivity, the Big 
Five personality traits, depression, cognitive reappraisal and expressive suppression, 
positive and negative affect, emotional avoidance, rumination, implicit theories of 
intelligence, life satisfaction, and mood repair. The first subset of the main sample (N = 
187) also completed measures of behavioral activation and inhibition, coping, optimism, 
psychological well-being, and self-esteem. The second subset of the main sample (N = 
75) completed measures of anxiety and locus of control instead. All continuous variables 
were transformed so that they ranged from a possible 0 to a possible 100, to provide more 
intuitive interpretation (see Cohen, Cohen, Aiken, & West, 1999). Descriptive statistics 
for all measures are reported in Appendix B.  
 Measures of Personality Traits. The Big Five personality traits (extraversion, 
agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and openness) were measured using the 
44-item Big Five Inventory (John & Srivastava, 1999). Behavioral activation and 
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behavioral inhibition were measured using the Behavioral Activation Scale, which 
measures reward responsiveness, fun-seeking, and drive; and the Behavioral Inhibition 
Scale (Carver & White, 1994). Trait optimism was measured using the 10-item Life 
Orientation Test (Scheier, Carver, & Bridges, 1994). 
Discriminant Validity. Participants completed a 4-item measure of implicit 
theories of intelligence (Dweck, 1999). Participants also rated their academic self-
efficacy using 10 items (e.g. “If you really wanted to, how confident are you that you 
can… complete your homework assignments on time?”) on a scale from 0 to 100. Locus 
of control was measured using a 13-item version of Rotter’s forced-choice Locus of 
Control Scale (Rotter, 1966). Emotion regulation self-efficacy was measured using a 10-
item measure of emotion-regulation self-efficacy used in Tamir et al.’s (2007) study. In 
this measure, participants indicated their confidence in being able to regulate specific 
emotions within specific situations (e.g., “If you really wanted to, how confident are you 
that you can… decrease your anxiety during an important examination?”) on a scale from 
0 to 100. Emotional intensity was measured using the 4-item Impulse Strength subscale 
of the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (Gross & John, 1995). 
Measures of Emotional Experience and Well-Being. Trait-level positive and 
negative affect were measured with the 20-item Positive and Negative Activation 
Schedule (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). In addition to the PANAS items, I also 
included a number of specific emotions (amusement, hope, interest, joy, love, pride, 
anger, anxiety, contempt, disgust, embarrassment, fear, guilt, loneliness, sadness, and 
shame), each of which was measured using one or more items. Emotional expression was 
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measured using the Berkeley Expressivity Questionnaire (Gross & John, 1995), which 
measures expressivity of positive emotions (3 items) and of negative emotions (5 items).  
Positive well-being was measured with the 5-item Satisfaction with Life Scale 
(Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985), the 10-item Rosenberg Self-Esteem 
questionnaire (Rosenberg, 1965), and the 18-item Psychological Well-Being 
questionnaire (Ryff, 1989), which has six subscales: autonomy, environmental mastery, 
purpose in life, personal growth, positive relations with others, and self-acceptance. Well-
being deficits were measured using the 20-item Center for Epidemiological Studies- 
Depression scale (Radloff, 1977), a measure of depressive symptoms intended for the 
general population; the 4-item Perceived Stress Scale (Cohen, Kamarck, & Mermelstein, 
1983); and the 21-item Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988).  
 Measures of Emotion Regulation and Coping. Cognitive reappraisal and 
expressive suppression were measured using the 10-item Emotion Regulation 
Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003). Rumination was measured using the 12-item 
rumination subscale of the Rumination and Reflection Questionnaire (Trapnell & 
Campbell, 1999). Coping was measured with the 28-item brief COPE (Carver, 1997), 
which measures 14 coping styles with two items each. Tendencies to approach and avoid 
emotions were measured using the Need for Affect Scale (Maio & Esses, 2001). General 
mood repair was measured with the 30-item Trait Meta-Mood Scale (Salovey, et al., 
1995), which measures tendencies to attend to affect (attention), be able to clearly 
identify affect (clarity), and to repair negative affect (repair). 
 
 
 30 
Results 
Questionnaire Development  
Factor Structure in Sample 1. The data from the 24 items administered to 
Sample 1 were subjected to an exploratory factor analysis using principle axis factoring. 
Four factors with eigenvalues greater than one were extracted, although the scree plot 
showed a large single factor, which explained 34.3% of the variance (see Figure 1). The 
second, third, and fourth factors accounted for small amounts of variance (4.3%, 3%, and 
2.6%, respectively).  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Scree plot for exploratory factor analysis of the 24 implicit theories of emotion 
items in sample 1. 
 
 
Possible alternative factor structures could include entity vs. incremental or 
positive emotion vs. negative emotion (both two-factor solutions) or a four-factor 
solution in which positive entity, negative entity, positive incremental, and negative 
incremental loaded separately. Although the scree plot did not suggest more than one 
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factor, two- and four-factor solutions were extracted for exploratory purposes, using 
exploratory factor analysis with oblique rotation, to allow the factors to covary. The two 
factor structure was consistent with incremental and entity factors, but these factors 
correlated at r = -.72, p < .001, which suggests that a single factor is appropriate. The 
four-factor solution was not consistent with the theorized structure.  
Replication of Factor Structure in Sample 2. The factor analysis on the 24 
items was repeated in the Sample 2, after removing those who also participated in Sample 
1 (remaining N = 195). A large first factor accounted for 30.9% of the variance. The 
factor loadings in the two samples correlated strongly, although the items loaded in 
different directions (coefficient of congruence = -.99). Factor loadings for the single 
factor structure are reported in Table 1. In Sample 2, however, the scree plot indicated a 
possible two-factor solution (see Figure 2), with the second factor explaining an 
additional 5.7% variance. The two-factor structure was consistent with incremental and 
entity factors, but the two factors correlated strongly, r = -.64, p < .001. The four-factor 
solution was not consistent with the theorized structure. See Table 1 for factor loadings in 
samples 1 and 2. 
Scale Construction. In designing a new measure of trait implicit theories of 
emotion, the first goal was to improve content validity by including items that addressed 
the controllability of both positive and negative emotions. The second goal was to have 
sufficient internal consistency among items, but in a relatively short scale, so that it could 
be used flexibly in individual difference research. I selected items based on the single 
factor structure, but included enough entity and incremental items to allow scoring of 
subscales with sufficient internal consistency. 
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Figure 2. Scree plot for exploratory factor analysis of implicit theories of emotion items 
in sample 2 
 
 
Table 1. Factor loadings for exploratory factor analysis in samples 1 and 2.  
 
Item Theory
 
Valence
 
Factor 
Loading 
Sample 1 
Factor 
Loading 
Sample 2 
The truth is, people have very little 
control over their emotions.
a 
E G -.70 .66 
It is usually not possible to change your 
negative emotions.
a 
E N -.68 .66 
No matter how strong a person’s negative 
emotions are, they can always find a 
way to change them.
a 
I N .67 -.55 
You can learn to do something about 
your negative emotions.
a 
I N .66 -.58 
No matter how hard they try, people 
can’t really change the emotions they 
have.
a 
E G -.66 .63 
If they want to, people can change the 
emotions that they have.
a 
I G .66 -.59 
When you have negative emotions, you 
cannot do much to change them.
a 
E N -.66 .68 
Negative emotions just happen to you, 
and there is nothing you can do about 
them.
a 
E N -.64 .53 
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Table 1 (continued). Factor loadings for exploratory factor analysis for samples 1 and 2 
     
Item Theory
 
Valence
 
Factor 
Loading 
Sample 1 
Factor 
Loading 
Sample 2 
Positive emotions come and go, and there 
is not much you can do about them.
a 
E P -.63 .64 
I believe that I am in control of my 
positive emotions.
a 
I P .63 -.54 
No matter the situation, you can always 
influence your positive emotions.
a 
I P .63 -.53 
People can learn to influence when and 
how they experience positive emotions. 
I P .61 -.53 
Anyone can learn to influence the 
positive emotions that they feel. 
I P .61 -.42 
There is not much a person can do to 
influence when and how they 
experience positive emotions. 
E P -.59 .52 
When you are feeling bad, there are 
things you can do to influence your 
emotions. 
I N .57 -.51 
There is no use in trying to influence 
your positive emotions; you have to 
just let them happen. 
E P -.55 .64 
You can control your negative reactions 
to bad situations. 
I N .54 -.54 
Negative emotions are something that 
people have control over. 
I N .52 -.65 
Everyone can learn to control his or her 
emotions.
a 
I G .51 -.45 
Positive emotions are caused by forces 
beyond your control. 
E P -.50 .46 
When a person feels negative emotions, 
they have to just let them run their 
course. 
E N -.44 .47 
When people feel positive emotions, it’s 
because they made them happen 
I P .43 -.38 
A positive emotion is something that 
happens to you, not something you 
make happen. 
E P -.41 .45 
There is no use in trying to avoid 
negative emotions. 
E N -.32 .49 
N   278 195 
Note. E = entity, I = incremental,
 
G = general, N = negative, P = positive.  
a 
item included in shortened form of the Emotional Mindset Scale (EMS). 
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To ensure content validity, while reducing the number of items, I retained the top 
two loading items from each of the positive incremental, negative incremental, positive 
entity, and negative entity subscales. In addition, the four items used in Tamir and 
colleagues’ research were included, to compare across studies
2
. This yielded a 12-item 
Emotional Mindset Scale (EMS; see Appendix A)
3
.  
Scale Properties.  EMS properties in both samples are reported in Table 2. The 
EMS had good internal consistency in both samples (!1 = .89, !2 = .85). The Cronbach’s 
alpha coefficients for the EMS were higher than those for the original four-item scale 
used in Tamir et al., (!1 = .73, !2 = .64). The six entity items (!1 = .82, !2 = .81) and six 
incremental items (!1 = .82, !2 = .76) had adequate to good internal consistency in both 
samples. The four items addressing negative emotions (!1 = .78, !2 = .68) and the four 
items addressing positive emotions (!1 = .73, !2 = .64) had slightly lower internal 
consistency.  
The EMS was scored as a continuous variable with higher scores indicating a 
stronger incremental theory of emotion. In sample 2, participants generally saw emotions 
(M = 64.59, SD = 13.15) as slightly more malleable than intelligence (M = 60.10, SD = 
23.93), t(259) = -2.97, p = .003, d = .23, which was also found by Tamir et al. (2007). 
                                                 
2
 Three of the four items from the original scale were among the top-loading items. The exception was 
“Everyone can learn to control his or her emotions,” which loaded at .51. 
3
 In naming the scale, I chose to use the term “mindset,” rather than “implicit theories of emotion,” to 
distinguish it from the original four-item scale used in Tamir et al. (2007), and also to avoid confusion with 
implicit evaluation of emotion regulation (e.g., Mauss, Evers, Wilhelm, & Gross, 2006). Throughout this 
dissertation, I will use the term Emotional Mindset to refer specifically to the scale developed here, and 
implicit theories of emotion to refer to the construct in general. 
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Gender Differences. In sample 2, the mean emotional mindset score for males (n 
= 76) was 63.10 (SD = 13.66), whereas the mean emotional mindset score for females (n 
= 183) was 65.16 (SD = 12.99). This difference was nonsignificant, t(257) = -1.15, p = 
.25. This is similar to implicit theories of intelligence, personality, and morality, which 
typically do not vary by gender (Dweck et al., 1995).  
 
Table 2. Emotional Mindset Scale properties in samples 1 and 2 
 
 Sample 1  Sample 2 
Internal consistency (!)    
   EMS 12-item .89  .85 
   Original 4-item .73   .64 
   Entity 6-item .82  .81 
   Incremental 6-item .82  .76 
   Negative 4-item .78  .68 
   Positive 4-item .73  .64 
    
Subscale Intercorrelations    
   Entity-Incremental -.72  -.58 
   Negative-Positive .68  .65 
    
Mean (SD) 68.40 (16.77)  64.59 (13.15) 
Range 8.33- 100  25-100 
Skew (SE) -.40 (.15)  -.35 (.15) 
    
N 278  262 
 
Test-Retest Reliability. A subset of the participants (n = 66) took the EMS both 
as part of Sample 1 and Sample 2. Participants generally took the questionnaire first at 
the beginning of the term as part of the general survey, and enrolled in the main study 
over the next several weeks. On average, there were 9.38 days (SD = 8.78) between 
sessions, with a range of 0 to 28 days (median = 7.5). Participants who took the 
questionnaire twice on the same day were excluded (remaining n = 53). 
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The short-term test-retest reliability was calculated by correlating participants’ 
scores in the general survey and in Study 1. The test-retest reliability for the 12-item 
EMS was r(51) = .59, p < .001. This is comparable to the original four-item scale, which 
had a test-retest reliability of r(51) = .56, p < .001, in this sample.  This suggests that 
emotional mindset is somewhat stable over time, but not as stable as personality traits 
such as the Big Five or as implicit theories of intelligence (Dweck et al., 1995).  
Personality Traits and Individual Differences 
Correlations between implicit theories and personality traits are presented in 
Table 3. Those who held an incremental theory of emotion were more likely to score 
higher on agreeableness, r(257) = .25, higher on openness, r(257) = .22, and lower on 
neuroticism, r(257) = -.25. An incremental theory had small correlations with 
conscientiousness, r(257) = .20, and extraversion, r(257) = .16. An incremental theory 
was associated with greater optimism, r(183) = .38, but implicit theories of emotion were 
not related to behavioral activation or inhibition. 
Discriminant Validity 
Correlations between implicit theories of emotion and cognitive-affective traits 
are presented in Table 4. As expected, EMS had small positive correlations with implicit 
theories of intelligence, r(257) = .25, and with emotion regulation self-efficacy, r(255) = 
.23. It did not significantly correlate with locus of control, r(73) = .17, although this 
could be due to the low internal reliability of the locus of control scale (! = .35) or to the 
smaller sample size. EMS did not significantly correlate with emotional intensity 
(impulse strength), r(255) = -.05. 
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Table 3. Zero-order and partial correlations between implicit theories of emotion and 
personality traits 
 
   Variable Controlled For 
 N r ITI
 
ERSE
 
LOC
a 
BFI Extraversion 259 .16* .15* .13* .31*** 
BFI Agreeableness 259 .25*** .18** .24*** .22* 
BFI Conscientious. 259 .20** .17** .16** .38*** 
BFI Neuroticism 259 -.25*** -.24*** -.18** -.12 
BFI Openness 259 .22*** .20** .17** .33*** 
BAS Drive 181 .06 .07 .06 – 
BAS Fun-Seeking 181 .11 .10 .09 – 
BAS Reward Resp. 181 .02 .01 .04 – 
BIS Inhibition 181 -.02 -.17* -.12 – 
LOT Optimism 185 .38*** .35*** .35*** – 
Note. Bold numbers significant controlling for family-wise error. ITI = Implicit Theories 
of Intelligence; ERSE = Emotion Regulation Self-Efficacy; LOC = Locus of Control. BFI 
= Big Five Inventory; BAS = Behavioral Activation System; BIS = Behavioral Inhibition 
System; LOT = Life Orientation Test. 
  
a
 BAS and LOT were not measured in the same subsample as locus of control (N = 75).  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
 
Table 4. Zero-order and partial correlations between implicit theories of emotion and 
other cognitive-affective personality variables 
 
   Variable Controlled For 
 N r ITI
 
ERSE
 
LOC
a 
Incremental theory of 
intelligence  
260 .25*** –  .23*** .14 
Emotion regulation 
self-efficacy 
257 .24*** .22*** – .35*** 
Locus of control 75 .17 .13 .18        – 
Impulse strength 255 -.05 -.05 .01 -.07 
Note. Bold numbers significant controlling for family-wise error. ITI = Implicit Theories 
of Intelligence; ERSE = Emotion Regulation Self-Efficacy; LOC = Locus of Control. 
a 
N = 75. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
  
Emotional Experience and Well-Being 
Correlations between implicit theories of emotion and emotional experience are 
presented in Table 5. An incremental theory was associated with more trait positive 
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affect, r(258) = .33, and with most specific positive emotions (amusement, hope, interest, 
joy, love, and pride). An incremental theory was also associated with less negative affect, 
r(258) = -.25. and with most specific negative emotions (anger, anxiety, contempt, 
disgust, embarrassment, fear, loneliness, and sadness).  
Table 5. Zero-order and partial correlations between implicit theories of emotion and trait 
emotional experience 
 
   Variable Controlled For 
 N r ITI
 
ERSE
 
LOC
a 
Positive Emotion 
PANAS  
Positive Affect 
 
260 
 
.33*** 
 
.32*** 
 
.28*** 
 
.42*** 
Amusement 260 .24*** .25*** .21** .23* 
Hope 260 .37*** .36*** .36*** .34** 
Interest  260 .24*** .22*** .19** .21
 
Joy 260 .32*** .30*** .29*** .29* 
Love 260 .23*** .23*** .23*** .21 
Pride  260 .26*** .26*** .23*** .26* 
BEQ Positive 
Expressivity 
255 .16* .11 .15*  .13 
Negative Emotion 
PANAS  
Negative Affect 
 
260 
 
-.25*** 
 
-.22*** 
 
-.19** 
 
-.19 
Anger 260 -.28*** -.26*** -.23*** -.26* 
Anxiety 260 -.23*** -.22*** -.16* -.23* 
Contempt 260 -.23*** -.22*** -.20** -.21 
Disgust 260 -.20** -.20** -.17** -.16 
Embarrassment 260 -.23*** -.22*** -.20** -.22 
Fear 260 -.20** -.18** -.14* -.22 
Guilt 260 -.17** -.14* -.12* -.15 
Loneliness 260 -.25*** -.25*** -.22*** -.22 
Sadness 260 -.32*** -.33*** -.28*** -.31** 
Shame 260 -.17** -.13* -.11 -.13 
BEQ Negative 
Expressivity 
255 -.06 -.09 -.003 -.10 
      
Note. Bold numbers significant controlling for family-wise error. ITI = Implicit theory of 
intelligence; ERSE = Emotion Regulation Self-Efficacy; LOC = Locus of control; 
PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule. BEQ = Berkeley Expressivity 
Questionnaire. 
a
 N = 75. 
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Correlations between implicit theories of emotion and well-being variables are 
presented in Table 6. An incremental theory was associated with greater life satisfaction, 
r(256) = .27, self-esteem, r(258) = .27, environmental mastery, r(183) = .29, and self-
acceptance, r(183) = .22, and with fewer depressive symptoms, r(257) = -.27 and 
perceived stress, r(257) = -.24. EMS was unrelated to emotional expressivity, autonomy, 
personal growth, positive relationships, purpose in life, or symptoms of anxiety, as 
measured by the BAI, although it was related to anxiety as measured as an emotion, and 
to trait neuroticism. 
 
Table 6. Zero-order and partial correlations between implicit theories of emotion and 
well-being variables 
 
   Variable Controlled For 
 N r ITI
 
ERSE
 
LOC
a 
SWLS Life Satis. 258 .27*** .26*** .23*** .42*** 
RSE Self-Esteem 260 .27*** .25** .22** – 
PWB Env. Mastery 185 .29*** .27*** .24** – 
PWB Self-Accept. 185 .22** .21** .20** – 
PWB Pos. Relation. 185 .04 .01 .02 – 
PWB Pers. Growth 185 .03 .00 .02 – 
PWB Purp. in Life 185 .05 .02 .04 – 
PWB Autonomy 185 .11 .11 .09 – 
BAI Anxiety 75 -.03 .00 -.11 .09 
CESD Depression 259 -.27*** -.26*** -.22*** -.18 
PSS Perceived 
Stress 
259 -.24*** -.23*** -.20** -.15 
Note. Bold numbers significant controlling for family-wise error. ITI = Implicit theory of 
intelligence; ERSE = Emotion Regulation Self-Efficacy; LOC = Locus of control; SWLS 
= Satisfaction with Life Scale; RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem; PWB = Psychological 
Well-Being; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; CESD = Center for Epidemiological 
Study—Depression; PSS = Perceived Stress Scale 
a
 RSE and PWB were not measured in the same subsample as locus of control (N = 75).  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
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Emotion Regulation and Coping 
Correlations. Correlations between implicit theories of emotion and emotion 
regulation are presented in Table 7. An incremental theory was associated with greater 
use of cognitive reappraisal, r(258) = .45, attention to mood, r(257) = .22, and repair of 
negative mood, r(257) = .39, and with less use of rumination, r(258) = -.19, and 
avoidance of emotion, r(258) = -.25. EMS was not correlated with expressive suppression 
or approach of emotions. 
 
Table 7. Correlations between implicit theories of emotion and emotion regulation 
 
   Variables Controlled For 
 N r ITI
 
ERSE
 
LOC
a 
ERQ Reappraisal 260 .45*** .43*** .41*** .49*** 
ERQ Suppression 260 -.10 -.08 -.12 -.24* 
TMMS Attention 259 .22*** .18** .24*** .28** 
TMMS Clarity 259 .17** .15* .13* .19 
TMMS Repair 259 .39*** .36*** .36*** .48*** 
RRQ Rumination 260 -.19** -.17** -.13*
 
-.12 
NFA Emotion  
   Approach 
260 .04 .03 .07 .17 
NFA Emotion  
   Avoidance 
260 -.25*** -.21*** -.25*** -.22 
Notes. Bold numbers significant controlling for family-wise error. ITI = Implicit theory 
of intelligence; ERSE = Emotion Regulation Self-Efficacy; LOC = Locus of control; 
ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; TMMS = Trait Meta-Mood Scale; RRQ = 
Reflection and Rumination Questionnaire; NFA = Need for Affect. 
a
 N = 75.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
Correlations between implicit theories of emotion and coping are presented in 
Table 8. An incremental theory of emotion was associated with greater use of acceptance, 
r(183) = .21, active coping, r(183) = .22, planning, r(183) = .21, and positive reframing, 
r(183) = .23, and with less behavioral disengagement, r(183) = -.27, denial, r(183) = -.21, 
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and self-blame, r(183) = -.20. EMS had no significant relationships to seeking emotional 
support, humor, instrumental support, religion, self-distraction, substance use, or venting.  
Empirically Identifying Helpless and Mastery-Oriented Strategies. In addition 
to examining the patterns of correlations with theoretically defined helpless and mastery-
oriented emotion regulation and coping strategies, we can also examine the relationships 
each strategy has with well-being. As an exploratory analysis, I calculated the correlation 
Table 8. Correlations between implicit theories of emotion and coping strategies 
 
  Variables Controlled For 
 r ITI
 
ERSE
 
Positive Reframing .23** .23** .21** 
Active Coping .22** .21** .20** 
Acceptance .21** .21** .19* 
Planning .19* .21** .18* 
Self-Distraction .12 .12 .12 
Emotional Support .10 .11 .12 
Religion .07 .10 .11 
Humor .04 .04 .01 
Instrumental Support .04 .07 .05 
Substance Use -.14 -.08 -.11 
Venting -.16 -.15 -.13 
Denial -.21** -.16* -.17* 
Self-Blame -.20** -.20** -.17* 
Behavioral 
Disengagement 
-.27*** -.23** -.22** 
Notes. N = 185. Bold numbers significant controlling for family-wise error. ITI = Implicit 
theory of intelligence; ERSE = Emotion Regulation Self-Efficacy. Coping and locus of 
control were not measured in the same subsample.  
* p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
between each strategy and its affect balance (positive affect minus negative affect). 
Strategies with positive correlations indicate that the more a person reports using that 
strategy, the more positive their affect balance is (the higher their ratio of positive to 
negative affect). Strategies with negative correlations indicate that the more a person 
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reports using that strategy, the more negative their affect balance is (the smaller their 
ratio of positive to negative affect, or the larger their ratio of negative to positive affect).  
 I then examined how implicit theories of emotion are related to these strategies. 
Figure 3 shows that the stronger a person’s incremental beliefs are, the more likely they 
are to use emotion regulation strategies associated with more positive and less negative 
affect, such as cognitive reappraisal and mood repair, and the less likely they are to rely 
on emotion regulation strategies that are associated with more negative and less positive 
affect, such as rumination and avoidance of emotions. 
 
Figure 3. Relationship between hedonic profile of emotion regulation strategy and 
incremental theory of emotion. 
 
 
Figure 4 shows the same pattern with coping strategies: The stronger a person’s 
incremental beliefs are, the more likely they are to use coping strategies associated with 
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more positive and less negative affect (positive reframing, active coping, and planning) 
and the less likely they are to rely on coping strategies that are associated with more 
negative and less positive affect (behavioral disengagement, self-blame, and denial).  
 
 
Figure 4. Relationship between hedonic profile of coping strategy and incremental theory 
of emotion. 
 
 
Control Analyses 
 
 Unique Associations with Implicit Theories of Emotion. When controlling for 
implicit theories of intelligence, the pattern of correlations was generally the same. 
Although some correlations were reduced in size, all of the significant zero-order 
correlations remained significant (see Tables 4-9). This was also the case when 
controlling for implicit theories of intelligence and emotion regulation self-efficacy. In 
some cases, correlations with implicit theories became nonsignificant when controlling 
for locus of control, including neuroticism, several specific emotions (interest, love, 
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disgust, embarrassment, fear, etc.), depression, perceived stress, trait negative affect, and 
mood clarity, although all of these correlations were in the same direction as the original 
correlation, and may have been significant with a larger sample size. The correlation 
between implicit theories of emotion and BEQ emotional impulse strength was not 
significant, r = .06, p = .40, therefore, I do not report partial correlations controlling for 
emotional intensity. 
Correction for Family-Wise Error. To correct for the number of analyses, the 
family-wise alpha level was set to p < .001. In this case, an incremental theory of emotion 
had significant positive zero-order correlations with agreeableness, conscientiousness, 
optimism, cognitive reappraisal, mood repair, attention to mood, emotion regulation self-
efficacy, positive affect, amusement, hope, interest, joy, love, pride, environmental 
mastery, and self-esteem, as well as implicit theories of intelligence and academic self-
efficacy. An incremental theory of emotion had significant negative correlations with 
neuroticism, behavioral disengagement, avoidance of emotions, perceived stress, 
depression, negative affect, anger, anxiety, contempt, embarrassment, loneliness, and 
sadness. 
Mediation 
Overview of Analyses. I examined two path models in which helpless- and 
mastery-oriented emotion regulation mediated the relationship between implicit theories 
and well-being. In the first model, I examined general approaches to emotion: mood 
repair and avoidance of emotion. In the second model, I examined specific strategies: 
cognitive reappraisal and behavioral disengagement. In both models, all paths were 
included and residuals were allowed to covary. The models were analyzed using MPlus 
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software (Muthén & Muthén, 2009). For both models, I predicted that the relationship 
between implicit theories of emotion and affect would be mediated by emotion 
regulation. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 9.  
 
Table 9.  Descriptive statistics and inter-correlations for variables included in path 
models 
 
Scale Mean (SD) 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Emotional Mindset  64.43 (13.17) .85 .39 -.26 .45 -.26 .32 -.25 
2. Mood Repair 63.44 (16.74)  .80 -.39 .64 -.42 .53 -.42 
3. Emotional Avoidance 38.94 (15.26)   .86 -.32 .43 -.29 .35 
4. Cognitive Reappraisal 63.67 (14.45)    .82 -.26 .56 -.32 
5. Behavioral 
Disengagement 
20.04 (20.87)     .62 -.28 .43 
6. Positive Affect 61.71 (14.19)      .85 -.22 
7. Negative Affect 34.07 (15.39)       .86 
Note. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are reported in bold in diagonal. N = 256 for all 
variables except Behavioral Disengagement (N = 183).  
 
 
 General Approaches. Data were available for 256 participants. EMS predicted 
greater mood repair, ! = .39, t = 6.27, p < .001 and lower emotional avoidance, ! = -.26, t 
= -4.12, p < .001. Mood repair significantly predicted more positive affect, ! = .46, t = 
7.32, p < .001 and less negative affect, ! = -.30, t = -4.52, p < .001. Avoidance of 
emotion predicted more negative affect ! = .22, t = 3.45, p < .001, but was not 
significantly related to positive affect, ! = -.08, t = -1.42, p = .16 (see Figure 5). 
 Bootstrapping analysis was used as a test of mediation, and showed that three of 
the four indirect paths were significant. Specifically, the relationship between implicit 
theories and positive affect was mediated by mood repair, ! = .18 (SE = .03), t = 5.25, p 
< .001, but not by avoidance of emotion, ! = .02 (SE = .02), t = 1.33, p = .18. The 
relationship between implicit theories and negative affect was mediated by both mood 
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repair, ! = -.12 (SE = .03), t = -3.62, p < .001 and avoidance of emotion, ! = -.06 (SE = 
.02), t = -2.57, p = .01. The direct effect of implicit theories of emotion on positive affect 
was significant, ! = .12, t = 2.23, p = .03, but the direct effect on negative affect was not, 
! = -.08, t = 1.47, p = .14. These results indicate that the relationship between implicit 
theories and negative emotion was fully mediated by general approaches to emotion, and 
the relationship between implicit theories and positive emotion was partially mediated by 
mood repair, but not by avoidance of emotion. 
 
 
Figure 5. Path analysis of indirect effects of implicit theories of emotion on positive and 
negative affect by general approaches to emotion. Dashed lines indicate non-significant 
paths. 
 
 
 Specific Strategies. Data were available for 183 participants. The pattern was 
similar to the general model. EMS significantly predicted more cognitive reappraisal, ! = 
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.43, t = 5.68, p < .001 and less behavioral disengagement, ! = -.26, t = -3.74, p < .001. 
Cognitive reappraisal predicted more positive affect, ! = .52, t = 7.52, p < .001 and less 
negative affect, ! = -.20, t = -2.62, p = .01. Behavioral disengagement predicted more 
negative affect, ! = .35, t = 5.27, p < .001, and marginally predicted less positive affect, ! 
= -.14, t = -1.90, p = .06 (see Figure 6).  
 
Figure 6. Path analysis of indirect effects of implicit theories of emotion on positive and 
negative affect by specific emotion regulation strategies. Dashed lines indicate non-
significant paths. 
  
 Bootstrapping analysis was used as a test of mediation, and showed that all of the 
indirect paths were significant or marginally significant. Specifically, the relationship 
between implicit theories and positive affect was mediated by cognitive reappraisal, ! = 
.22 (SE = .04), t = 5.36, p < .001, and was marginally significantly mediated by 
behavioral disengagement, ! = .04 (SE = .02), t = 1.76, p = .08. The relationship between 
implicit theories and negative affect was mediated by cognitive reappraisal, ! = -.09 (SE 
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= .04), t = -2.52, p = .01, and by disengagement, ! = -.09 (SE = .03), t = -3.01, p = .003. 
The direct relationship between implicit theories and positive affect was not significant, ! 
= .01, t = .10, p = .92, nor was the direct relationship between implicit theories and 
negative affect, ! = -.10, t = -1.41, p = .16. This suggests that both relationships were 
fully mediated by emotion regulation.  
Discussion 
 In Study 1, I developed and validated a questionnaire to assess individual 
differences in implicit theories of emotion, expanding on past research by improving 
internal consistency and content validity, by addressing beliefs about both negative and 
positive emotions. Using this scale, I showed that implicit theories of emotion are related 
to, but not redundant with implicit theories of intelligence, locus of control, and emotion 
regulation self-efficacy, and established discriminant validity by showing that for the 
most part, correlations between implicit theories of emotion and personality, emotional 
experience, and emotion regulation are significant even when controlling for these 
conceptually related variables. Implicit theories were unrelated to emotional intensity, 
suggesting that people who believe emotions are uncontrollable are not necessarily the 
ones who experience the strongest emotional impulses.  
 Replicating and extending past research, I showed that incremental theories—
beliefs that emotions are malleable and controllable—are associated with a more positive 
profile of well-being: more positive emotion, less negative emotion, greater life 
satisfaction, higher self-esteem, a greater sense of environmental mastery, and lower 
depression and perceived stress. In addition, incremental theories were associated with 
more adaptive emotion regulation and coping strategies, including mood repair in 
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general, and greater use of cognitive reappraisal, active coping, positive reframing, and 
acceptance; and less maladaptive emotion regulation, including less avoidance of 
emotion, less rumination, behavioral disengagement and denial. This supports the 
hypothesis that incremental theorists are more likely to rely on active, mastery-oriented 
emotion regulation and less likely to rely on passive, helpless-oriented emotion 
regulation. Moreover, the relationship between implicit theories of emotion and 
emotional experience is mediated by use of mastery- and helpless-oriented strategies.  
Self-report data measured at the trait level is useful for finding out how the 
variables covary in real life, and thus has higher external validity than other methods. 
Because of the correlational nature of this data, however, we cannot make any 
conclusions about the causal role of implicit theories of emotion on these outcome 
variables. In analyzing these relationships, I was able to show that relationships between 
implicit theories of emotion and emotion regulation and well-being were not merely due 
to implicit theories in general, locus of control, emotion regulation self-efficacy, or 
emotional intensity. In addition, the mediation model tentatively suggests a causal 
relationship between implicit theories and well-being. A correlational design, however, 
cannot rule out all possible third variables. As a next step, I designed an experimental 
manipulation of implicit theories of emotion, to examine the causal effects of implicit 
theories on emotional experience and emotion regulation. 
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CHAPTER III 
STUDY 2: THE EFFECTS OF IMPLICIT THEORIES ON  
EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCE 
Introduction 
 The purpose of Study 2 was to investigate the effects of implicit theories on 
emotional experience and spontaneous emotion regulation. Individual difference research 
has shown that an incremental theory is associated with a generally positive pattern of 
emotional experience and well-being, and that this is due in part to emotion regulation 
(Study 1; Tamir et al., 2007). The next step was to begin to test the causal relationships 
between implicit theories on the one hand, and emotional experience and emotion 
regulation on the other. 
I first ran a pilot study to develop stimuli that could reliably manipulate implicit 
theories of emotion in a laboratory setting. Past research on implicit theories has used 
versions of popular-press style articles to present evidence as to the nature of personality 
(Dweck et al., 1995a) and morality (Chiu et al., 1997). I adapted such stimuli to present 
evidence of the fixed or malleable nature of emotions, and created two versions of an 
article, one entitled “Emotions are dynamic, changeable processes” (incremental 
condition), and the other entitled “Emotions are fixed, automatic processes” (entity 
condition). Both articles presented anecdotal, developmental, clinical, and brain imaging 
evidence to support the major thesis of the article; the articles were as similar as possible, 
and differed only in the results of the studies described (see Appendices C and D). In 
addition, where possible, evidence presented described real research, although the names 
of the researchers and affiliated institutions were fictionalized. 
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I then tested whether experimentally manipulating implicit theories of emotion 
would cause people to experience an emotional situation in different ways. Participants 
recorded their emotional experience while watching a sad movie scene, and then again 
during a “recovery” movie scene. First, I hypothesized that participants in the incremental 
condition would experience less negative affect during a negative emotional situation, 
compared to those in the entity condition. Second, I hypothesized that participants in the 
incremental condition would experience more favorable affect balance (more positive 
than negative affect) during the recovery period, and would recover more quickly after a 
negative experience than those in the entity condition, as measured by the slope of affect 
during the recovery video. Third, I hypothesized that participants in the incremental 
condition would be more likely to report using emotion regulation, and would report that 
their strategies were more effective, compared to participants in the entity condition. 
Pilot Study 
 The purpose of the pilot study was to develop a method of experimentally 
manipulating implicit theories of emotion. A successful manipulation would produce 
group differences in implicit theories of emotion, but no differences in mood. 
Additionally, the two articles should be rated as equally informative, interesting, and 
persuasive. 
Method 
Data were collected from 59 undergraduate students from the human subject pool. 
Participants signed up for the study online and completed the study in the lab. After 
consenting to participate, participants were randomly assigned to either the entity (N = 
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25) or incremental (N = 34) condition
4
, and read one of two Psychology Today-style 
articles that presented research evidence favoring either an entity or incremental view, 
described above (see Appendices C and D). 
After reading the article, participants rated the extent to which they found the 
article interesting, informative, and persuasive, using a 7-point rating scale from 
“disagree strongly” to “agree strongly.” They then completed the four items from Tamir 
et al.’s (2007) original implicit theories scale, which includes two entity and two 
incremental items, and rated their mood using a single item (“How are you feeling right 
now?”) on a 7-point scale, which ranged from “very negative” to “very positive.”  
Results and Discussion 
All dependent measures were transformed so that they ranged from a possible 0 to 
100. Descriptive and inferential statistics are presented in Table 10. There were no 
differences in how interesting, informative, or persuasive participants in the entity 
condition found the article, compared to those in the incremental condition. There was 
also no difference in participants’ moods: Entity participants (M = 62.00, SD = 22.32) 
and incremental participants (M = 63.13, SD = 18.98) were both, on average, in a slightly 
pleasant mood after reading the article, t(56) = .21, p = .84, d = .05.   
A higher score on the four-item implicit theory of emotion scale indicates a 
stronger incremental theory. Participants in the incremental condition had a significantly 
higher score (M = 66.67, SD = 19.40) than those in the entity condition (M = 49.67, SD = 
                                                 
4
 Differences in sample sizes within the groups were due to true randomization. 
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17.47), indicating that the manipulation of implicit theories was successful, t(56) = 3.45, 
p = .001, d = .92.  
 
Table 10. Manipulation check results in the pilot study 
 
 Condition    
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Interesting 70.67 (20.00) 65.66 (23.55) -.86 .40 -.23 
Informative 80.67 (17.80) 75.76 (17.23) -1.06 .29 -.28 
Persuasive 64.00 (25.31) 62.12 (22.93) -.30 .77 -.09 
Mood 62.00 (22.32) 63.13 (18.98) .21 .84 .05 
Implicit Theory 49.67 (17.47) 66.67 (19.40) 3.45 .001 .92 
N 25 34    
 
Consistent with past research in other domains, implicit theories of emotion can 
be experimentally manipulated, suggesting that implicit theories can exist as an 
individual difference, but can also be shifted temporarily. This is an important step in 
investigating the causal effects of implicit theories on cognition, emotion, and behavior, 
which was a major goal of Studies 2-5. 
Study 2 Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 146 undergraduate students from the University of Oregon 
human subject pool who participated in this study in exchange for credit toward an 
introductory psychology or linguistics class (110 females, 36 males; 81% White, 12% 
Asian-American, 4% Hispanic, 3% other). The average age was 20.83 (SD = 5.24, range 
17 to 49). Participants signed up for the study online, knowing only that it was a two-part 
study (15 minutes online, 45 in the laboratory). Data from four participants were 
excluded because they did not properly use the rating dial in Part 2 (there was no variance 
in online mood ratings), leaving full data for 142 participants. 
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Part 1: Pre-Laboratory Session  
 In a 15-minute online session before reporting to the lab, participants completed a 
series of individual difference measures, including the Berkeley Expressivity 
Questionnaire, the Big Five Inventory, the Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, and a 
Locus of Control measure, as described in Study 1. They also completed the 12-item 
EMS and a four-item measure of implicit theories of intelligence, as well as demographic 
variables. Participants completed Part 1 online at their convenience, but were told that 
they were required to complete it before reporting to the lab, and were encouraged to do 
so as soon as possible. On average, there were 5.90 (SD = 5.06) days between sessions 
(range 0 to 29, with a median of 5.5). 
Part 2: Laboratory Session  
Participants were run up to four at a time. Upon reporting to the laboratory, 
participants read and signed a consent form, and were seated at one of four computers, 
which were spaced so that no participant could see what was on the other screens. They 
were told that the laboratory portion of the study consisted of three parts. In the first part, 
they would read and evaluate an article that included research conducted at the University 
of Oregon. Then, they would watch and rate a series of short videos, after which they 
would complete a recall test about the article they had read.  
Assignment of Condition. Participants were randomly assigned to either an 
entity (n = 65) or incremental condition (n = 77)
5
, and read a printed version of one of the 
                                                 
5
 Differences in group size were due to the randomization process. 
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articles described above. They were also randomly assigned to either the neutral recovery 
condition (n = 67) or the positive recovery condition (n = 75).  
Reading and Manipulation Checks. Participants answered two open-ended 
questions after reading the article: “In 2-3 sentences, please summarize the main points of 
this article.” and “Name three kinds of evidence used to support this main point. In your 
opinion, what is the most compelling evidence presented in this article?” They also rated 
the extent to which they thought the article was interesting, informative, and persuasive, 
on a 1 (“disagree strongly”) to 7 (“agree strongly”) scale. They then completed the four-
item implicit theories of emotion questionnaire (Tamir et al., 2007), and rated their 
current mood from 1 (“very negative”) to 7 (“very positive”).  
 Movie Ratings. Participants were then introduced to the movie-rating task. They 
were told that they would be using their mouse to track their feelings for the entire time 
they watched each video. The rating scale ranged from negative on the left to positive on 
the right, and appeared on the same screen as the video clip, using MediaLab software 
(Jarvis, 2004). Participants wore headphones throughout this process.  
 The first video was a 30-second clip of a screensaver depicting colored lines 
appearing and disappearing.  After the video, participants rated how confident they were 
in being able to rate their feelings while watching the next video, on a scale from 1 (“not 
at all confident”) to 7 (“very confident”). This video was considered a training period, 
and was not included in analyses.  
 The second video was a 3-minute clip from The Champ, depicting a scene in 
which a young boy witnesses the death of his father after a boxing fight. This clip elicits 
sadness in participants (Rottenberg, Ray, & Gross, 2004). Participants rated their feelings 
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during this video using the sliding scale, and afterwards completed a post-video 
questionnaire adapted from Rottenberg et al., (2004). This questionnaire asked them how 
much they felt each of several emotions—including amusement, fear, happiness, interest, 
sadness, and unhappiness—on a 0 (“not at all/none”) to 8 (“extremely/a great deal”).  
Participants then watched either a neutral video or an amusing video as the 
recovery video. The neutral video was a scene from Alaska’s Wild Denali, depicting 
nature scenes of Alaska. The amusing video was a scene from When Harry Met Sally, in 
which the female character pretends to experience an orgasm while in a crowded 
restaurant. Each of these videos was about three minutes long, and elicits neutral or 
mildly pleasant feelings, and amusement, respectively (Rottenberg et al., 2004). 
Participants again rated their feelings during this video using the sliding scale, and 
completed the same questionnaire described above.  
Reading Comprehension and Recall. After rating all of the movies, participants 
answered three open-ended questions, in which they were asked to recall the title, main 
point, and evidence presented in the article they read earlier in the session.  
Self-Reported Emotion Regulation. At the end of the study, but before 
debriefing, participants wrote down what they thought the purpose of the study was, as 
well as whether they engaged in any efforts to change their emotions, and whether those 
efforts were successful. All participants were debriefed by the researcher, who described 
the true purpose of the study, and answered any questions the participants had. 
Participants also received an extended article on the most up-to-date research on the 
malleability of emotions, which provided evidence for both the automaticity and 
flexibility of emotion and emotion regulation, using much of the same research presented 
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in the fictitious articles, but using the researchers’ real names, and providing references 
for further reading. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
Implicit Theories of Emotion. Manipulation check statistics are reported in 
Table 11. All continuous variables were transformed so that they ranged from a possible 
0 to a possible 100. There were no significant differences in how interesting, informative, 
or persuasive participants in the entity condition found the article, compared to those in 
the incremental condition. Entity participants (M = 61.28, SD = 21.87) and incremental 
participants (M = 64.29, SD = 20.00) were both, on average, in a slightly pleasant mood 
after reading the article (before the film clips), but did not differ from each other, t(140) = 
.85 p = .39, d = .14. Participants in the incremental condition  (M = 74.10, SD = 21.38) 
had significantly higher implicit theory scores than those in the entity condition (M = 
49.81, SD = 18.94), indicating that the manipulation of implicit theories was successful, 
t(140) = 7.11 p < .001, d = 1.20.  
 
Table 11. Manipulation check results in Study 2 
 
 Condition    
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Interesting 81.15 (16.55) 79.54 (18.01) -.55 .58 -.09 
Informative 79.23 (19.55) 81.49 (15.92) .76 .45 .13 
Persuasive 66.53 (24.71) 69.48 (20.53) .78 .44 .13 
Mood 61.28 (21.87) 64.29 (20.00) .85 .39 .14 
Implicit Theory 49.81 (18.94) 74.10 (21.38) 7.11 < .001 1.20 
N 65 77    
 
Movie Valence. Criterion variables for the movie valence manipulation check 
were drawn from the post-video questionnaire. Comparison between the negative video 
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and the recovery videos (neutral and positive) was made using paired-sample t-tests. 
Participants who viewed the negative and neutral movies felt significantly more sadness 
after watching the negative video (M = 7.64, SD = 1.43) than after watching the neutral 
video (M = 1.57, SD = 1.38), t(66) = 27.32, p < .001, d = 3.11. Participants who viewed 
the negative and positive movies also felt significantly more sadness after watching the 
negative video (M = 7.68, SD = 1.54) than after watching the positive video (M = 1.28, 
SD = .65), t(73) = 34.86, p < .001,  d = 4.48.  
Independent groups t-tests compared experienced emotions between the two 
recovery conditions. Participants who watched the positive video felt significantly more 
amusement (M = 7.38, SD = 1.68) than those who watched the neutral video (M = 4.93, 
SD = 2.09), t(139) = -7.72, p < .001,  d = 1.30. Participants who watched the neutral 
video also felt marginally more sadness (M = 1.57, SD = 1.17) than those who watched 
the positive video (M = 1.28, SD = .66), t(139) = 1.80, p = .07,  d = .32. Thus, the positive 
video appeared to elicit a more clearly positive emotional experience, compared to the 
neutral video. 
Hypothesis 1: Emotional Experience During the Negative Video 
The first hypothesis was that participants in the incremental condition would 
experience less negative affect than those in the entity condition. This was tested three 
ways. First, I examined whether participants differed on their self-rated experience of 
sadness after the movie. Entity participants (M = 7.62, SD = 1.55) and incremental 
participants (M = 7.84, SD = 1.24) did not differ in their self-reported sadness, t(140) = 
.96, p = .33, d = .16. Second, I examined whether participants differed in their aggregated 
(mean) online affect ratings over the course of the three-minute video. Entity participants 
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(M = -2.25, SD = .91) and incremental participants (M = -2.26, SD = 1.06) did not differ 
in their aggregated mean online ratings during the sad video, t(140) = -.05, p = .96, d = -
.01. These results are reported in Table 12. 
 
Table 12. Emotional experience during negative video 
 
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
      
Self-report sadness 7.62 (1.55) 7.84 (1.24) .96 .33 .16 
Aggregated affect -2.25 (.91) -2.26 (1.06) -.05 .96 -.01 
N 65 77    
 
Third, I examined the slope at which participants declined in affect over the 
course of the video. Affect ratings were grouped into 10-second segments. Affect was 
entered as the dependent variable, using the model below using HLM 7 software 
(Raudenbush, Bryk, & Congdon, 2010). Linear and quadratic effects of time were 
modeled as Level 2 predictors, and implicit theory condition was modeled as a Level 1 
predictor, with the entity condition coded as 0 and the incremental condition coded as 1. 
AFFECT = !0i + !1i(time) + !2i(time
2
) + rij 
 !0i = "00 + "01(theory) + u0i 
 !1i = "10 + "11(theory) + u1i 
 !2i = "20 + "21(theory) + u2i 
There was a significant linear effect of time, such that affect became more 
negative over time, " = -.43 (SE = .03), t(138) = -16.64, p < .001, as well as a significant 
quadratic effect, " = .02 (SE < .00), t(138) = 12.06, p < .001. There was no main effect of 
implicit theory condition, and theory condition did not significantly interact with time 
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(see Table 13 and Figure 7). Thus, the hypothesis that incremental participants would 
experience less negative affect than entity participants was not supported.  
 
Table 13. Fixed and random effects in multi-level modeling (negative video) 
 
Fixed Effects 
 Coefficient SE t 
Intercept  "00 .05 .09 .56 
Linear Effect: Time  "10 -.43 .03 -16.64*** 
Quadratic Effect: Time
2  "20
 .02 .00 12.06***
 
Theory  "01 .00 .12 .03 
Theory*Time "11 -.03 .04 -.77 
Theory*Time
2  "21
 .00 .00 1.33 
 
Random Effects 
 Variance 
Component 
df #2 
Intercept  u0i .42 138 689.86*** 
Linear Effect u1i .04 138 976.74*** 
Quadratic Effect u2i .00 138 904.05*** 
Level 1 rij .17   
*** p < .001. 
 
Figure 7. Average continuous online affect ratings during negative video. 
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Hypothesis 2: Recovery From Negative Affect 
 The second hypothesis was that participants in the incremental condition would 
experience a more favorable affect balance and would recover more quickly during the 
recovery video. This was measured in three ways. First, I examined the self-reported 
sadness and happiness that participants rated after the recovery video. Second, I 
examined the mean aggregated online affect ratings for the recovery videos. Third, I 
examined the slopes of online affect ratings over the course of the video. Analyses were 
conducted separately for the neutral and positive recovery videos. 
Neutral Recovery.  Entity participants and incremental participants did not differ 
in the amount of sadness, happiness, or amusement that they experienced during the 
neutral recovery film, t’s  = -.67 to .44, p’s  > .50. They also did not differ in the mean 
aggregated online ratings, t(65) = -.32, p = .75. These results are reported in Table 14. 
 
Table 14. Emotional experience during neutral video 
 
 Condition    
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Sadness 1.69 (1.26) 1.55 (1.25) -.44 .66 -.11 
Happiness 5.83 (1.77) 6.11 (1.80) .63 .53 .16 
Amusement 4.90 (2.04) 5.24 (2.06) .67 .50 .17 
Aggregated mean 1.29 (1.00) 1.37 (.92) .32 .75 .09 
N 29 38    
 
The same multi-level model described above was used for analyzing the affect 
ratings over time in the neutral video. There was a significant linear effect of time, such 
that positive affect increased over time, " = .16 (SE = .05), t(65) = 3.41, p < .001. The 
quadratic effect was marginally significant, " = -.004 (SE = .002), t(65) = -1.83, p = .07. 
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There was no main effect of implicit theory condition, and theory condition did not 
significantly interact with time (see Table 15 and Figure 8).  
 
Table 15. Fixed and random effects in multi-level modeling (neutral video) 
 
Fixed Effects 
 Coefficient SE t 
Intercept  "00 .35 .14 2.59* 
Linear Effect: Time  "10 .16 .05 3.41** 
Quadratic Effect: Time
2  "20
 -.004 .002 -1.83
† 
Theory  "01 .12 .18 .10 
Theory*Time "11 .01 .06 .09 
Theory*Time
2  "21
 .00 .00 .02 
 
Random Effects 
 Variance 
Component 
df #2 
Intercept  u0i .38 65 231.39*** 
Linear Effect u1i .05 65 406.95*** 
Quadratic Effect u2i .00 65 375.30*** 
Level 1 rij .22   
†
 p < .08. * p < .05. ** p < .01. *** p < .001. 
 
Figure 8. Average continuous online affect ratings during the neutral recovery video. 
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Positive Recovery. Entity participants and incremental participants did not differ 
in the amount of sadness, happiness, or amusement that they experienced during the 
positive recovery film, t’s = -.38 to .93, p’s  > .35. They also did not differ in the mean 
aggregated online ratings, t(73) = -.92, p = .36. These results are reported in Table 16.  
 
Table 16. Emotional experience during positive recovery video 
 
 Condition    
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Sadness 1.25 (.60) 1.31 (.69) .38 .70 .09 
Happiness 6.19 (1.67) 5.82 (1.82) -.93 .35 -.21 
Amusement 7.56 (1.48) 7.49 (1.52) -.20 .84 -.05 
Aggregated mean 1.45 (1.07) 1.22 (1.10) -.92 .36 -.21 
N 36 39    
 
The same multi-level model described above was used for analyzing the positive 
video. There was a significant linear effect of time, such that positive affect increased 
over time, " = .20 (SE = .04), t(71) = 5.01, p < .001, as well as a significant quadratic 
effect, " = -.004 (SE = .002), t(71) = -2.22, p = .03. There was no main effect of implicit 
theory condition, and theory condition did not significantly interact with time (see Table 
17 and Figure 9). Thus, the hypothesis that incremental participants would experience 
more positive affect and would recover more quickly was not supported. 
 
Table 17. Fixed and random effects in multi-level modeling (positive video) 
 
Fixed Effects 
 Coefficient SE t 
Intercept  "00 .22 .13 1.75
† 
Linear Effect: Time  "10 .20 .04 5.01*** 
Quadratic Effect: Time
2  "20
 -.005 .002 -2.22*
 
Theory  "01 .14 .18 .64 
Theory*Time "11 -.02 .05 -.40 
Theory*Time
2  "21
 -.002 .003 -.50 
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Table 17 (continued). Fixed and random effects in multi-level modeling (positive 
video) 
 
Random Effects 
 Variance 
Component 
df #2 
Intercept  u0i .36 71 189.37*** 
Linear Effect u1i .04 71 273.97*** 
Quadratic Effect u2i .00 71 298.35*** 
Level 1 rij .22   
† 
p < .08. * p < .05. *** p < .001. 
 
Figure 9. Average continuous online affect ratings during the positive recovery video. 
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done so, and how successful they thought they were. Trained research assistants coded 
the responses. Emotion regulation was coded as either 1 (yes) or 0 (no). The 
directionality of the emotion regulation attempt (increase or decrease) and the valence of 
the emotions targeted (positive or negative) were also noted. Self-reported success was 
coded as 1 (not successful), 2 (somewhat successful), or 3 (yes, successful). 
 The number of participants in each condition who used emotion regulation is 
reported in Table 18, which includes the specific goals of regulation. A total of 94 
participants reported engaging in some form of emotion regulation. Of these, 41 were in 
the entity condition, and 43 were in the incremental condition. This difference was 
nonsignificant, #2(1) = .05, p = .83. Moreover, participants in the incremental condition 
(M = 2.19, SD = .81) did not rate their emotion regulation as more successful than those 
in the entity condition (M = 1.91, SD = .78), t(70) = 1.46, p = .15, although there was a 
small effect in the hypothesized direction, d = .35. Thus, the hypothesis that participants 
in the incremental condition would be more likely to regulate their emotions was not 
generally supported.  
 
Table 18. Number and percentage of participants reporting use of emotion regulation 
within each group 
 
 Condition 
 Entity Incremental 
 N (%) N (%) 
Neutral recovery   
   Decrease negative  7  (24)  7  (18) 
   Increase negative  10  (42)  8  (21) 
   Increase positive  7  (24)  4  (11) 
   Decrease positive  0  (0)  0  (0) 
   Total emotion regulation  17  (59)  21  (55) 
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Table 18 (continued). Number and percentage of participants reporting use of emotion 
regulation within each group 
 
 Condition 
 Entity Incremental 
 N (%) N (%) 
   
Positive recovery   
   Decrease negative  10  (28)  16  (41) 
   Increase negative  8  (22)  4  (10) 
   Increase positive  4  (11)  2  (5) 
   Decrease positive  0  (0)  3  (8) 
   Total emotion regulation  24  (67)  22  (56) 
   
Total decrease negative  17  (26)  23  (30) 
Total increase negative  18  (28)  12  (16) 
Total increase positive  11  (17)  6  (8) 
Total decrease positive  0  (0)  3  (4) 
Total emotion regulation  41  (63)  43  (56) 
Note. Totals reflect number of individuals who reported regulating emotions, who may 
have had multiple goals. Percentages are presented in parentheses.  
 
Follow-Up Analyses 
 Additional follow-up analyses are presented in Appendix E. I examined 1) the 
peaks and ends of each video to see whether incremental and entity participants differed 
in their most intense affect, and in the affect at the end of each movie, 2) whether 
individual differences in implicit theories of emotion (EMS) predicted any of the 
dependent variables, 3) whether results remained the same when controlling for 
individual differences measured in part 1, and 4) whether those individual differences 
moderated any of the effects. 
Discussion 
This study investigated the effects of beliefs about the malleability of emotions on 
emotional experience and emotion regulation. Specifically, I examined how leading a 
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person to believe emotions are uncontrollable vs. controllable influenced their emotional 
reactions to a sad video, followed by either a neutral (mildly pleasant) video or a positive 
(amusing) video. I had hypothesized that an incremental theory would be associated with 
a more positive affective experience overall, including a more positive affect balance and 
quicker recovery from negative emotion, and that it would also be associated with greater 
emotion regulation. 
These hypotheses were not supported. Participants in the entity and incremental 
conditions did not differ in their experience of negative affect during the sad video, as 
measured by aggregated mean affect ratings during the movie, the slope at which affect 
decreased over time, or global self-report after the movie. They also did not differ in their 
experience of affect during either the neutral or the amusing recovery video. Finally, 
participants in the entity and incremental conditions did not differ in their self-reported 
use of emotion regulation during these emotion-eliciting videos.  
In examining open-ended reports of emotion regulation after the fact, it appears 
that participants varied in what they were attempting to do and feel within the situation, 
and that these goals did not differ systematically between entity and incremental groups. 
Explicitly, participants were asked to rate their emotions while watching video clips, but 
many people had individual goals within the situation as well. Several participants 
mentioned up-regulating negative emotions because they felt they were supposed to feel 
more sadness in response to the boy’s grief at his father’s death (responding to task 
demands). Others mentioned down-regulating negative emotions because they did not 
want to show sadness in the presence of a researcher (social goals), or because they did 
not want to feel sad for personal reasons (hedonistic goals). This does not entirely explain 
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why there were equal numbers of attempts in entity and incremental conditions, but it 
does suggest that the effects of implicit theories of emotion might depend on clear 
contextual demands. This issue will be addressed in Study 3 by providing participants 
with an explicit goal. 
It is also possible that methodological choices or limitations contributed to the 
failure to detect differences between the groups. For example, several participants 
discussed idiosyncratic responses to the videos that influenced either their emotional 
experience, their emotion regulation, or both (e.g., a few participants grew up in Alaska 
and had strong positive reactions to the Denali video, several participants reported feeling 
embarrassment in response to the orgasm scene from When Harry Met Sally, and some 
participants brought up the recent death of a family member when discussing The 
Champ).  
Study 3 was designed to explicitly investigate emotion regulation, and therefore 
addressed several of these limitations. First, participants rated a range of stimuli, which 
would help reduce the influence of idiosyncratic responses to any particular stimulus. 
Second, in Study 3, the situational goals were more explicit. Rather than investigating 
spontaneous emotion regulation, as I did in Study 2, I asked participants to try to remain 
objective while rating emotion-eliciting images, and also while attending to them and 
feeling their emotions naturally. This within-subjects contrast could help us understand 
how implicit theories of emotion interact with situational characteristics.  
Study 2 suggests that people who have read evidence for emotion malleability are 
not any more likely than those who have read evidence for emotional uncontrollability to 
engage in spontaneous emotion regulation. When faced with a demanding situation in 
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which the goals are clear, however, incremental participants might be more likely to 
attempt to change their emotions to be in line with the situational demands, because they 
believe their emotions are changeable. On the other hand, entity participants might be 
less likely to try to change their emotions, because they believe they are helpless to 
change them. These hypotheses were examined in Study 3. 
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CHAPTER IV 
STUDY 3: THE EFFECTS OF IMPLICIT THEORIES ON EMOTION REGULATION 
Introduction 
 The purpose of Study 3 was to examine the effects of implicit theories of emotion 
on emotion regulation. The main question was whether those individuals with an 
incremental theory are more likely to use emotion regulation, compared to those with an 
entity theory. In Study 1, I found that trait incremental beliefs are associated with greater 
use of effective emotion regulation strategies, and greater cognitive reappraisal in 
particular (see also Tamir et al., 2007). This may be because an incremental theory 
encourages the use of active emotion regulation strategies; if a person believes that 
emotions are changeable, they will be more likely to try to change them when necessary. 
However, it could also be that individuals who engage in effective regulation strategies 
develop an incremental theory over time. To test whether implicit theories of emotion 
cause differences in emotion regulation, I experimentally manipulated implicit theories of 
emotion and emotion regulation goals. 
 Study 2 failed to find a difference between entity and incremental participants in 
spontaneous emotion regulation during an emotion-eliciting task. Post-experimental 
feedback from participants suggested that this was due at least in part to the fact that 
participants in both conditions had diverse emotion-related goals regarding the situation: 
some to up-regulate and some to down-regulate, whereas others did not attempt to change 
their emotions at all. Therefore, in Study 3, I sought to provide a context in which the 
goal was explicit, and emotion regulation would aid them in the goal.  
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In this study, participants rated emotionally positive, negative, and neutral 
pictures while either attending naturally to the pictures or attempting to remain objective 
(manipulated within subjects in a counter-balanced order). Study 2 suggested that implicit 
theories of emotion might not influence emotional experience when people are able to 
experience their emotions naturally. I predict, however, that those who believe emotions 
are malleable and controllable should be more likely to try to influence their own 
emotions when the situation calls for it. On the other hand, I predict that those who 
believe emotions are uncontrollable will have similar emotional experiences across 
conditions, regardless of whether they are expected to regulate their emotions or not. The 
major hypothesis of this study was that when viewing emotionally valenced pictures 
(positive or negative), those in the incremental condition would experience more neutral 
affect in the reappraise (remain objective) condition compared to the attend (watch 
naturally) condition, whereas those in the entity condition would experience similar affect 
in both conditions, regardless of situational cues to regulate.  
Method 
Participants 
 Participants were 94 undergraduate students (58 female, 36 male; 87.2% 
Caucasian, 6.4% Black/African-American, 11.7% Asian/Asian-American, 5% other) 
from the University of Oregon human subject pool who participated in exchange for 
credit toward an introductory psychology or linguistics class. The average age was 19.98 
(SD = 2.93, range 18 to 42). Participants signed up for the study online, knowing only 
that it was a two-part study (15 minutes online, 45 in the laboratory). Before coming into 
 72 
the lab, participants completed the same individual difference measures as in Study 2. On 
average, there were 2.9 days between sessions (range: 0 to 12, median 2 days). 
Procedure 
 Participants were run up to four at a time. Upon reporting to the laboratory, 
participants read and signed a consent form, and were seated at one of four computers, 
which were spaced so that no participant could see what was on the other screens. They 
were told that the laboratory portion of the study consisted of three parts. In the first part, 
they would read and evaluate an article that included research conducted at the University 
of Oregon. Then, they would rate a series of pictures, after which they would complete a 
recall test about the article they had read.  
Assignment of Condition. Participants were randomly assigned to either an 
entity (n = 48) or incremental (n = 45) condition. The manipulation of implicit theories 
and the reading and manipulation checks were the same as in Study 2.   
Picture Ratings. Each participant saw both attend and reappraise conditions; 
order was counterbalanced between participants. In the attend condition, participants 
were instructed to “please attend carefully to each picture and rate how each picture 
makes you feel as you look at it.” In the reappraise block, they were instructed to  
Try to increase your sense of objective distance, viewing pictured events from a 
detached, third-person perspective, as if you were a medical professional, 
historian, or journalist. For example, you may do this by imagining the scenes as 
less personally relevant, as unreal, or as physically farther away from yourself. 
Use the strategy you find most personally effective in maintaining objectivity. 
 
 These instructions were adapted from Ochsner, Ray, Cooper, Robertson, Chopra, 
Gabrieli, & Gross (2002), and were phrased to avoid direct references to emotion, and 
instead focused on cognitive control with emotional implications.  
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Within each block, participants were presented with 375 x 500 pixel images using 
MediaLab software (Jarvis, 2004). The first sentence of the attend or reappraise 
instructions were repeated above each picture, and below, participants were presented 
with the question “How does this picture make you feel?” Responses ranged from 1 “very 
negative” to 7 “very positive.” Within each block, there were 15 positive, 15 neutral, 15 
and negative pictures, for a total of 90 pictures, presented in a randomized order. Pictures 
were chosen from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & 
Cuthbert, 1995), which has pre-established norms for valence. Positive pictures had 
ratings above 7 on the 8-point scale, negative pictures had ratings below 2, and neutral 
pictures had ratings between 4 and 5. 
Reading Comprehension and Recall. Reading comprehension and recall 
questions were the same as in Study 2. After they were done, participants were debriefed 
by the researcher as in Study 2. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
There were no significant differences in how interesting, informative, or 
persuasive participants in the entity condition found the article, compared to those in the 
incremental condition (see Table 19). There was also no difference in participants’ 
moods: Entity participants (M = 68.06, SD = 17.81) and incremental participants (M = 
69.63, SD = 20.81) were both, on average, in a slightly pleasant mood after reading the 
article, t(91) = .39, p = .70, d = .08. Participants in the incremental condition (M = 74.81, 
SD = 15.46) had significantly higher scores on the implicit theories of emotion measure 
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than those in the entity condition (M = 51.04, SD = 19.83), indicating that the 
manipulation of implicit theories was successful, t(91) = 6.42, p < .001, d = 1.34.  
 
Table 19. Manipulation check results in Study 3 
 
 Condition    
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Interesting 78.47 (11.89) 72.96  (20.50) -1.60 .11 -.33 
Informative 77.08 (15.61) 78.52 (13.11) .48 .63 .10 
Persuasive 66.31 (19.50) 71.11 (16.82) 1.26 .21 .26 
Mood 68.06 (17.81) 69.63 (20.81) .39 .70 .08 
Implicit Theory 51.04 (19.83) 74.81 (15.46) 6.42 <.001 1.34 
N 48 45    
 
Main Analyses 
Affect ratings were recoded so that they ranged from a possible 0 to a possible 
100, with a higher number indicated more positive emotion, and 50 as the mid-point, 
indicating neutral affect. Implicit theory (entity, incremental) was entered as a between-
subjects variable into a repeated measures ANOVA; emotion regulation instructions 
(attend, reappraise) and picture block valence (negative, neutral, positive) were entered as 
within-subjects variables. Means and standard deviations for each of the groups are 
presented in Table 20. 
As expected, the main effect of valence was significant, F(2,182) = 1004.07, p < 
.001. Simple contrasts showed that positive pictures (M = 74.93, SD = 8.60) were rated as 
more positive than neutral pictures (M = 53.22, SD = 4.85), F(1,92) = 733.64, p < .001. 
Negative pictures (M = 20.32, SD = 9.06) were rated as more negative than neutral 
pictures, F(1,92) = 925.17, p < .001. This suggests that the stimuli elicited the emotions 
that they were intended to elicit.  
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Table 20. Descriptive statistics for picture ratings 
 
  Picture Valence  
  Negative Neutral Positive Total 
Incremental  Att. 16.47 (7.57) 52.31 (5.45) 76.75 (8.80) 48.51 (3.94) 
  Rea. 22.99 (13.35) 55.65 (6.47) 73.91 (11.87) 50.85 (5.32) 
  Total 20.88 (9.83) 53.98 (4.77) 75.33 (8.68) 49.68 (3.91) 
      
Entity  Att. 18.97 (8.96) 52.18 (5.86) 76.23 (8.48) 49.13 (4.02) 
  Rea. 22.76 (12.73) 52.82 (6.47) 72.87 (11.44) 49.49 (3.78) 
  Total 20.88 (9.83) 52.50 (4.86) 75.33 (8.60) 49.31 (3.43) 
      
Total  Att. 17.77 (8.37) 52.24 (5.61) 76.48 (8.59) 48.83 (3.94) 
  Rea. 22.87 (12.97) 54.19 (6.10) 73.37 (11.60) 50.14 (4.61) 
  Total 20.32 (9.06) 53.22 (4.85) 74.93 (8.60) 49.49 (3.65) 
Note. Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. Att. = Attend condition; Rea. = 
Reappraise condition 
 
 
There was also a significant main effect of emotion regulation instructions: 
Pictures were rated slightly more negative in the attend condition (M = 48.83, SD = 4.02) 
than in the reappraise condition (M = 50.14, SD = 4.61), F(1,91) = 8.65, p = .004. This 
was qualified by a significant interaction between valence and instruction, however, 
F(2,91) = 12.68, p < .001. Specifically, participants rated negative pictures more 
negatively in the attend condition, and positive pictures more positively in the attend 
condition, compared to the reappraise condition, whereas the difference between attend 
and reappraise was smaller in the neutral condition (see Figure 10). 
The main effect of implicit theory was nonsignificant, as was the two-way 
interaction between valence and theory. In other words, collapsing across valence and 
instruction, there were no overall differences in picture ratings between entity (M = 
49.31, SD = 3.43) and incremental participants (M = 49.68, SD = 3.91), F(1,91) = .24, p = 
.63.  
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Figure 10. Interaction between valence and instruction 
 
 
The major hypothesis of this study was that there would be an interaction between 
implicit theory and emotion regulation, such that emotion regulation instructions would 
only influence ratings of emotional pictures when participants held incremental beliefs. 
The two-way interaction between implicit theory and emotion regulation instructions was 
significant, F(1,91) = 4.73, p = .03. There was a larger difference between attend and 
reappraisal instructions for participants in the incremental condition, compared to those in 
the entity condition (see Figure 11). Thus, the main hypothesis was supported. The three-
way interaction between theory, instructions, and valence was nonsignificant, indicating 
that this effect did not differ among negative, neutral, and positive pictures. 
0!
10!
20!
30!
40!
50!
60!
70!
80!
90!
Negative! Neutral! Positive!
A
ff
ec
t 
R
a
ti
n
g
!
Picture Valence!
Attend!
Reappraise!
 77 
 
Figure 11. Interaction between implicit theory of emotion and regulation instructions 
 
 
Follow-Up Analyses 
 Additional follow-up analyses are presented in Appendix F. I examined 1) 
correlations between affect ratings in the reappraise and attend conditions for incremental 
and entity participants, 2) whether individual differences in implicit theories of emotion 
(EMS) predicted any of the dependent variables, 3) whether results remained the same 
when controlling for individual differences measured in Part 1, and 4) whether those 
individual differences moderated any of the effects. In addition, I present figures 
depicting the nonsignificant three-way interaction (theory x instruction x valence). 
Discussion 
 Two major differences distinguished Studies 2 and 3. First, participants rated a 
range of stimuli, rather than single videos. Although this sacrificed the ability to examine 
continuous online emotional experience, this design was less likely to produce 
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idiosyncratic responses to emotion-eliciting stimuli. The second major difference was 
that Study 3 introduced explicit instructions and a goal within the situation, rather than 
assessing inferred and unprompted emotion regulation.  
The purpose of Study 3 was to investigate the effects of implicit theories of 
emotion on emotion regulation in a context with a specific goal. In this case, participants 
were asked to try to remain objective while rating emotionally evocative pictures. I 
hypothesized that participants in the incremental condition, who read evidence that 
emotions are malleable, would be more likely to engage in emotion regulation and would 
rate the pictures as more neutral, compared to participants in the entity condition, who 
read evidence that emotions are unchangeable. This hypothesis was generally supported: 
There was a smaller difference in the ratings of positive and negative pictures for those in 
the incremental condition than those in the entity condition (Figure 11). In other words, 
incremental participants rated emotionally evocative pictures as more neutral than did 
entity participants.  
 Study 1 showed that individual differences in implicit theories of emotion are 
related to emotion regulation and emotional well-being. In general, incremental theories 
of emotion are associated with more adaptive forms of emotion regulation, such as 
cognitive reappraisal, which was the emotion regulation strategy suggested to participants 
in this study. Both the experimental and trait findings are consistent with the implicit 
theory model, in which incremental theorists respond to challenges with a mastery pattern 
of behavior, and entity theorists respond to challenges with a helpless pattern. Studies 4 
and 5 test this model more explicitly.  
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CHAPTER V 
STUDY 4: THE EFFECTS OF IMPLICIT THEORIES ON RESPONSES  
TO EMOTION REGULATION FAILURE 
Introduction 
The purpose of Study 4 was to examine the effects of implicit theories of emotion 
on emotional experience and motivation in the face of challenge. In other domains, entity 
theories predict helpless patterns of response to challenge, in which a person makes 
maladaptive attributions for their failure (i.e., to uncontrollable factors), experiences more 
negative affect upon confronting obstacles or failure, avoids further challenge, withdraws 
effort, and ultimately declines in performance. In contrast, incremental theories predict 
mastery patterns of response to challenges, in which a person makes adaptive attributions 
for their failure (i.e., to controllable factors), maintains interest and determination, 
perseveres through increased effort, and ultimately improves in performance (Blackwell 
et al., 2007; Diener & Dweck, 1978; Hong et al., 1999; Robins & Pals, 2002). Such 
patterns of cognition, affect, and motivation can determine whether a person’s skills 
improve or stagnate. If this holds in the domain of emotion, helpless and mastery patterns 
of emotion regulation may explain why some people are able to regulate their emotions 
successfully, whereas others fail or do not attempt to do so in the first place.   
Helpless- and Mastery-Oriented Patterns 
Attributions. In the domain of intelligence, entity theorists are more likely to 
interpret processes and outcomes in a way that promotes helplessness, whereas 
incremental theorists are more likely to interpret processes and outcomes in a way that 
promotes mastery, a pattern found in middle school children (Blackwell et al., 2007) and 
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in college students (Hong et al., 1999; Robins & Pals, 2002). For example, incremental 
theorists are more likely than entity theorists to attribute academic failures to lack of 
effort (Hong et al., 1999), more likely to believe that exerting effort is a normal part of 
goal striving, and more likely to believe that increasing effort will help them achieve their 
goals (Blackwell et al., 2007). In contrast, entity theorists are less likely to attribute 
failure to effort (Hong et al., 1999), and more likely to believe effort indicates low ability 
(Blackwell et al., 2007). For entity theorists, if you are trying hard, you must not be good 
at it, a belief that discourages effort and promotes helpless behavior (Hong et al., 1999).  
Affect. Upon confronting challenge, entity intelligence theorists are more likely to 
experience negative affect such as frustration, disappointment, and distress (Blackwell et 
al., 2007), compared to incremental theorists. This is in part because they believe that 
effort and failure indicate low global ability, which they believe they cannot improve; this 
information threatens their self-esteem (Robins & Pals, 2002). In contrast, incremental 
theorists are less likely to experience negative affect, in part because they believe that 
effort and failure indicate only low current ability, insufficient effort, or ineffective 
strategies. These attributions do not threaten self-esteem, and so are not likely to produce 
as much negative affect (see also Dweck, 1999). Dweck reports that some young 
incremental intelligence theorists have in fact responded to obstacles with positive affect 
(Dweck & Leggett, 1988), and so might experience greater positive affect in the form of 
determination, interest, and excitement.   
Motivation. Behavioral response to challenge is the central feature of helpless 
and mastery patterns. When encountering difficulty, entity intelligence theorists are more 
likely to withdraw from a task and decrease effort, whereas incremental theorists are 
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more likely to remain engaged and sometimes increase effort (Blackwell et al., 2007; 
Dweck & Leggett, 1988). A helpless reaction may take the form of losing interest in the 
task, continuing to use maladaptive strategies (Dweck, 1999), or declining an opportunity 
for remedial action (Hong et al., 1999). A mastery-oriented reaction could involve 
maintaining interest, switching to a new strategy (Dweck, 1999), or taking advantage of 
an opportunity for improvement (Hong et al., 1999).  
Mastery and Helplessness in Emotion Regulation 
Does the same pattern of cognition, affect, and motivation found in entity and 
incremental intelligence theorists translate to the domain of emotions? Study 4 was 
adapted from the paradigm described by Hong et al. (1999), who examined the 
relationship between implicit theories of intelligence (measured and manipulated), 
attributions for failure, and coping behavior. Specifically, they gave entity and 
incremental intelligence theorists a cognitive task and then presented them with 
standardized low scores. They measured attributions for failure (Studies 1 and 3), and 
their preferences for remedial action (Studies 2 and 3). In these studies, incremental 
theorists were more likely to attribute their failures to insufficient effort, compared to 
entity theorists, and were more likely to choose to try to improve their scores.  
In the current study, participants were introduced to an “emotional interference” 
task, in which emotional stimuli would interfere with their performance on the task. They 
were then given standardized, negative feedback indicating that their performance was 
inadequate, after which they rated their attributions for their performance, their negative 
and positive affect, and their motivation to engage in a tutorial to improve their 
performance or to engage in an unrelated task. My hypotheses were derived from Dweck 
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and Leggett’s (1988) theoretical description of helpless and mastery patterns, from Hong 
et al.’s (1999) findings, as well as from the empirical model tested by Robins and Pals 
(2002), who found that college students with entity and incremental theories of 
intelligence differed in cognitive, affective, and motivational reactions after encountering 
academic obstacles. 
Attributions. In the emotional domain, people can attribute emotion regulation 
difficulty to a number of factors. As in the achievement domain, they could attribute 
emotion regulation failure to a lack of emotion regulation ability, or to insufficient effort. 
They could also blame emotion regulation difficulty on the strength of the emotional 
impulses (e.g., “My emotions are just too strong”), or to features of the particular 
situation (e.g., the strength of the emotion-evoking stimuli, the instructions for a task).  
To evaluate cognitive reactions to emotional challenge, I assessed attributions that 
participants made for their performance—the extent to which they believed their 
performance was due to ability, effort, strategy, and a variety of other controllable and 
uncontrollable factors. I predicted that because they believe emotions are changeable, 
incremental emotion theorists would be more likely to attribute emotion regulation 
difficulty to controllable factors, such as effort and strategy choice. In contrast, I 
predicted that because they believe emotions are unchangeable, participants in the entity 
condition would be more likely to attribute emotion regulation difficulty to 
uncontrollable factors, such as the strength of the emotional impulse. It is also possible 
that participants in the entity condition would be more likely to “explain away” their 
failures, indicating their interest in the task or their current mood as reasons for their 
difficulty (e.g., Dweck, 1999).    
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Affect.  In the domain of emotion, strong emotions and difficulty regulating 
emotion threaten well-being for entity theorists, but not necessarily for incremental 
theorists. Harmon-Jones and colleagues (2011) found that the more people wanted to 
avoid withdrawal emotions (disgust and fear), the more intensely they experienced them. 
I have found that an entity theory of emotion is associated with greater avoidance of 
emotion overall (Study 1), which may be associated with greater reactivity to particularly 
stressing negative situations. To assess affective reactions to emotional challenge, I 
measured participants’ affect in response to this failure. I hypothesized that those in the 
entity condition would report feeling more negative affect after receiving failure 
feedback, compared to those in the incremental condition. It is also possible that those in 
the incremental condition would report feeling more positive affect, in the form of 
interest and determination, compared to entity participants (Dweck & Leggett, 1988).  
Motivation. To assess motivation following emotion regulation failure, I 
measured participants’ preference for remedial action (adapted from Hong et al. 1999). 
Participants were given the choice between taking a tutorial that would give them 
feedback about their performance and techniques on the emotional interference task, or 
completing an equivalent but unrelated, unemotional task (a reading comprehension 
tutorial), allowing them to withdraw from the emotional situation. I hypothesized that 
participants in the incremental condition would be more likely to choose the remedial 
course of action (emotion regulation tutorial), compared to those in the entity condition, 
who would be more likely to choose the unrelated reading comprehension tutorial. 
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Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were 92 undergraduate students (67 female, 25 male; 81.5% 
Caucasian, 2.2% Black/African-American, 12.0% Asian/Asian-American, 12.0% 7.6% 
other) from the University of Oregon human subject pool who participated in this study 
in exchange for credit toward an introductory psychology or linguistics class. The 
average age was 19.41 (SD = 1.21, range 18 to 22). Participants signed up for the study 
online, knowing only that it was a two-part study (15 minutes online, 45 in the 
laboratory). Before coming into the lab, participants completed the same individual 
difference measures as in Studies 2 and 3. On average, there were 2.95 days between 
sessions (range: 0 to 13). 
Procedure 
Participants were run up to four at a time. Upon reporting to the laboratory, 
participants read and signed a consent form, and were seated at one of four computers, 
which were spaced so that no participant could see what was on the other screens. They 
were told that the laboratory portion of the study consisted of three parts. In the first part, 
they would read and evaluate an article that presented research conducted at the 
University of Oregon. Then, they would engage in an unrelated attention control task, 
which helped us establish stimuli for future research, after which they would complete a 
recall test about the article they had read.  
Assignment to Condition. Participants were randomly assigned to either an 
entity (n = 48) or incremental (n = 44) condition. Manipulation of implicit theories of 
emotion, and reading and manipulation checks were the same as in Studies 2 and 3. 
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Dot-Probe Task. After completing the manipulation check, participants were told 
that they would be engaging in an unrelated task, designed to measure “emotional 
interference.” This task was a dot-probe task (also known as an attention probe task), in 
which two pictures (either two emotionally neutral images, or one emotional image and 
one emotionally neutral image) appear on screen. Images were chosen from the 
International Affective Picture System (IAPS; Lang et al., 1995), selected on the same 
basis as in Study 3. Participants were told,  
This task measures emotional interference- the degree to which emotions 
interfere with your performance. Some of the pictures will have emotional 
content that will automatically capture your attention. You will need to ignore 
the emotional content and focus on identifying the location of the dot. The 
better able to control your emotions, the better you will do on this task. 
 
In each trial, a fixation cross was presented for 500 ms, followed by a stimulus 
pair displayed for 1000 ms, followed immediately by the presentation of a dot probe 
behind one of the two pictures for 100 ms. These presentation times were in part based on 
past research using this paradigm, and in part on pre-testing, which indicated that a longer 
presentation of the dot probe did not present enough of a perceived challenge for 
participants. Participants were instructed to press “k” when the dot appeared on the right, 
and “d” when the dot appeared on the left. Colored stickers were placed on the keys for 
reminders. The screen remained blank until the participant pressed the correct key, after 
which the next trial began. If a participant pressed the wrong key, an “X” would appear 
and they would need to press the other key. The computer recorded reaction times for 
each trial and the number of errors participants made.  
Participants saw one hundred thirty-five pairs of pictures, presented one pair at a 
time on a horizontal axis on the computer screen using Direct RT software (Jarvis, 2008). 
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Images were presented in a block design, with 15 picture pairs per block. Nine blocks 
were presented, alternating neutral/neutral, neutral/negative, and neutral/positive pairs of 
images. For all blocks, placement of the dot was such that it appeared equally as often on 
the right and on the left. For blocks containing emotional stimuli, the dot appeared 
equally as often behind the emotional stimulus (congruent trials) and behind the neutral 
stimulus (incongruent trials), and the placement of neutral and emotional stimuli were 
randomly assigned. 
Failure Feedback. When participants finished the dot probe task, the computer 
prompted them to raise their hands. As they finished, the researcher led them individually 
into a second room, where a second experimenter waited with a handout that provided 
them with performance feedback (Appendix G). All participants received feedback that 
they had done relatively poorly: “You scored in the 27
th
 percentile of all the people who 
have completed this task, which means that your emotional interference score is 
relatively high.” The complete feedback script is available in Appendix H. 
 Participants then completed a final series of tasks, in which they rated their 
attributions for their performance, their current affect, and indicated how much they were 
interested in one of two tasks: one designed to measure engagement and perseverance 
with the current task, and one designed to measure withdrawal. Finally, they completed a 
recall test of the article that they read in the first part of the study, as described in Studies 
2 and 3.  
Attributions. On the computer, participants were instructed to “rate the extent to 
which each of the following factors influenced your performance” on a scale from 1 (very 
slightly or not at all) to 5 (very much). Attributions included “my ability,” “my effort,” 
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“my mood,” “my interest in the task,” “my concentration,” “the strategy I used,” “my 
familiarity or unfamiliarity with the task,” “the difficulty of the task,” “luck,” and “my 
understanding of the instructions.”  
Affect. Participants were instructed to “indicate to what extent you feel this way 
right now” on a scale ranging from 1 (very slightly or not at all) to 5 (extremely) on the 
Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). 
Positive affect words included interested, excited, strong, enthusiastic, proud, alert, 
inspired, determined, attentive, and active. Negative affect words included distressed, 
upset, guilty, scared, hostile, bored, irritable, ashamed, nervous, jittery, afraid, and 
disappointed. 
Motivation. Participants were then told, “In the time remaining, you can choose 
between the following activities that will help us develop materials for future research. 
Please tell us how interested you are in each of the tasks, and then choose one.” 
Participants rated how interested they were in one tutorial that had been shown to 
improve performance on the emotional interference task they had just completed, and 
how interested they were in another tutorial that had been shown to improve performance 
on reading comprehension, on a scale from 1 (not at all) to 5 (extremely). They were then 
asked to choose only one of the tutorials to complete. 
Debriefing. Participants did not complete the tutorial, but were instead debriefed 
as in Studies 2 and 3. In addition, they were told that the feedback that they received 
regarding their performance on the emotional interference task did not reflect their actual 
performance, but was identical for each participant.  
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Results 
Manipulation Checks 
There were no significant differences in how interesting or informative 
participants in the entity condition found the article, compared to those in the incremental 
condition (see Table 21). There was also no difference in participants’ moods: entity 
participants (M = 93.75, SD = 27.72) and incremental participants (M = 94.89, SD = 
33.05) were both, on average, in a pleasant mood after reading the article, t(90) = .15, p = 
.88, d = .04. Participants in the entity condition had a significantly lower implicit theory 
score (M = 48.36, SD = 24.04) than those in the incremental condition (M = 80.38, SD = 
12.00), indicating that the manipulation of implicit theories was successful, t(86) = 7.85, 
p < .001, d = 1.69. In this sample, participants in the entity condition rated the article as 
less persuasive (M = 62.50, SD = 20.24) than participants in the incremental condition (M 
= 72.62, SD = 23.30), t(86) = 2.18, p = .03, d = .40
6
. 
 
Table 21. Manipulation check results in Study 4 
 
 Condition    
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Interesting 74.46 (21.40) 80.36 (20.31) 1.32 .19 .28 
Informative 79.35 (15.19) 82.14 (22.28) .69 .49 .14 
Persuasive 62.50 (20.24) 72.62 (23.30) 2.18 .03 .40 
Mood 93.75 (27.72) 94.89 (33.05) .15 .88 .04 
Implicit Theory 48.36 (24.04) 80.38 (12.00) 7.85 < .001 1.69 
N 48 44    
 
 
 
                                                 
6
 Entering persuasiveness as a covariate did not change the significance levels of the findings reported 
below. Analyses controlling for persuasiveness in Appendix I. 
 89 
Hypothesis Testing 
All continuous rating scores (except reaction times) were transformed so that they 
ranged from a possible 0 to a possible 100 scale. Means and standard deviations for each 
of the groups are presented in Table 22.  
Table 22. Descriptive and inferential statistics for dependent variables (Study 4) 
 
 Condition    
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Attributions      
   Ability 30.73 (27.89) 44.19 (27.73) 2.30* .02 .48 
   Effort 32.29 (29.15) 43.60 (30.42) 1.81
† 
.07 .38 
   Mood 38.07 (28.27) 38.02 (30.94) .01 .99 .00 
   Interest 41.15 (26.03) 45.93 (25.55) .88 .38 .18 
   Concentration 53.13 (29.90) 62.21 (28.02) 1.49 .14 .31 
   Strategy 33.85 (31.15) 47.67 (30.28) 2.14* .04 .46 
   Familiarity 28.65 (27.28) 38.37 (31.50) 1.58 .12 .32 
   Task difficulty 21.86 (25.59) 22.67 (27.06) .15 .88 .03 
   Luck 8.85 (14.11) 8.14 (17.86) -.21 .83 -.03 
   Instructions 29.17 (26.96) 30.23 (35.17) .16 .87 .03 
Affect      
   Positive 25.83 (15.91) 30.40 (18.46) 1.27 .21 .27 
   Negative 9.69 (7.80) 9.59 (8.71) -.06 .96 -.01 
Motivation      
   Interest in emotion 
tutorial 
44.79 (24.17) 50.00 (28.53) .95 .35 .20 
   Interest in other task 29.69 (26.12) 47.09 (29.48) 2.99* <.01 .62 
   Preference for  
       emotion over  
       unrelated task 
15.10 (29.51) 2.33 (33.99) -1.92
† 
.06 -.40 
N 48 44    
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
† 
p < .08.
 
* p < .05. 
 
 
Attributions. The first hypothesis predicted that participants in the incremental 
condition would attribute failure to more controllable factors (i.e., effort, familiarity, 
strategy, and concentration), compared to those in the entity condition, who would 
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attribute failure to more uncontrollable factors (i.e., mood, luck, misunderstanding the 
directions, or task difficulty).  
Participants in the incremental condition were marginally more likely to attribute 
their failure to lack of effort (M = 43.60, SD = 30.42) than those in the entity condition 
(M = 32.29, SD = 29.15),  t(89) = 1.81, p = .07, d = .38. Participants in the incremental 
condition were more likely to attribute their failure to the strategy that they used (M = 
47.67, SD = 30.28) compared to those in the entity condition (M = 33.85, SD = 31.15), 
t(89) = 2.14, p = .04, d = .46. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis. 
Participants in the incremental condition were also more likely to attribute their failure to 
low ability (M = 44.19, SD = 27.73) than participants in the entity condition (M = 30.73, 
SD = 27.89), t(89) = 2.30, p = .02, d = .48. In contrast, participants in entity and 
incremental conditions were about as likely to attribute their performance to mood, task 
difficulty, and luck.  
Affect. The second hypothesis predicted that participants in the incremental 
condition would experience less negative affect upon receiving failure feedback, 
compared to those in the entity condition. Participants in the incremental condition (M = 
9.59, SD = 8.71) and those in the entity condition (M = 9.69, SD = 7.80) experienced 
similar levels of negative affect, t(89) = .06, p = .96, d = .01. Participants in the 
incremental condition (M = 30.40, SD = 18.46) also did not differ from participants in the 
entity condition (M = 25.83, SD = 15.91) in the amount of positive affect they 
experienced after feedback, t(90) = -1.27, p = .21, d = -.27. There were no significant 
differences between groups on any affect item (e.g., distressed, bored, determined).  
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Motivation: Task Choice. The third hypothesis predicted that those in the 
incremental condition would demonstrate more perseverance, compared to those in the 
entity condition, who would demonstrate more desire to withdraw. A desire to persevere 
was measured by interest in taking an emotional control tutorial that had been shown to 
improve performance on the emotion interference task. There was no difference between 
participants in the entity (M = 44.79, SD = 24.17) and incremental (M = 50.00, SD = 
28.53) conditions, however, t(89) = .95, p = .35, d = .20. A desire to withdraw was 
measured by interest in a tutorial that has been shown to improve reading comprehension 
(an unrelated task). Contrary to expectations, participants in the incremental condition (M 
= 47.09, SD = 29.48) expressed a greater desire to engage in the unrelated task than those 
in the entity condition (M = 29.69, SD = 26.12), t(89) = 2.99, p < .01, d = .62. Because 
participants in the incremental condition expressed more interest in both tasks, I 
calculated preference for the emotion-related task over the unrelated task. This difference 
was marginally significant, such that participants in the entity condition (M = 15.10, SD = 
29.51) expressed greater desire for the emotion task over the reading comprehension task, 
compared to participants in the incremental condition (M = 2.33, SD = 33.99), t(89) = -
1.92, p = .06, d = -.40, which was contrary to predictions. 
Of the entity participants, 41 (85%) chose the emotion interference tutorial, and 7 
(15%) chose the reading comprehension tutorial. Of the incremental participants, 28 
(64%) chose the emotion interference tutorial, and 16 (36%) chose the reading 
comprehension tutorial. A chi-square test was significant, #2(1)  = 5.81,  p = .02, but is in 
an opposite direction than I hypothesized: Participants in the entity condition showed a 
greater tendency to choose the emotion-related tutorial over the unrelated task, whereas 
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those in the incremental condition were more evenly split, though the majority of both 
groups preferred the unrelated task (see Figure 12). 
 
 
Figure 12. Percent of participants in entity and incremental conditions who chose 
emotion regulation and reading tutorials. 
 
Relationships Among Attributions, Affect, and Motivation. Regardless of 
implicit theory condition, do attributions predict affect and motivation to engage or 
withdraw from the activity? Correlations among attributions, affect, and motivation are 
reported in Table 23. None of the attributions were associated with negative affect, 
although positive affect was related to attributions to strategy (r  = .29, p = .005), task 
familiarity (r = .29, p = .005), task difficulty (r = .25, p = .02), and luck (r = .25, p = .02).  
Greater interest in the remedial emotion regulation tutorial was related to stronger 
attributions to mood (r = .23, p = .03), strategy choice (r = .32, p = .002), task familiarity 
(r = .22, p = .04), and task difficulty (r = .31, p = .003). Greater interest in the unrelated 
task was related to stronger attributions to effort (r = .23, p = .03). Greater preference for 
the emotion-related task over the unrelated task was related to stronger attributions to 
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strategy choice (r = .23, p = .03) and task difficulty (r = .25, p = .02). Interest in the two 
tasks were correlated at r = .33 (p = .002), and positive and negative affect were 
correlated at r = .26 (p = .01).  
 
Table 23. Correlations among attributions, affect, and motivation (Study 4) 
 
 Positive 
Affect 
Negative 
Affect 
Interest in 
emotion 
task 
Interest in 
unrelated 
task 
Preference 
for emotion 
task 
Attributions      
   Ability .09 .10 .02 .20 -.16 
   Effort .01 .02 .06 .23* -.14 
   Mood .19 .16 .23* .12 .08 
   Interest -.03 .09 .15 .15 -.02 
   Concentration -.02 -.08 .13 .08 .05 
   Strategy .29* .07 .32* .03 .23* 
   Familiarity .29* .13 .22* -.02 .18 
   Difficulty .25* -.03 .31* .00 .25* 
   Luck .25* .11 .06 .06 -.01 
   Instructions .01 .07 .10 .08 .00 
Affect      
   Positive – .26* .32* .26* .03 
   Negative  – .02 .11 -.08 
Motivation      
   Interest in  
     emotion task 
  – .33* .53* 
   Interest in  
      unrelated  
      task 
   – -.63* 
Note. N = 91.  
* p < .05.  
 
Follow-Up Analyses 
 Additional follow-up analyses are presented in Appendix I. I examined 1) whether 
individual differences in implicit theories of emotion (EMS) predicted any of the 
dependent variables, 2) whether results remained the same when controlling for 
individual differences measured in part 1, 3) the reaction times in the dot-probe task, 4) 
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attribution, controlling for the tendency of incremental participants to make more 
attributions in general (reflecting a possible response bias), and 5) the results controlling 
for the perceived persuasiveness of the article.   
Discussion 
 As a whole, Study 4 did not support the hypothesis that an incremental theory 
would promote a mastery pattern in response to challenge, whereas an entity theory 
would promote a helpless pattern. There were, however, some notable findings.  
Incremental participants were more likely to make attributions for their poor 
performance overall, and spread out their attributions among several different factors. 
Compared to those in the entity condition, participants in the incremental condition were 
more likely to attribute their poor performance to ability and strategy, and marginally 
more likely to attribute their performance to effort. This latter finding is consistent with 
research in the academic domain, in which incremental intelligence theorists are more 
likely to attribute academic failure to insufficient effort (Dweck, 1999). Stronger 
attribution to strategy by incremental participants is also consistent with the theoretical 
model, as well as with the results of Study 1, which suggest that incremental participants 
might be more sensitive to the effectiveness of emotion regulation strategies. Both effort 
and strategy are controllable factors that allow for improvement in the future. The finding 
that incremental participants were more likely to attribute their performance to ability 
was not expected, although this finding can be difficult to interpret because entity and 
incremental theorists often view ability in different ways: Entity theorists may attribute 
performance to stable ability, whereas incremental theorists attribute performance to 
current ability (Dweck, 1999).  
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 The hypothesis that participants in the incremental condition would experience 
less negative affect after receiving failure feedback, compared to those in the entity 
condition, was not supported. There was no significant difference in the amount of 
negative affect reported, and in fact, there were low levels of negative affect reported 
overall: 70% of participants scored 10 or lower on a 100-point scale. There was also no 
significant difference between entity and incremental participants in the amount of 
positive affect that they reported, nor on any single affect items, including interest and 
boredom, which could be seen as indicators of motivation. 
 The hypothesis that participants in the incremental condition would show more 
interest in, and choose to engage in, an emotion regulation tutorial directly related to the 
task that they had just performed poorly on, was not supported. Interest in the emotion 
regulation tutorial was designed to indicate perseverance at emotion regulation, whereas 
interest in the alternative task (a reading comprehension tutorial) was designed to indicate 
withdrawal or avoidance of further failure. There was no difference between groups in 
interest in the emotion regulation tutorial, and incremental participants actually preferred 
the unrelated task, compared to entity participants. When a difference score was 
computed, entity participants were more likely to prefer the emotion regulation tutorial 
over the unrelated task, compared to incremental participants, who showed only a slight 
preference for emotion regulation tutorial over the unrelated task.  When forced to choose 
between the two tasks, most participants, regardless of implicit theory condition, chose 
the emotion regulation tutorial, and this trend was more pronounced in the entity 
condition. The finding that incremental participants expressed more interest in both tasks 
could indicate that they were more engaged in the laboratory session altogether, 
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compared to entity participants, but this finding was not anticipated and is ambiguous.  
Although most participants appeared to believe the feedback, it could be that the 
participants in this study were not actively engaged in the task, and this could be in part 
because of their beliefs about emotion and emotion regulation. For example, entity 
participants, who believe emotions cannot be changed, may not have expected to do well 
on the task in the first place. Incremental participants, who believe emotions can be 
changed, may not have seen this task as relevant to real-life situations. This would 
explain the overall low levels of negative affect experienced even after poor performance 
feedback, although this idea was not tested directly. Therefore, in Study 5, I made it 
clearer to participants that the dot-probe “emotional interference” task was associated 
with real life outcomes.  
Thus, on the whole, I did not find support that entity emotion participants 
exhibited a helpless pattern in response to emotion regulation failure. The design of the 
current study was adapted from research in other domains of implicit theories. It is 
possible that implicit theories of emotion do not foster mastery or helpless responses to 
challenge in the same way that implicit theories of intelligence do. Because it is difficult 
to interpret null effects, I postpone theoretical interpretation of these findings until the 
discussion of Study 5, which presents opportunity for replication and extension, with 
some methodological improvements.  
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CHAPTER VI 
STUDY 5: THE EFFECTS OF IMPLICIT THEORIES OF EMOTION ON  
EMOTION REGULATION FAILURE AND SUCCESS 
Introduction 
Like Study 4, Study 5 investigated how implicit theories of emotion influence 
response to challenge. There were two major differences between Studies 4 and 5, 
however, as well as more minor methodological improvements. 
Major Differences 
First, in Study 5, I included both failure and success feedback conditions 
(randomly assigned). Because challenge is expected to moderate the effect of implicit 
theories on response patterns, we would expect implicit theories to have a greater effect 
on cognition, emotion, and motivation in the challenge (failure) condition, and a weaker 
effect in a non-challenge (success) condition. Therefore, in Study 5, half of the 
participants were given the same failure feedback as in Study 4, and half were given 
feedback that their performance was above average.  
Second, rather than having a choice between a skill-improving tutorial and an 
unrelated task, participants completed a second round of dot-probe trials after feedback. 
Because I did not actually provide a course of remedial action in Study 4, I could only 
assess intention to take remedial action, but not actual improvement in effort. In Study 5, 
rather than give participants a choice between a tutorial or unrelated task, I informed 
them that they would be completing the task a second time, to give them a chance to 
improve their effort (or, in contrast, to withdraw effort) or to change their strategy. 
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Methodological Improvements 
Although most participants believed the feedback that they received in Study 4 
(each person received feedback individually), in Study 5, I made two changes to the 
procedure to improve realism and strengthen the manipulation. First, when introducing 
the task, we emphasized the importance of the “emotional interference” (dot probe) task 
as relevant for everyday life. In Study 4, one reason for the weak results could be because 
participants, regardless of theory condition, did not see the task as relevant or important 
to their daily lives. Despite failure feedback, there was a low level of negative affect, 
indicating that the participants did not perceive the results of the task as relevant to their 
goals. In Study 5, we included information in the verbal instructions given to participants 
that indicated that this task predicted success in a number of domains, including 
relationships and career performance.  
Second, to increase the strength and relevance of the feedback manipulation, 
participants completed the study in pairs, in which one participant received failure 
feedback, and the other success feedback. This introduced an element of social 
comparison that simulated a competition; participants learned of their skill in relation to 
others. In addition to strengthening the manipulation, this allowed for comparisons in 
response variables in both non-challenging (success) and challenging (failure) conditions. 
Instructions to the participants were also clarified to reduce confusion regarding dot-
probe errors: Before feedback, the researcher told participants that errors and computer 
glitches would not count in their final reaction time scores.  
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Hypotheses 
First, I hypothesized that after failure feedback, those in the incremental condition 
would make attributions to controllable factors such as strategy and effort, compared to 
those in the entity condition, who would be more likely to attribute their failure to 
uncontrollable factors such as mood and ability. I did not predict any differences in 
attributions after success feedback. Second, I hypothesized that incremental participants 
would experience more positive affect than entity participants in the failure condition, but 
both groups would experience positive affect in the success condition. In addition, I 
hypothesized that entity participants would experience more negative affect than 
incremental participants in the failure condition, and both groups would experience low 
amounts of negative affect in the success condition. Third, I hypothesized that in the 
failure condition, incremental participants should report greater effort than entity 
participants in the second round of trials, and that they should perceive their second 
performance as better. In the success condition, I did not expect differences between 
implicit theories groups.  
Method 
 
Participants 
Participants were 114 undergraduate students (67 female, 46 male, 1 unreported; 
67.5% Caucasian, 1% Black/African-American, 15.8% Asian/Asian-American, 3.5% 
Hispanic/Latino, 11.4% other) from the University of Oregon Human Subject Pool who 
participated in this study in exchange for credit toward an introductory psychology or 
linguistics class. The average age was 19.98 (SD = 2.23, range 18 to 49). Participants 
signed up for the study online, knowing only that it was a two-part study (15 minutes 
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online, 45 in the laboratory). Before coming into the lab, participants completed the same 
individual difference measures as in Studies 2-4. On average, there were 2.8 days 
between sessions (range: 0 to 18). 
Procedure 
 
Participants were run in pairs. When only one participant signed up for a session, 
a confederate played the part of the second participant, and the true participant was 
randomly assigned to failure or success conditions. Upon reporting to the laboratory, 
participants read and signed a consent form, and were seated at one of two computers, 
spaced so that the participants could not see the other’s screen. They were told that the 
laboratory portion of the study consisted of three parts. In the first part, they would read 
and evaluate an article that presented research conducted at the University of Oregon. 
They would then engage in an attentional control task, and finally complete a recall test 
about the article they had read.  
Assignment to Condition. Participants were randomly assigned to either an 
entity (n = 47) or incremental (n = 67) condition
7
. Manipulation of implicit theories of 
emotion, and reading and manipulation checks, were the same as in Studies 2-4. 
Dot-Probe Task. The dot-probe task was the same as in Study 4, except that three 
blocks (one of each valence) occurred before feedback, and six blocks (two of each 
valence) occurred after feedback. In addition, a statement regarding the relevance of this 
task for real life was added to the instructions: “People who do well on this task (who 
                                                 
7
 Differences in group size were due to random assignment. 
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have low emotional interference) tend to have better control of their emotions in general, 
have more stable social relationships, and perform better in job-related tasks.” 
Success and Failure Feedback. After both participants had completed the dot 
probe task, the researcher told them that he/she was going to get their scores. The 
researcher went into another room and came back with a piece of paper that showed 
supposed results of their performances (see Appendix J). To the person who was assigned 
to the success feedback condition, the researcher said, “You scored in the 81
st
 percentile 
of all people who completed this task, which means that your emotional interference 
score is lower than most people’s.” To the person who was assigned to the failure 
feedback condition, the researcher said, “You scored in the 27
th
 percentile of all the 
people who have completed this task, which means that your emotional interference score 
is higher than most people’s.” The full feedback script is presented in Appendix K. 
Attributions and Affect. Measures of attributions and positive and negative 
affect were the same as in Study 4.  
Second Dot-Probe Task and Motivation. Participants then completed a second 
round of dot-probe trials, alternating blocks of neutral-neutral stimuli, negative-neutral 
stimuli, and positive-neutral stimuli. After they completed the second round, they 
indicated how well they thought they had performed on the second task, and how much 
effort they had put into the second task, as a measure of perseverance vs. withdrawal. 
They were explicitly asked to compare their effort and performance to the first round of 
trials. The performance question asked, “How do you think you scored, compared to the 
first trial of this task?” with possible answer choices including “a lot worse than before,” 
“moderately worse than before,” “a little worse than before,” “about the same as before,” 
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“a little better than before,” etc. The effort question asked, “How much effort did you put 
in during this trial, compared to last time?” with possible answer choices including “As 
little as possible,” “much less than before,” “a little less than before,” “about the same as 
before,” “a little more than before,” “much more than before,” and “as much as possible.” 
Participants then completed the recall task and were debriefed using the procedure 
described in Study 4. 
Results 
Manipulation Checks 
There were no significant differences in how interesting, informative, or 
persuasive participants in the entity condition found the article, compared to those in the 
incremental condition (see Table 24). In this study, however, there was a significant 
difference in post-manipulation mood: Participants in the entity condition (M = 72.34, SD 
= 17.47) were in a better mood than participants in the incremental condition (M = 65.17, 
SD = 18.74), t(112) = 2.07, p = .04, d = -.40. Therefore, all analyses below are reported 
entering post-manipulation mood as a covariate. Participants in the incremental condition 
had a significantly higher implicit theory score (M = 74.62, SD = 16.42) than those in the 
entity condition (M = 43.75, SD = 22.00), indicating that the manipulation of implicit 
theories was successful, t(112) = 8.58, p < .001, d = 1.59.  
Hypothesis Testing 
All variables except reaction times were recoded so that they ranged from a 
possible 0 to a possible 100. Analyses were conducted using 2 (theory: entity vs. 
incremental) x 2 (feedback: success vs. failure) between-subjects ANOVA, with post-
manipulation mood as a covariate.  
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Table 24. Manipulation check results in Study 5 
 
 Condition    
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Interesting 54.96 (12.49) 52.99 (13.27) -.80 .42 -.15 
Informative 53.90 (13.99) 55.22 (12.72) .53 .60 .10 
Persuasive 46.45 (15.52) 46.77 (14.28) .11 .91 .02 
Mood 72.34 (17.47) 65.17 (18.74) -2.07 .04 -.40 
Implicit Theory 43.75 (22.00) 74.63 (16.42) 8.58 < .001 1.59 
N 47 67    
 
Attributions 
The first hypothesis predicted an interaction between theory and feedback: 
Though there would be no difference in theory conditions in the success feedback 
condition, in the failure condition, participants in the incremental condition would 
attribute failure to changeable (vs. unchangeable) factors, compared to those in the entity 
condition. Mean attribution scores are presented in Table 25. 
 
Table 25. Mean post-feedback attribution ratings for entity and incremental participants 
 
 Condition  
 Entity Incremental Total 
Success Feedback 
   Ability 43.47 (25.25) 45.59 (29.17) 44.74 (27.44) 
   Effort 56.52 (22.88) 55.15 (32.44) 55.70 (27.75) 
   Mood 42.39 (28.64) 41.18 (30.70) 41.67 (29.63) 
   Interest 72.83 (28.12) 66.91 (28.02) 69.30 (27.96) 
   Concentration 50.00 (30.15) 48.53 (31.35) 49.12 (30.61) 
   Strategy 63.24 (29.67) 47.83 (37.63) 57.02 (33.66) 
   Familiarity 34.78 (31.75) 25.74 (27.86) 29.39 (29.55) 
   Difficulty 43.48 (28.42) 41.91 (29.34) 42.54 (28.72) 
   Luck 13.04 (23.68) 9.56 (21.33) 10.96 (22.17) 
   Instructions 53.26 (29.49) 54.41 (31.06) 53.95 (30.17) 
   N 23 34 57 
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Table 25 (continued). Mean post-feedback attribution ratings for entity and 
incremental participants 
 
 Condition  
 Entity Incremental Total 
Failure Feedback 
   Ability 30.21 (24.42) 37.88 (23.49) 34.65 (23.98) 
   Effort 26.04 (26.04) 31.82 (29.49) 29.39 (28.00) 
   Mood 31.25 (26.83) 37.12 (31.33) 34.65 (29.41) 
   Interest 42.71 (32.54) 46.97 (29.82) 45.18 (30.78) 
   Concentration 41.67 (27.25) 36.37 (29.38) 38.60 (28.37) 
   Strategy 32.29 (29.00) 38.63 (28.70) 35.96 (28.75) 
   Familiarity 31.25 (23.60) 33.33 (32.27) 32.46 (28.72) 
   Difficulty 33.33 (24.08) 23.48 (20.67) 27.63 (22.50) 
   Luck 4.17 (9.52) 8.33 (18.40) 6.57 (15.33) 
   Instructions 30.21 (32.12) 28.03 (28.48) 28.95 (29.80) 
   N 24 33 57 
Total 
   Ability 36.70 (25.46) 41.79 (26.61) 39.69 (26.15) 
   Effort 40.96 (28.75) 43.66 (32.96) 42.54 (31.19) 
   Mood 36.70 (28.00) 39.18 (30.84) 38.16 (29.60) 
   Interest 57.45 (33.75) 57.09 (30.40) 57.24 (31.68) 
   Concentration 45.75 (28.70) 42.54 (30.78) 43.86 (29.85) 
   Strategy 39.89 (34.05) 51.12 (31.51) 46.49 (32.90) 
   Familiarity 32.98 (27.64) 29.48 (30.13) 30.92 (29.05) 
   Difficulty 38.30 (26.50) 32.84 (26.90) 35.09 (26.76) 
   Luck 8.51 (18.26) 8.96 (19.80) 8.77 (19.10) 
   Instructions 41.49 (32.67) 31.42 (42.44) 41.45 (32.39) 
   N 47 67 114 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
Hypothesis tests are reported in Table 26. There were no significant interactions 
between implicit theory and feedback condition for any of the attributions. For several 
attributions, there was a main effect of feedback condition: Participants in the success 
feedback condition were more likely to attribute their success to ability, effort, mood, 
understanding of the instructions, the ease of the task, the strategy they used, and their 
interest level in the task (but not to luck, concentration, or familiarity with the task). 
There was a marginal main effect of strategy, such that incremental participants (M = 
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51.12, SD = 31.51) were more likely than entity participants (M = 39.89, SD = 35.05) to 
attribute their outcome to strategy use, F(1,110) = 3.39, p = .07.  
 
Table 26. ANOVA tests for group differences in attribution ratings 
 
 Main Effect:  
Theory 
F(1,110) 
Main Effect:  
Feedback 
F(1,110) 
Theory x Feedback 
Interaction 
F(1,110) 
   Ability .99 4.55*  .32 
   Effort .16 24.52*  .43 
   Mood .17 1.81  .39 
   Interest .02 19.80*  .82 
   Concentration .36 3.27
† 
 .12 
   Strategy 3.39
† 
11.55*  .59 
   Familiarity .39 .13 1.00 
   Difficulty 1.35 8.47*  .71 
   Luck .01 1.92 1.10 
   Instructions .01 18.44*  .08 
† 
p < .08. * p < .05. 
 
 
Affect. Means and standard deviations are reported in Table 27 and ANOVA tests 
are reported in Table 28. 
 
Table 27. Mean post-feedback ratings of affect and motivation 
 
 Entity Incremental Total 
Success feedback 
   Positive Affect 41.85 (22.04) 50.15 (22.38) 46.80 (22.42) 
   Negative Affect 6.42 (5.84) 7.55 (9.37) 7.10 (8.09) 
   Effort 53.62 (11.19) 47.55 (15.42) 50.00 (14.09) 
   Performance 46.38 (13.25) 39.22 (17.83) 42.11 (16.40) 
   N 23 34 57 
Failure feedback 
   Positive Affect 31.67 (18.92) 25.23 (14.04) 27.94 (16.43) 
   Negative Affect 16.47 (11.71) 17.08 (15.51) 16.83 (13.92) 
   Effort 66.67 (14.74) 64.14 (13.90) 65.20 (14.18) 
   Performance 53.47 (15.53) 51.01 (18.13) 52.04 (16.98) 
   N 24 33 57 
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Table 27 (continued). Mean post-feedback ratings of affect and motivation 
 
 Entity Incremental Total 
Total 
   Positive Affect 36.65 (20.92) 37.87 (22.44) 37.37 (21.74) 
   Negative Affect 11.58 (10.52) 12.25 (13.55) 11.96 (12.35) 
   Effort 60.28 (14.56) 55.72 (17.81) 57.60 (16.01) 
   Performance 50.00 (14.74) 45.02 (18.81) 47.08 (17.35) 
   N 47 67 114 
Note. Standard deviations are presented in parentheses. 
 
Negative Affect. I hypothesized that entity participants would experience greater 
negative affect following failure, compared to incremental participants, whereas there 
would be no difference between implicit theory groups following success. For negative 
affect, there was no main effect of implicit theory manipulation: Collapsing across 
feedback conditions, incremental participants (M = 12.25, SD = 13.55) and entity 
participants (M = 11.58, SD = 10.52) reported no differences in negative affect, F(1,109) 
= .09, p = .77. There was a main effect of feedback condition: Collapsing across implicit 
theories of emotion, participants in the failure feedback condition (M = 16.83, SD = 
13.92) reported more negative affect than those in the success feedback condition, (M = 
7.10, SD = 8.09), F(1,109) = 19.04, p < .001. There was no interaction between implicit 
theory and feedback condition, F(1,109) = .03, p = .87. 
Positive Affect. I hypothesized that incremental participants would experience 
greater positive affect following failure, compared to entity participants, but that there 
would be no difference in positive affect between the groups following success. For 
positive affect, there was no main effect of implicit theory manipulation: Collapsing 
across feedback conditions, incremental participants (M = 37.87, SD = 22.44) and entity 
participants (M = 36.65, SD = 20.92) reported no differences in positive affect, F(1,109) 
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= .56, p = .46. There was a main effect of feedback condition: Collapsing across implicit 
theories of emotion, participants in the success feedback condition (M = 46.80, SD = 
22.42) reported more positive affect than those in the failure feedback condition, (M = 
27.94, SD = 16.43), F(1,109) = 19.99, p < .001. There was also a marginally significant 
interaction between theory and feedback, F(1,109) = 3.27, p = .07 (see Figure 13). 
Specifically, there was a larger difference in positive affect for incremental participants 
between failure feedback (M = 25.23, SD = 14.04) and success feedback (M = 50.15, SD 
= 22.38), t(65) = -5.44, p = .001, d = -1.33, compared to those in the entity condition 
(Mfail = 31.67, SD = 18.92; Msucc = 41.85, SD = 22.04), t(45) = -1.70, p = .10, d = -.50.  
Table 28. ANOVA tests for group differences in affect and motivation 
 
 Main Effect:  
Theory 
Main Effect:  
Feedback 
Theory x Feedback 
Interaction 
Affect    
   Positive  .06 22.41* 3.95* 
   Negative  .16 20.08*  .02 
Motivation    
   Effort  2.58 30.62*  .44 
   Performance  2.31 8.91*  .55 
* p < .05. 
 
Comparison with Study 4 
By examining only the main effect of theory within the failure condition, I could 
see whether findings from Studies 4 replicated in Study 5. To compare effect sizes, I 
transformed the results from Study 5 into t-scores and calculated Cohen’s d effect sizes 
for each mean difference (see Table 29). In both studies, incremental participants were 
more likely to attribute their performance to ability (d’s .48, .36) and to strategy (d’s .46, 
.22). 
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Figure 13. Interaction between theory and feedback condition for positive affect. 
 
 
Table 29. Comparison of effect sizes in Studies 4 and 5 
 
 Study 4 Study 5 
 t d t d 
Attributions     
   Ability 2.30 .48 1.20 .36 
   Effort 1.81 .38 .77 .17 
   Mood .01 .00 .74 .20 
   Interest .88 .18 .51 .14 
   Concentration 1.49 .31 -.69 -.18 
   Strategy 2.14 .46 .82 .22 
   Familiarity 1.58 .32 .27 .07 
   Difficulty .15 .03 -1.66 -.44 
   Luck -.21 -.03 1.01 .28 
   Instructions .16 .03 -.27 -.07 
Affect     
   Positive 1.27 .27 -1.48 -.39 
   Negative -.06 -.01 .16 .04 
Note. A positive score indicates that the incremental mean was higher than the entity 
mean. 
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Motivation 
Effort. I hypothesized that 1) there would be no difference in theory conditions in 
the success feedback condition, and 2) in the failure condition, participants in the 
incremental condition would report greater effort during the second round of trials than 
those in the entity condition. There was only a main effect of feedback: On average, 
participants in the success feedback condition reported using the same amount of effort 
(M = 4.00, SD = .85), whereas participants in the failure feedback condition reported 
increasing their effort slightly (M = 4.91, SD = .85), F(1,109) = 29.40, p < .001.  
Self-Reported Performance. I hypothesized that 1) in the success feedback 
condition, there would be no difference in theory conditions, and 2) in the failure 
condition, participants in the incremental condition would believe they improved over 
time, demonstrating a mastery pattern, whereas those in the entity condition would 
believe they declined in performance, demonstrating withdrawal from task engagement. 
There were no significant interactions between implicit theory and feedback condition. 
Relationships Among Attributions, Affect, and Motivation 
Regardless of implicit theory condition, do attributions predict affect and 
motivation to engage or withdraw from the activity? Correlations among attributions, 
affect, and motivation are reported in Table 30. Correlations among attributions, affect, 
and motivation, broken down by theory condition, are presented in Table 31. Correlations 
among these variables, broken down by feedback valence condition, are presented in 
Table 32. 
Collapsing across conditions, attributions to ability, effort, mood, interest, 
concentration, strategy, difficulty, and understanding of instructions were all positively 
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related to more positive affect (r’s .19 to .43, p’s < .05). Only attribution to luck was 
significantly related to negative affect (r = .19, p < .05), though the correlation between 
negative affect and attribution to mood was marginally significant (r = .18, p = .06). 
Attribution to familiarity was related to greater effort (r = .26, p = .01) and better self-
rated performance (r = .20, p = .04). Positive affect was unrelated to negative affect, 
effort, or performance, whereas negative affect was related to more effort (r = .31, p = 
.001) and better self-reported performance (r = .23, p = .01). Effort and performance were 
moderately correlated (r = .47, p < .001).  
 
Table 30. Correlations among attributions, affect, and motivation (Study 5)  
 
 Positive 
Affect 
Negative 
Affect 
Effort Performance 
Attributions     
   Ability .24* .02 .07 .01 
   Effort .43* -.09 -.06 -.12 
   Mood .30* .18
† 
.13 .02 
   Interest .22* -.01 -.10 -.04 
   Concentration .41* -.07 .07 -.04 
   Strategy .33* -.02 -.09 -.15 
   Familiarity .01 .13 .26* .20* 
   Difficulty .19* -.05 -.10 -.09 
   Luck .01 .19* -.04 -.02 
   Instructions .40* -.11 -.07 -.06 
Affect     
   Positive – .01 -.15 -.06 
   Negative  – .31* .23* 
Motivation     
   Effort   – .47* 
   Performance    – 
†
 p < .08. * p < .05. 
  
 
For both entity and incremental participants, attributions to effort, concentration, 
and understanding of instructions were associated with greater positive affect. 
Attributions to mood were significantly related to more positive affect for incremental 
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participants, and marginally related to more positive affect for entity participants. For 
incremental participants only, attributions to interest and strategy were correlated with 
positive affect. Differences in correlations between entity and incremental participants 
were significant for strategy, z = 2.05, p = .04, and marginally significant for interest, z = 
1.88, p = .06.  
 
Table 31. Correlations among dependent variables by theory condition 
 
 Entity Condition Only Incremental Condition Only 
 Pos. 
Affect 
Neg. 
Affect 
Effort Perf. Pos. 
Affect 
Neg. 
Affect 
Effort Perf. 
Attributions         
   Ability .17 -.06 .11 .07 .28 .06 .06 -.01 
   Effort .29* -.31* -.10 -.13 .51* .01 -.03 -.11 
   Mood .27
† 
-.03
 
.03 -.15 .31*
 
.28*
 
.19 .11 
   Interest .02 -.08 -.05 -.07 .37* .03 -.14 .03 
   Concentr. .38* .02 .30* -.15 .43* -.11 -.08 .00 
   Strategy .12 -.05 -.01 -.04 .48* -.01 -.11 -.18 
   Familiarity -.16 .04 -.03 -.09 .12 .18 .41* .33* 
   Difficulty .24 .08 -.10 .00 .17 -.12 -.12 -.16 
   Luck .01 .09 .04 .10 .02 .24
† 
-.09 -.08 
   Instructions .33* -.16 .07 -.06 .45* -.08 -.16 .06 
Affect         
   Positive – -.01 -.01 -.01 – .02 -.23
† 
-.08 
   Negative  – .29* .41*  – .33* .16 
Motivation         
   Effort   – .34*   – .52* 
   Performance    –    – 
† 
p < .08. * p < .05  
 
 
For entity participants only, attributions to effort were associated with lower 
negative affect (r = -.31, p = .03), a relationship that was not significant for incremental 
participants (r = .01, ns), z = 1.69, p = .09. For incremental participants only, attributions 
to mood were associated with significantly greater negative affect (r = .28). For entity 
participants only, attributions to concentration predicted greater effort during the second 
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trial (r = 30, p = .04), whereas for incremental participants, attributions to familiarity 
predicted greater effort during the second trial (r = .41, p = .001) as well as greater self-
rated performance (r = .33, p = .006).  
In the success feedback condition, attributions to ability, effort, mood, 
concentration, and instructions were significantly related to positive affect, and 
attributions to strategy were marginally related. Attributions to mood and luck were 
associated with greater negative affect, and attributions to task difficult were associated 
with lower negative affect. In the failure feedback condition, only attributions to 
concentration were marginally related to more positive affect, and attributions to strategy 
and difficulty were correlated with greater negative affect.  
 
Table 32. Correlations among dependent variables by feedback condition 
 
 Success Condition Only Failure Condition Only 
 PA NA Effort Perf. PA NA Effort Perf. 
Attributions         
   Ability .35* .12 .23
† 
.07 -.10 .11 .13
 
.06 
   Effort .42* .01 .09 -.03 .13 .14 .28* .03 
   Mood .41*
 
.27*
 
.04 -.21 .10
 
.25
† 
.39* .32* 
   Interest .21 .08 .08 .03 -.11 .22 .12 .12 
   Concentration .47* -.09 .17 .03 .24
† 
.06 .18 -.01 
   Strategy .25
† 
-.07 -.08 -.06 .18
 
.27* .26
† 
-.06 
   Familiarity -.05 -.01 .21 .12 .18 .20 .32* .26
† 
   Difficulty .02 -.26* -.07 -.11 .18 .32* .20 .12 
   Luck -.14 .46*
 
.02 -.09 .15 .14
 
.01 .15 
   Instructions .35* .08 .05 -.10 .19 .05 .23
† 
.22 
Affect         
   Positive – .31* .09
 
.11 – .20 .05
 
.03 
   Negative  – -.02 -.02  – .26* .22
† 
Motivation         
   Effort   – .47*   – .32* 
   Performance    –    – 
† 
p < .08. * p < .05. 
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In the success feedback condition, nothing significantly predicted greater effort 
after the second trial, though attributions to ability were marginally related (r = .23, p = 
.08). On the other hand, in the failure feedback condition, attributions to effort, mood, 
and task familiarity significantly predicted more effort, and attributions to strategy and 
instructions predicted more effort. In the success feedback condition, nothing 
significantly predicted better self-rated performance, whereas in the failure feedback 
condition, attributions to mood (r = .32, p = .02) and to task familiarity (r = .26, p = .05) 
predicted better self-rated performance. Correlations between effort and performance 
were significant in both conditions.  
Follow-Up Analyses 
 Additional follow-up analyses are presented in Appendix I. I examined 1) whether 
individual differences in implicit theories of emotion (EMS) predicted any of the 
dependent variables, 2) the reaction times in the two rounds of the dot-probe task, and 3) 
the attribution items in more detail, paralleling Study 4. 
Discussion 
As in Study 4, I had hypothesized that upon encountering failure feedback, 
participants in the entity condition would display a helpless pattern of maladaptive 
attributions, greater negative affect and less positive affect, and less persistence in 
emotion regulation efforts. In contrast, participants in the incremental condition would 
display a mastery pattern of adaptive attributions, greater positive affect and less negative 
affect, and greater persistence in emotion regulation efforts. Moreover, I hypothesized 
that this difference would not be present after receiving success feedback, and that entity 
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and incremental participants would think, feel, and behave more similarly. These 
hypotheses, as a whole, were not supported, although some group differences did emerge. 
 In terms of attributions, it was not surprising that group differences were observed 
between success and failure feedback conditions. Participants who received success 
feedback were more likely to attribute their successes to a wide range of factors, 
including ability, effort, mood, task difficulty, strategy, and interest in the task, compared 
to those who received failure feedback. In contrast, there was only one marginally 
significant effect of implicit theory manipulation: Incremental participants were more 
likely to attribute their outcome to strategy use, compared to entity participants. This 
effect replicated the finding from Study 4 that incremental participants were more likely 
than entity participants to attribute failure to strategy use, and consistent with the findings 
from Study 1, which showed that trait incremental theorists were more likely to use 
effective emotion regulation strategies compared to ineffective emotion regulation 
strategies, whereas trait entity theorists did not discriminate to the same degree. The 
hypothesized interaction between theory and feedback valence did not emerge: 
Incremental participants were more likely to make strategy attributions regardless of 
whether they succeeded or failed. One possible explanation is that incremental theorists 
are more likely to consider strategy in their emotion regulation success or failure, 
whereas entity theorists are less likely to consider strategy in their attempts to regulate 
their emotions, although this hypothesis was not directly tested here. 
In terms of affect, there was a clear main effect of feedback condition: 
Participants who received success feedback experienced more positive and less negative 
affect, compared to those who received failure feedback. There was also a significant 
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interaction between implicit theory and feedback: Participants in the incremental 
condition experienced a greater difference in positive affect between failure and success 
feedback, compared to participants in the entity condition. One possible explanation for 
this interaction is that participants in the incremental condition were trying out a strategy 
to regulate their emotions, and those in the success condition were pleased that their 
strategy worked, whereas those in the failure condition were displeased. Entity 
participants, on the other hand, may not have expected any strategy to work, so their 
affective reaction to the feedback was not as strong.  Future research should investigate 
the speculation that incremental theorists are more likely to consider the effectiveness of 
their strategies before choosing them and are more responsive to feedback about that 
effectiveness, as this was not directly tested here. 
Although Study 5 included several methodological improvements over Study 4, 
additional improvements could be made. For example, rather than measuring attributions 
directly (“What factors influenced your performance?” and listing several factors), it may 
be more useful to provide participants with more direct statements to probe their 
cognitive patterns following failure or success. As it was, asking participants to rate their 
attributions for their performance was slightly awkward—in Study 5, participants had to 
rate the extent to which they felt “the ease or difficulty of the task” contributed to their 
performance. These double-barreled questions make interpretation of the data difficult. 
On the other hand, asking participants to rate their agreement with a statement such as 
“This task was difficult” would be clearer to participants and more interpretable for the 
researchers.  
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Together, Studies 4 and 5 suggest that the helpless and mastery patterns that have 
emerged in the domain of intelligence may not closely parallel helpless and mastery 
patterns in the domain of emotion. In these two studies, incremental participants were 
more likely to attribute emotion regulation failure to strategy use, which supports the 
finding in Study 1 that incremental theorists are more sensitive to the emotion regulation 
strategies they choose to employ. The entire constellation of cognition, affect, and 
motivation did not emerge, but these results raise questions that may be addressed in 
future research. 
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CHAPTER VII 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
Summary of Main Findings 
The main purpose of this dissertation was to better understand the construct of 
implicit theories of emotion and how these beliefs about emotion relate to the regulation 
and experience of emotion. In Study 1, I developed a questionnaire to assess individual 
differences in implicit theories, for use in this and future research. I found that an 
incremental theory of emotion—a belief that emotions are changeable—was associated 
with greater overall subjective well-being and more positive emotion, and less 
depression, stress, and negative emotion. This may be due to the emotion regulation 
strategies that people use: Incremental theorists are more likely to repair negative moods 
in general, and are more likely to rely on active, flexible strategies such as cognitive 
reappraisal and active coping. On the other hand, entity theorists are more likely to try to 
avoid emotions, and to rely on passive, inflexible strategies such as rumination and 
behavioral disengagement. 
 Although implicit theories did not have a direct effect on the experience of 
emotion when participants experienced their emotions naturally (Study 2), participants 
who had read about the malleability of emotions were more likely to regulate their 
emotions when the situational goal was clear—that is, when they were asked to try to 
remain objective while viewing emotion-eliciting stimuli (Study 3). Participants who had 
read about the automatic and uncontrollable nature of emotions were less likely to 
regulate their emotions, and rated the images as emotionally evocative while they were 
supposed to remain objective, as while they attended to the stimuli naturally. In 
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combination with Study 1, this suggests that implicit theories of emotion influence the 
experience of emotion by way of emotion regulation. 
 Studies 4 and 5 examined whether the patterns of helpless and mastery cognition, 
affect, and motivation found in other domains generalized to emotional challenge. 
Although the patterns as a whole did not emerge, incremental participants were more 
likely to attribute their failure (or success) on an emotional control task to the strategy 
that they used. In addition, in Study 5, incremental participants experienced more positive 
affect after they succeeded in the emotional control task, and less when they failed, 
compared to entity theorists. Taken together with the results of Study 1, this suggests that 
incremental theorists may be more sensitive to the effectiveness of emotion regulation 
strategies than entity theorists, a hypothesis not directly tested here, but that can and 
should be examined in future research.  
Implications for the Study of Implicit Theories 
 The research presented here on implicit theories of emotion highlights at least two 
of the main premises of the implicit theories model (see Dweck, 1999; Dweck & Leggett, 
1988). First, past research in other domains of implicit theories suggests that the effects 
of implicit theories are sensitive to situational context. In non-challenging situations, 
people who hold entity and incremental theories of intelligence, for example, may 
perform equally well. When abilities are challenged, however, implicit theories influence 
how a person thinks, feels, and behaves in response. The experiments presented here 
demonstrate the importance of situational variables for implicit theories of emotion. For 
example, implicit theories did not clearly influence the experience of emotion when 
participants rated their emotional experience without further guidelines (Study 2), but 
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they did influence emotional experience when participants were explicitly asked to 
remain objective (Study 3). Although we cannot generalize to other laboratory tasks or to 
real life, this difference suggests that the role that implicit theories play depends on the 
context.  
   Second, past research in other domains of implicit theories has shown that entity 
theories encourage a helpless response to challenge, and incremental theories encourage a 
mastery-oriented response to challenge. One of the goals of this dissertation was to 
investigate the extent to which the implicit theory model generalizes to the domain of 
emotions. Taken together, the results of Studies 4 and 5 suggest that manipulating 
implicit theories of emotion does not produce a parallel pattern of cognition, affect, and 
motivation as does manipulating implicit theories of intelligence, at least in a strict sense. 
Yet there are indications that implicit theories of emotion are related to helplessness and 
mastery in emotion regulation in a broader sense. 
Study 1 showed that incremental theorists are more likely to distinguish between 
effective and ineffective emotion regulation strategies, whereas entity theorists are more 
likely to rely on ineffective ones such as rumination, behavioral disengagement, and 
denial. These latter strategies represent helplessness, in that they do not involve active 
problem-solving, and focus instead on the feelings themselves (rumination), distancing 
oneself from a problem (denial), and giving up (disengagement). In addition, Study 3 
showed that entity participants were less likely than incremental participants to respond 
to instructions to try to remain objective: Their ratings of emotional pictures in the 
objective condition were similar to their ratings in the attend condition. In other words, 
they either did not try to remain objective, or they tried, but failed. Finally, in both 
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Studies 4 and 5, incremental participants were more likely to attribute their performance 
on an emotional control task to the strategy that they used—an internal, controllable 
factor. In addition, in Study 5, incremental participants experienced more positive affect 
when they did well, and less when they did poorly, compared to entity participants, which 
suggests that they could be more sensitive to performance feedback because it is useful in 
retaining or revising their strategy, although this was not directly tested here. 
Based on these findings, it is likely that helpless and mastery-oriented responses 
do exist in the domain of emotion, but the patterns of cognition, affect, and behavior that 
accompany them may be different. In particular, the ideas of failure and success could 
have different meanings in emotion regulation than in academic achievement. In the case 
of intelligence, more is clearly better. In the case of emotion regulation, however, the 
goals may vary between individuals and across situations. Success and failure, therefore, 
may need to be defined on a situational or personal basis in order for implicit theories of 
emotion to produce mastery and helpless responses. Specifically, performing well on a 
computerized laboratory task may not be as important in emotion regulation as the social 
or emotional consequences of successfully or unsuccessfully regulating one’s emotions. 
We could use vignettes or hypothetical situations with clear goals, memories of 
personally defined successful or unsuccessful emotion regulation, or a more ecologically 
valid laboratory task (such as social engagement) with performance feedback to create a 
sense of failure or success. 
Moreover, the attributions, feelings, and motivations that implicit theories of 
emotion produce may differ from those in other domains. Dweck initially used open-
ended questions to probe young students’ thoughts and feelings as they encountered 
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successes and failures. Indeed, much of Dweck’s early work was qualitative (see Dweck, 
1999, for a review). In this way, she was able to identify variables that distinguished 
helpless and mastery-oriented individuals. We could investigate the spontaneous 
attributions people make for emotion regulation success or failure, and the strategies that 
entity and incremental theorists nominate as likely to be the most useful. Rather than 
adapting an already existing paradigm to investigate implicit theories of emotion, it might 
be useful to start from the ground up, both to clarify findings from this research, and to 
inform future research. 
There is one additional parallel between the current studies and previous research 
on implicit theories in other domains, namely, the tendency for people to endorse 
incremental over entity beliefs. In Study 1, the mean of the Emotional Mindset Scale was 
skewed towards the incremental end of the scale, with only a small portion of participants 
scoring below the midpoint. In Studies 2 through 5, although the manipulation was 
successful in distinguishing between incremental and entity groups, the manipulation 
check indicated that the entity groups were, on average, around the mid-point of the 
scale, rather than below it. Therefore, it could be that participants were simply responding 
to demand characteristics in answering the manipulation check items. Participants, on 
average however, rated the articles as persuasive and informative, and several 
hypothesized effects on dependent variables did emerge. 
The bias towards an incremental theory is not unique to implicit theories of 
emotion. Dweck reports that when incremental items are included in measures of 
individual differences in implicit theories in other domains, the scale is often skewed 
(Dweck et al., 1995). Her solution has been to include only items that address entity 
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beliefs in her measures, explaining that incremental items are especially compelling for 
participants. Thus, the issue could be a methodological one. Perhaps different items 
would produce a more balanced scale for the EMS. Perhaps the manipulation used here 
was not strong enough, and in order to fully create entity theorists, we need to develop a 
more persuasive manipulation less susceptible to demand characteristics. It will be 
important to test additional ways to shift implicit theories of emotion, such as through a 
long-term intervention or personally relevant recollections of emotion controllability or 
uncontrollability. 
On the other hand, this issue could also be a theoretical one: Maybe there just are 
fewer true entity theorists. Given the single dimension that emerged in the factor analysis 
in Study 1, as well as this skew towards incremental beliefs in both the individual 
difference and experimental research, it is likely that the typology of entity and 
incremental theorists simplifies the nature of implicit theories. Moreover, the terms 
“entity” and “incremental” were adapted from the implicit theory paradigm, and are not 
necessarily as meaningful in the domain of emotions as they may be in the domain of 
intelligence. It may be more useful, therefore, to discuss implicit theories of emotion, as 
well as implicit theories in other domains, as a spectrum of beliefs about the malleability 
of the attribute in question, and investigate the relationships those malleability beliefs 
have for experience and self-regulation in the laboratory and in real life.  
Implications for the Study of Emotion Regulation 
The idea that some emotion regulation and coping strategies are more effective 
than others is not new (e.g., Carver et al., 1989; Folkman & Lazarus, 1988; Gross, 1998a; 
Nolen-Hoeksema, 1991). The current research, however, suggests why some people are 
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more likely to rely on ineffective strategies. Incremental theorists, because they believe 
emotions are changeable, are more likely to use adaptive emotion regulation strategies 
that directly address the problem or influence emotions in a flexible way, such as 
cognitive reappraisal, active coping, and mood repair in general, which are associated 
with more positive well-being. In contrast, entity theorists, because they believe emotions 
are unchangeable, are less likely to use such active strategies, and tend to fall back upon 
secondary strategies such as avoiding emotions, or ruminating on a negative situation, 
which are associated with lower well-being. 
It is important to note, however, that it is not that entity theorists use maladaptive 
strategies more than they use adaptive ones. Rather, they use them more than incremental 
theorists. A belief that emotions are changeable is more likely to foster the development 
of emotion regulation skills: Incremental intelligence theorists may be more likely to 
abandon ineffective strategies and try new ones after failure, whereas entity theorists, if 
they do not give up altogether, may continue to persist with ineffective ones (Dweck, 
1999). In emotion regulation, if an incremental theorist does not find that rumination 
helps, he or she may try something new, such as active coping.  
Future Directions 
Implicit Theories of Emotion and Emotion-Related Goals 
 As mentioned above, this research suggests that goals may play an important role 
in the effect of implicit theories on emotion regulation and experience. Implicit theories 
of intelligence predict the achievement goals that students adopt: Entity intelligence 
theorists tend to hold performance goals, in which they seek to demonstrate that they are 
intelligent (or at least not unintelligent; Elliot & Dweck, 1988), and incremental theorists 
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tend to hold learning goals, in which they seek to master the skills required of them, 
taking on new challenges and even risking failure in order to do so (Dweck & Leggett, 
1988). Entity personality and moral theorists tend to hold evaluation goals, in which they 
seek to prove that they possess desirable qualities and document where others stand on a 
particular trait or moral characteristic, whereas incremental personality and moral 
theorists tend to hold development goals, in which they seek to develop desired 
characteristics within themselves, and to understand the processes that lead people to act 
the way that they do (Chiu et al., 1997; Dweck et al., 1995).  
 Regarding emotion regulation, one can distinguish performance goals, in which 
people seek to prove to others that they are able to manage their emotions and are “okay”, 
from learning goals, in which people seek to develop their ability to manage their 
emotions (Rusk, Tamir, & Rothbaum, 2011). Research suggests that people with 
performance emotion regulation goals are more likely to use defensive emotion 
regulation strategies such as rumination and thought suppression, whereas people with 
learning goals are more likely to use cognitive reappraisal (Rusk et al., 2011). Thus, we 
can hypothesize that entity emotion theorists tend to hold performance emotion 
regulation goals, and incremental emotion theorists tend to hold learning emotion 
regulation goals, but to date, no research has linked implicit theories with emotion 
regulation goals.  
 Moreover, having emotion regulation goals in general may be different from 
having emotion-related goals within a situation. We must therefore distinguish emotion 
regulation goals (goals relating to one’s emotion regulation processes and strategies) 
from emotion goals (goals related to the experience of emotion, or to the outcomes of 
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emotion regulation). We sometimes assume that people want to feel pleasure and avoid 
pain, but because moods and emotions have cognitive and social consequences as well as 
affective ones, there are cases in which it is more adaptive to down-regulate positive 
emotions or up-regulate negative ones (Parrott, 1993; Tamir, 2009). For example, anger 
is perceived as functional within a confrontational context, whereas happiness is 
perceived as functional within a collaborative context (Tamir & Ford, in press).  
The use of emotions to achieve goals, regardless of hedonic tone, is known as 
instrumental emotion regulation. Not everyone knows which emotions will be useful to 
them within situations, and more flexible use of emotion regulation within given contexts 
is related to better overall well-being, compared to inflexible use of emotion regulation 
(Tamir & Ford, in press). I would hypothesize that an incremental theory is associated 
with instrumental use of emotion to serve one’s contextual goals, and that this mediates 
positive functioning in social and achievement domains, as well as other aspects of 
psychological well-being. Because they believe emotions are malleable, incremental 
theorists may be more able to regulate their emotions flexibly than entity theorists. I 
chose not to focus on goals in this dissertation, but believe that incorporating the concept 
of goals in the model of implicit theories of emotion is an important next step. 
Individual Differences and Temporal and Developmental Stability 
Although four of the five studies presented here experimentally manipulated 
implicit theories of emotion, it will be important to investigate how trait-level differences 
in beliefs influence emotion regulation and experience. It is possible that trait implicit 
theories are more likely to produce consistent patterns of emotion and behavior in a 
laboratory setting, compared to new belief systems created in the lab. In the experiments 
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presented here, although I was able to successfully manipulate implicit theories of 
emotion, it could be that the more stable, familiar beliefs a person holds regarding the 
nature of emotions are more likely to influence their emotions and emotion regulation. 
Another step is to further investigate how stable such beliefs actually are. In Study 
1, I found that implicit theories of emotion are moderately stable over a period of weeks, 
although not as stable as personality traits, and not as stable as implicit theories of 
personality and intelligence (Dweck et al., 1995). The successful manipulation of implicit 
theories of emotion in the four experiments presented here provides further evidence that 
these beliefs can be at least temporarily shifted in an experimental setting. This is 
important both methodologically, as it provides a way to test causal relationships between 
implicit theories of emotion and outcome variables such as emotion regulation and 
experience, but also theoretically. Taken together, these findings suggest that implicit 
theories themselves are at least somewhat malleable.  
One important question is whether these beliefs remain stable over longer periods, 
such as through major life transitions, over the course of particular forms of 
psychotherapy (e.g., Cognitive Behavioral Therapy), or over the course of one’s lifetime. 
It is possible that with therapy, or with life experience, people learn that emotions are 
malleable. Indeed, older individuals tend to experience less negative emotion compared 
to younger individuals, possibly because they improve in emotion regulation skills over 
the years (Gross, Carstensen, Pasupathi, Tsai, Skorpen, & Hsu, 1997). Likewise, it will 
be important to examine how beliefs about emotion develop. It is likely that implicit 
theories of emotion, like emotions themselves, can be quite dynamic over the lifespan. 
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Other Emotion-Related Beliefs 
 In this dissertation, I focused on beliefs about the malleability of emotions. It is 
possible, however, that there are a number of dimensions of emotion-related beliefs that 
influence how people experience emotion. For example, in the opening paragraph, I 
described someone who believed that emotions serve important functions in everyday 
life, whereas another person believed that emotions interfere with functioning. This 
helpful versus harmful dimension is one belief system that is worth examining in the 
future: Does it predict how a person regulates emotions in daily life, and how is it related 
to implicit theories of (the malleability of) emotion?  
Conclusion 
 In this dissertation, I have demonstrated that there are meaningful individual 
differences in the ways that people think about emotions, and that these beliefs have 
implications for the emotions that they feel, the ways that they regulate those emotions, 
and ultimately, their well-being. Although much more research is needed on this topic, 
these five studies offer initial information regarding how implicit theories of emotion 
operate, and suggest ways in which they might interact with situational variables in order 
to promote helplessness and mastery in emotion regulation.   
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APPENDIX A 
EMOTIONAL MINDSET SCALE (EMS) 
Instructions: Please rate how much you agree or disagree with the following statements 
regarding emotions. Although some of the questions may seem similar to one another, 
they differ in important ways. For each item, please answer using the following scale: 
 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree 
a little 
Neutral Agree  
a little 
Agree  
Strongly 
1 2 3 4 5 
 
1. A positive emotion is something that happens to you, not something that you make 
happen.  
2. Negative emotions are something that people have control over.  
3. Negative emotions just happen to you, and there is nothing you can do about them. 
4. No matter the situation, you can always influence your positive emotions.  
5. No matter how hard they try, people can’t really change the emotions that they 
have.  
6. Positive emotions are caused by forces beyond your control.  
7. You can control your negative reactions to bad situations.  
8. When you have negative emotions, you cannot do much to change them.  
9. When people feel positive emotions, it’s because they made them happen.  
10. Everyone can learn to control his or her emotions.  
11. There is not much a person can do to influence when and how they experience 
positive emotions.   
12. You can learn to do something about your negative emotions.  
13. It is usually not possible to change your negative emotions.  
14. People can learn to influence when and how they experience positive emotions.  
15. If they want to, people can change the emotions that they have.  
16. Positive emotions come and go, and there is not much you can do about them.  
17. No matter how strong a person’s negative emotions are, they can always find a 
way to change them.  
18. When a person feels negative emotions, they have to just let them run their course.  
19. I believe that I am in control of my positive emotional experiences.  
20. The truth is, people have very little control over their emotions.  
21. There is no use in trying to influence your positive emotions; you have to just let 
them happen. 
22. When you are feeling bad, there are things you can do to influence your emotions.  
23. There is no use in trying to avoid negative emotions.  
24. Anyone can learn to influence the positive emotions that they feel.  
 
Note. Bold items are included in the 12-item EMS. Italicized items were included in 
Tamir et al. (2007).  
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APPENDIX B 
 
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR SCALES IN STUDY 1 
 
 N Mean
a 
SD Items ! 
Personality Traits      
   BFI Extraversion 259 58.08 18.16 8 .87 
   BFI Agreeableness 259 67.77 13.22 9 .78 
   BFI Conscientiousness 259 60.91 13.49 9 .79 
   BFI Neuroticism 259 50.89 17.09 8 .84 
   BFI Openness 259 63.59 12.74 10 .76 
   BAS Drive 184 56.96 17.36 4 .77 
   BAS Fun-Seeking 184 67.47 16.91 4 .67 
   BAS Reward Responsiveness 184 78.68 13.48 7 .71 
   BIS Inhibition 184 67.16 15.79 7 .76 
   LOT Optimism 185 59.52 14.41 9 .71 
      
Discriminant Validity      
   Implicit Theories of  
      Intelligence 
 
260 
 
60.10 
 
23.94 
 
4 
 
.95 
   Academic Self-Efficacy 260 76.98 14.77 12 .88 
   Locus of Control 75 51.39 16.47 12 .35 
   Emotion Reg. Self-Efficacy 257 55.38 15.87 10 .79 
   BEQ Impulse Strength 259 62.44 17.73 4 .70 
      
Well-Being      
   PANAS Negative Affect 260 34.11 15.43 10 .86 
   PANAS Positive Affect 260 61.82 14.21 10 .85 
   Amusement 260 66.01 18.09 2 .56 
   Anger 260 38.97 16.71 5 .83 
   Anxiety 260 44.33 20.78 3 .70 
   Contempt 260 35.67 17.79 2 .62 
   Disgust 260 25.78 21.93 1 -- 
   Embarrassment 260 32.34 23.17 1 -- 
   Fear 260 33.03 21.07 2 .83 
   Guilt 260 32.36 23.95 2 .67 
   Hope 260 65.67 19.08 2 .75 
   Interest 260 63.08 15.64 2 .75 
   Joy 260 66.88 19.01 2 .78 
   Loneliness 260 36.44 24.32 2 .84 
   Love 260 68.89 21.11 2 .71 
   Pride 260 59.81 20.19 2 .72 
   Sadness 260 30.48 21.09 3 .83 
   Shame 260 29.90 23.38 1 -- 
   Stress 260 55.82 23.54 2 .83 
   BEQ Positive Expressivity 260 75.93 14.88 3 .71 
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 N Mean
a 
SD Items ! 
   BEQ Negative Expressivity 259 49.31 16.13 5 .59 
   CESD Depression 259 27.22 17.24 20 .91 
   PSS Perceived Stress 259 43.96 17.99 4 .76 
   BAI Anxiety 75 76.30 17.40 21 .92 
   PWB Autonomy 185 51.25 16.44 3 .63 
   PWB Environmental Mastery 185 53.26 13.62 3 .59 
   PWB Personal Growth 185 64.73 13.68 3 .54 
   PWB Positive Relationships 185 50.78 15.73 3 .66 
   PWB Purpose in Life 185 50.84 15.35 3 .50 
   PWB Self-Acceptance 185 58.71 16.46 3 .70 
   RSE Self-Esteem 184 69.88 19.98 10 .90 
   SWLS Satisfaction with Life 258 62.53 19.88 5 .87 
      
Emotion Regulation      
   ERQ Reappraisal 260 63.71 14.45 6 .79 
   ERQ Suppression 260 36.22 16.25 4 .69 
   TMMS Repair 259 63.43 16.75 6 .80 
   TMMS Attention 259 67.26 12.17 13 .84 
   TMMS Clarity 259 58.41 13.68 11 .84 
   NFA Approach 260 61.83 12.79 13 .83 
   NFA Avoid 260 39.06 15.18 13 .86 
   RRQ Rumination 260 62.23 15.91 12 .87 
   COPE Active Coping 185 67.48 20.51 2 .68 
   COPE Planning 185 70.99 21.27 2 .71 
   COPE Positive Reframing 185 60.63 23.59 2 .69 
   COPE Acceptance 185 64.41 21.76 2 .45 
   COPE Humor 185 55.14 29.63 2 .81 
   COPE Religion 185 28.83 30.85 2 .86 
   COPE Emotional Support 185 61.80 27.04 2 .79 
   COPE Instrumental Support 185 64.96 25.63 2 .87 
   COPE Self-Distraction 185 83.60 23.04 2 .63 
   COPE Denial 185 14.77 22.54 2 .77 
   COPE Venting 185 42.52 22.45 2 .42 
   COPE Substance Use 185 17.03 25.00 2 .91 
   COPE Behavioral  
      Disengagement 
185 20.00 20.84 2 .62 
   COPE Self-Blame 185 41.71 28.93 2 .81 
Note. BFI = Big Five Inventory; BAS = Behavioral Activation System; BIS = Behavioral 
Inhibition System; LOT = Life Orientation Test; BEQ = Berkeley Expressivity 
Questionnaire; PANAS = Positive and Negative Affect Schedule; CESD = Center for 
Epidemiology Scale—Depression; BAI = Beck Anxiety Inventory; PWB = Psychological 
Well-Being; RSE = Rosenberg Self-Esteem; SWLS = Satisfaction with Life Scale; ERQ 
= Emotion Regulation Questionnaire; TMMS = Trait Meta-Mood Scale; NFA = Need for 
Affect; RRQ = Reflection and Rumination Questionnaire; COPE = Brief COPE. 
a
 All measures were rescaled so that they ranged from a possible 0 to 100. 
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APPENDIX C 
 
EXPERIMENTAL STIMULUS: ENTITY CONDITION 
 
(next page) 
 132 
 
 133 
 134 
APPENDIX D 
 
EXPERIMENTAL STIMULUS: INCREMENTAL CONDITION 
 
(next page) 
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APPENDIX E 
 
FOLLOW-UP ANALYSES FOR STUDY 2 
 
Peaks and Ends 
The peak-and-end rule suggests that the most intense moments of an emotional 
experience and the ending of emotional experience are psychologically meaningful (for a 
review, see Fredrickson, 2000). I therefore analyzed whether incremental and entity 
participants differed at the peaks of each of the videos, and at the end of each of the 
videos, as measured using the continuous rating dials, grouped into 10-second 
increments. I defined peaks both nomothetically (by examining the high and low points 
for each movie clip for the whole sample, and examining whether the groups differed at 
those particular time points) and idiographically (by extracting the minimum and 
maximum ratings for each person).  
Negative Video 
For the negative video, incremental participants (M = -2.43, SD = 1.30) did not 
significantly differ from entity participants (M = -2.71, SD = 1.14), at the end of the 
negative video, t(140) = -1.31, p = .19, although there was a small effect size suggesting 
that incremental participants ended on a slightly less negative note than entity 
participants, d = -.23. They also did not differ at the lowest point of the sample (segment 
15), with incremental (M = -2.92, SD = 1.21) and entity (M = -3.00, SD = .99) 
participants equally negative, t(140) = -.40, p = .69, d = -.08. When measured 
idiographically, the incremental group had an average minimum value of -3.14 (SD = 
1.04), and the entity group had an average minimum value of -3.12 (SD = .85), which did 
not significantly differ, t(140) = .15, p = .88, d = .02. Results are reported in Table A1. 
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Table E1. Peak and end emotional experiences for negative video. 
 Entity Incremental t p d 
Negative end -2.71 (1.14) -2.43 (1.30) -1.31 .19 -.23 
Negative peak 
(sample) 
-3.00 (.99) -2.91 (1.21) -.40 .69 -.08 
Negative peak 
(person) 
-3.12 (.85) -3.14 (1.04) .15 .88 .02 
N 65 77    
 
Neutral Video 
For the neutral recovery video, entity participants (M = 1.85, SD = 1.20) did not 
differ from incremental participants (M = 1.93, SD = 1.14) in their final ratings of the 
neutral video, t(65) = -.27, p = .79, d = -.07. They also did not differ in the peak of the 
neutral video (segment 15), with entity participants (M = 1.92, SD = 2.01) and 
incremental participants (M = 2.01, SD = 1.19) rating their affect similarly, t(65) = -.32, p 
= .75, d = -.06. The groups also did not differ in their average maximum affect rating: 
Entity participants had a maximum of 2.06 (SD = 1.14) and incremental participants had 
a maximum of 2.31 (SD = 1.16), which did not differ, t(65) = -.87, p = .39, although there 
was a small effect indicating that incremental participants experienced a more positive 
peak than entity participants, Cohen’s d = -.22. Results are reported in Table A2. 
 
Table E2. Peak and end emotional experiences for neutral recovery. 
 
 Entity Incremental t p d 
Neutral end 1.85 (1.20) 1.93 (1.14) -.27 .79 -.07 
Neutral peak (sample) 1.92 (2.01) 2.01 (1.19) -.32 .75 -.06 
Neutral peak (person) 2.06 (1.14) 2.31 (1.16) -.87 .39 -.22 
N 29 38    
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Positive Video 
For the positive recovery video, entity participants (M = 2.46, SD = 1.16) ended 
on a higher note than incremental participants (M = 1.74, SD = 1.74), t(73) = 2.11, p = 
.04, d = .49. They did not significantly differ at the sample’s maximum, with entity 
participants (M = 1.99, SD = 1.61) rating their affect as nonsignificantly higher than 
incremental participants (M = 1.32, SD = 1.87), t(73) = 1.65, p = .10, d = .39. They also 
did not differ in their idiographically defined peaks: entity participants had an average 
maximum rating of 2.58 (SD = 1.14), and incremental participants had an average 
maximum rating of 2.28 (SD = 1.15), t(73) = 1.15, p = .25, d = .27. Although the group 
differences were not consistently significant at p < .05, there are small effect sizes for all 
measures of emotion, suggesting that entity participants may experienced higher positive 
affect during key points in the positive video. These results are reported in Table A3. 
 
Table E3. Peak and end emotional experiences for positive recovery. 
 
 Entity Incremental t p d 
Positive end 2.46 (1.16) 1.74 (1.74) 2.11 .04 .49 
Positive peak (sample) 1.99 (1.61) 1.32 (1.87) 1.65 .10 .39 
Positive peak (person) 2.58 (1.14) 2.28 (1.15) 1.15 .25 .27 
N 36 39    
 
Trait Implicit Theories of Emotion 
Data on individual differences in implicit theories of emotion were collected 
before participants reported to the laboratory for the experimental session. The analyses 
from Study 2 were repeated, substituting the EMS score for manipulated implicit theory. 
Prior to coming in to the lab, participants assigned to the entity group (M = 62.82, SD = 
14.43) did not differ from participants in the incremental group (M = 63.43, SD = 16.34) 
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on trait implicit theories of emotion, t(138) = -.24, p = .82. Continuous ratings on the 
implicit theory of emotion manipulation check (state implicit theory) did, however, 
correlate with trait ratings of implicit theories of emotion, r(138) = .39, p < .001. For the 
following analyses, I first ran simple correlations between trait implicit theory and 
emotion, and then ran regression analyses, entering in both trait and manipulated implicit 
theory, predicting emotion.  
Emotion During Negative Video 
Trait implicit theory was not related to self-reported sadness after the film clip, 
r(138) = -.11, p = .19, but it was related to the aggregated mean affect ratings during the 
negative video, r(138) = .19, p = .03, such that those with a higher trait incremental 
theory experienced greater negative affect during the negative video. When both trait and 
manipulated implicit theories of emotion were entered into a regression equation, trait 
incremental theory predicted more negative affect during the negative video, b = .012 (SE 
= .005), t(137) = 2.24, p = .03 but manipulated theory did not, b = .005 (SE = .17), t(137) 
= .03, p = .98. These results are reported in Table E4. Neither of the interactions between 
trait and manipulated implicit theory was significant.  
Using multi-level modeling (SPSS 17.0 Mixed Models), I analyzed trait implicit 
theory predicting affect ratings during the negative video. Trait implicit theory (centered 
on the grand mean), time, and the interaction between the two were entered as predictors. 
There was a main effect of trait implicit theory, such that those with a higher incremental 
theory experienced more positive affect during the video, b = .006 (SE = .003), t(2520) = 
1.98, p = .047. The effect of time was significant, and the interaction between EMS and 
time was as well, b = .0006 (SE = .0003), t(2520) = 2.04, p < .041. 
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Table E4.  Trait-level implicit theories predicting experience of negative affect during sad 
video. 
 
 b SE ! t p 
 Self-reported sadness during negative video 
EMS  .012 .005 .19 2.24 .03* 
Manipulated .005 .005 .00 .03 .98 
      
 Aggregated mean affect rating during negative video 
EMS  -.010 .008 -.11 -1.33 .19 
Manipulated .218 .236 .08 .92 .36 
  
Emotion During Neutral Video 
For the neutral recovery video, trait implicit theory did not predict self-reported 
happiness, r(65) = .03, p = .83 or sadness, r(65) = -.04, p = .74, but it did marginally 
predict aggregated mean affect ratings, such that those with incremental theories rated 
their affect during the neutral video as more positive overall, r(65) = .23, p = .06. When 
entered with manipulated theories of emotion, trait implicit theories of emotion was 
marginally related to aggregated affect ratings, b = .014 (SE = .007), t = 1.89, p = .06. 
These results are reported in Table E5, along with results for the positive recovery video. 
Emotion During Positive Video  
For the positive recovery video, trait implicit theory did not predict self-reported 
amusement, r(71) = -.19, p = .11 or self-reported sadness, r(71) = -.12, p = .31. Nor did it 
predict the aggregated mean affect ratings during the video, r(71) = -.05, p = .65. None of 
the interactions between trait and manipulated implicit theory were significant.  
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Table E5. Trait-level implicit theories predicting experience of affect during recovery. 
 
 b SE ! t p 
 Aggregated mean affect rating during neutral recovery video 
EMS  .014 .007 .23 1.89 .06
+ 
Manipulated .044 .231 .02 .19 .85 
      
 Aggregated mean affect rating during positive recovery video 
EMS  -.004 .009 -.06 -.48 .63
 
Manipulated -.218 .258 -.10 -.85 .40 
 
 To examine the slope of recovery over time, I used multi-level modeling, with 
EMS, time, and the interaction between the two as predictors of affect ratings. For the 
neutral video, there was a main effect of time, and a main effect of trait implicit theories, 
such that those with incremental theories experienced more positive affect, b = .01 (SE = 
.004), t(1139) = 2.39, p = .02. The interaction was not significant, b < .001, t(1139) = .89, 
p = .37. For the positive video, there was significant main effect of time, and a main 
effect of implicit theories, b = .014 (SE = .005), t(1241) = 2.72, p = .007, such that those 
with an incremental theory experienced more positive affect during the video. The 
interaction between EMS and time was significant, b = -.002 (SE = .0005), t(1241) = -
3.98, p < .001, suggesting that those with a trait incremental theory recovered less quickly 
over the course of the positive video, compared to those with trait entity theories.  
Individual Differences as Covariates 
The Big Five personality traits, emotional impulse strength, locus of control, 
cognitive reappraisal, and implicit theories of intelligence (measured in Part 1) were 
entered into regression equations with manipulated implicit theory predicting aggregated 
affect. In no cases did the manipulated implicit theory of emotion predict affect ratings, 
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so they are omitted from the tables, however, coefficients in Tables E6-E8 are controlling 
for the effect of the manipulation.  
Negative Video 
Neuroticism, impulse strength, and locus of control all predicted negative affect, 
but the manipulation was nonsignificant (see Table E6). Specifically, higher neuroticism, 
stronger emotional impulse strength, and external locus of control each predicted lower 
affect ratings, controlling for the effect of the implicit theory manipulation.  
 
Table E6. Covariates predicting mean affect ratings during negative video. 
 
 b SE ! t p 
Baseline mood .097 .067 .12 1.45 .87 
Extraversion -.006 .005 -.10 -1.21 .23 
Neuroticism -.016 .005 -.30 -3.62 < .001 
BEQ impulse -.011 .004 -.24 -2.84 .005 
Locus of control -.015 .004 -.28 -3.38 .001 
Reappraisal .003 .005 .05 .55 .58 
Implicit theories of 
intelligence 
-.003 .004 -.08 -.96 .34 
Note. Rows represent separate analyses. Each analysis controlled for manipulated implicit 
theory of emotion. Manipulated implicit theory was not significant in any case.  
 
Neutral Video  
Individual difference variables from Part 1 were entered into regression equations 
with manipulated implicit theory predicting aggregated mean affect during the neutral 
recovery video. Baseline mood predicted affect ratings during the neutral video, such that 
people who started out in a higher mood had higher affect ratings during the recovery 
video, b = .19 (SE) = .09, t = 2.09, p = .04. Higher extraversion marginally predicted 
higher affect ratings during the neutral video, b = .01 (SE = .007), t = 1.69, p = 10. None 
of the other covariates predicted affect ratings (see Table E7). 
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Table E7. Covariates predicting mean affect ratings during neutral recovery video. 
 
 b SE ! t p 
Baseline mood .187 .089 .25 2.09 .04 
Extraversion .012 .007 .21 1.69 .10
 
Neuroticism -.007 .006 -.13 -1.02 .31 
BEQ impulse -.001 .005 -.04 -.30 .77 
Locus of control -.004 .006 -.09 -.74 .46 
Reappraisal .010 .007 .17 1.40 .17 
Implicit theories 
of intelligence 
.005 .005 .13 1.00 .32 
Note. Rows represent separate analyses. Each analysis controlled for manipulated implicit 
theory of emotion. Manipulated implicit theory was not significant in any case.  
 
 
Positive Video 
Individual difference variables from Part 1 were entered into regression equations 
with manipulated implicit theory predicting aggregated affect during the positive 
recovery video. None of the covariates predicted affect ratings, except that greater use of 
cognitive reappraisal predicted marginally higher ratings, b = .014 (SE = .008), t = 1.79, p 
= .08 (see Table 2.13).  
Table E8. Covariates predicting mean affect ratings during positive recovery video. 
 
 b SE ! t p 
Baseline mood .138 .104 .16 1.33 .19 
Extraversion .005 .007 .09 .75 .46
 
Neuroticism -.010 .007 -.17 -1.40 .16 
BEQ impulse .008 .007 .13 1.12 .27 
Locus of control -.001 .007 -.01 -.10 .92 
Reappraisal .014 .008 .21 1.79 .08
 
Implicit theories 
of intelligence 
-.002 .006 -.05 -.52 .68 
Note. Rows represent separate analyses. Each analysis controlled for manipulated implicit 
theory of emotion. Manipulated implicit theory was not significant in any case.  
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Individual Differences as Moderators 
To test for moderation by individual differences, the variables listed above were 
entered into regression equations along with their interaction term with manipulated 
implicit theories of emotion. In this case, the continuous ratings of implicit theories of 
emotion that participants made during the manipulation check was used, and both were 
centered on the grand mean. 
Negative Video  
There were significant main effects of neuroticism (! = -.29, p = .001), impulse 
strength (! = -.23, p = .005), and locus of control (! = -.27, p = .001), and a marginal 
main effect of trait implicit theories of intelligence (! = .18, p = .06), but the interactions 
with manipulated implicit theories of emotion were nonsignificant. There were 
marginally significant interactions between manipulated implicit theories of emotion and 
conscientiousness (! = .16, p = .06) and implicit theories of intelligence (! = .15, p = 
.07). 
Neutral Video 
There were significant main effects of openness (! = .37, p = .009) and 
conscientiousness (! = .24, p = .047), and marginally significant main effects of baseline 
mood (! = .22, p = .08) and implicit theories of intelligence (! = .22, p = .09). There was 
also a significant interaction between implicit theories of emotion (manipulated) and 
implicit theories of intelligence (! = -.27, p = .03).  
Positive Video 
There was a significant main effect of agreeableness (! = .28, p = .02) and a 
marginal main effect of cognitive reappraisal (! = .23, p = .054). There was also a 
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significant interaction between manipulated implicit theory of emotion and openness (! = 
.28, p = .02), and a significant interaction between manipulated implicit theory of 
emotion and locus of control (! = -.32, p = .008).  
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APPENDIX F 
 
FOLLOW-UP ANALYSES FOR STUDY 3 
 
Correlations Between Attend and Reappraise Ratings. 
To further examine the interaction between instruction and implicit theory, I 
analyzed the correlation between a person’s picture ratings in attend and reappraise trials. 
If entity participants are less responsive to instructions to remain objective, we would 
expect a larger correlation between ratings in the two instruction conditions, compared to 
incremental participants. Overall, the correlation between attend and reappraise ratings 
for incremental participants was r(44) = .43, and for entity participants was r(45) = .60. 
This difference was nonsignificant, z = -1.09, p = .28. Correlations between attend and 
reappraise ratings also did not differ between entity and incremental groups in the neutral 
or positive pictures (see Table F1). For the negative pictures, however, entity participants 
had a significantly higher correlation, r(45) = .62 than incremental participants, r(42) = 
.18, z = -2.52, p = .01. The correlation was significant for entity participants, p < .001, but 
not for incremental participants, p = .22.  
 
Table F1. Correlations between attend and reappraise conditions 
 
 Negative Neutral Positive Total 
Incremental (n = 46) .18
ns 
.29* 
 
.42**
 
.43**
 
Entity (n = 47) .62**
 
.53**
 
.48**
 
.60**
 
Total (N = 93) .41** .38** .45** .48** 
     
Difference in  
correlation 
z = -2.52 ** 
p = .01 
z = -1.36 
p = .17 
z = -.35 
p = .72 
z = -1.09 
p = .28 
ns 
nonsignificant. * p < .05. ** p < .01.     
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Trait Implicit Theories of Emotion 
The hypothesis tests conducted in Study 3 were repeated, substituting the trait 
level implicit theories of emotion, as measured by the EMS in Part 1, for the manipulated 
implicit theory. There was no main effect of trait implicit theory of emotion, nor was 
there an interaction between trait EMS and valence, or trait EMS and instruction. When 
both trait EMS and manipulated implicit theories of emotion were included in the 
analyses, the interaction between manipulated implicit theory and instruction remained 
significant, F(1,89) = 4.48, p = .04 (see Figure 3.2), as did the main effect of valence. The 
main effect of trait implicit theories of emotion was not significant.  
 
Figure F1. Interaction between manipulated implicit theory of emotion and regulation 
instructions, controlling for trait implicit theories of emotion (values shown at mean of 
EMS).  
 
Individual Differences as Covariates 
The Big Five personality traits, impulse strength, cognitive reappraisal, locus of 
control, and implicit theories of intelligence were each entered into the repeated measures 
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ANOVA as covariates with manipulated implicit theories of emotion predicting affect 
ratings in instructions x valence conditions. None of the covariates changed the pattern of 
results. In all cases, there were significant main effects of valence and instruction, a 
significant interaction between valence and instruction, and the hypothesized interaction 
between instruction and theory. There were, however, significant main effects of 
extraversion, neuroticism, openness, and cognitive reappraisal with higher extraversion, 
lower neuroticism, higher openness, and more reappraisal predicting higher affect ratings.  
Conscientiousness, agreeableness, cognitive reappraisal, and implicit theories of 
intelligence interacted with valence. More conscientious people and people with 
incremental theories of intelligence rated negative pictures more negatively, and positive 
pictures more positively, compared to less conscientious people and entity intelligence 
theorists. The two were correlated, however, and the effect seemed to be driven by 
conscientiousness (implicit theories of intelligence did not significantly interact with 
valence after controlling for conscientiousness). More agreeable people rated positive 
pictures more positively than less agreeable people. People who reappraised more often 
rated neutral and positive pictures more positively than people who reappraised less 
often.   
Individual Differences as Moderators 
Each of the individual difference measures listed above was entered into the 
repeated measures ANOVA, along with an interaction term between the individual 
difference measure and manipulated implicit theories of emotion. In all cases, the main 
effects of valence and instruction, and the interactions between valence and instruction, 
and manipulated implicit theory of instruction, were significant. The only individual 
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difference that interacted with the manipulation was that there was a marginally 
significant interaction between extraversion and manipulated implicit theories of emotion 
(p = .08). Given the number of analyses conducted, however, this may be a spurious 
finding. The interaction is presented in Figure F2. 
 
  
 
Figure F2. Interaction between BFI Extraversion and experimentally manipulated 
implicit theories of emotion. 
 
Three-Way Interaction Results 
 The results of the three-way interaction between manipulated implicit theories, 
picture valence, and instructions are presented in Figure F3. The two plots show the same 
pattern: In both cases, the line representing the reappraise condition is flatter than the one 
representing the attend condition, indicating that ratings of positive and negative pictures 
were less intense when participants were told to remain objective. 
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Figure F3. Theory x Instruction x Valence Three Way Interaction (nonsignificant) 
 
 
I also analyzed the implicit theory by instruction interaction for each of the 
picture valences separately. When analyzing only the negative images, the main effect of 
instruction was significant, F(1,91) = 16.64, p < .001. The instruction x theory interaction 
was nonsignificant, F(1,91) = 1.20, p = .28. When analyzing the positive pictures only, 
the main effect of instruction was significant, F(1,91) = 7.31, p < .001. The instruction x 
theory interaction was nonsignificant, F(1,91) = .05, p = .83. When analyzing the neutral 
images only, the main effect of instruction was significant, F(1,91) = 8.78, p = .004. The 
instruction x theory interaction was significant, F(1,91) = 4.01, p < .05 (see Figure F4).  
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Figure F4. Interaction between implicit theory manipulation and instructions for images 
by valence. 
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APPENDIX G 
 
FEEDBACK STIMULUS FOR STUDY 4 
 
(next page) 
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APPENDIX H 
 
FEEDBACK SCRIPT FOR STUDY 4 
 
This printout shows how you did on the dot-probe task. This task measures how much 
emotions interfere with your cognitive processing. In other words, the better you are at 
controlling your emotions, the more quickly you can perform the task. It’s not so much 
about getting things right, but about how quickly you make your response. Differences 
are small- usually just a couple milliseconds, but they can have big implications. People 
who do well on this test tend to have better interpersonal relationships and are generally 
more successful in life.  
 
Let’s see how you did: So remember that this task measures reaction time. The more 
quickly you respond, the less emotional interference you show. Slower responses mean 
that your emotional interference score is higher. This bar graph shows your reaction times 
across the blocks of pictures [pointed to the higher bars]. You can see that they were a 
little above average [pointed to the lower bars]. 
 
You can see your reaction times for each block here [pointed to the big table], and over 
here it’s broken down by the tone of the picture [pointed to comparison table]. Down here 
you see your percentage- you scored in the 27
th
 percentile of all the people who have 
completed this task, which means that your emotional interference score is relatively 
high. [gave them a couple seconds to look it over, and answer any questions they might 
have, but do not give away the hypothesis.] Are you all set with this? [put away the 
feedback and had them sit at the computer.] 
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APPENDIX I 
 
FOLLOW-UP ANALYSES FOR STUDY 4 
 
Individual Differences in Implicit Theories of Emotion 
I examined correlations between trait implicit theories of emotion, measured 
before participants came in to the lab, and the dependent variables—attributions, affect, 
and task preference. There were no significant correlations with trait implicit theories of 
emotion. When entering trait implicit theory of emotion as a covariate into the ANOVA 
models, the pattern of significance remained the same: Attributions for ability and 
strategy were both significantly higher in the incremental condition, and attribution for 
effort was marginally higher in the incremental condition. Participants in the incremental 
condition also preferred to engage in the unrelated task, compared to participants in the 
entity condition, and had a marginally higher preference for the unrelated task, regardless 
of trait implicit theory. 
When the interaction between trait and manipulated implicit theories of emotion 
was added, there were no significant interactions between trait and manipulated implicit 
theory of emotion, though the interaction was marginally significant in predicting 
attribution for strategy (p = .07). In all cases for the dependent variables of positive and 
negative affect, and attributions to ability, effort, and strategy, and task preference, the 
group differences between manipulated entity and incremental conditions remained 
significant. The manipulated implicit theory of emotion group differences on effort 
attributions and task preference were marginally significant, as it was in the original 
analysis.  
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Individual Difference Covariates 
The Big Five personality traits, emotional impulse strength, trait cognitive 
reappraisal, locus of control, and implicit theories of intelligence were each entered as 
covariates in predicting the dependant measures that were either significant or marginally 
significant (i.e., attributions to ability, effort, and strategy, preference for the unrelated 
task, and preference for the remedial tutorial over the unrelated task). In all cases, the 
pattern of significance did not change when individual differences were entered as 
covariates (i.e., the group differences that were statistically significant remained 
statistically significant, p < .05, and the group differences that were marginally 
significant remained marginally significant, p < .08).  In the case of attributions to 
strategy, there were marginally significant main effects of openness and 
conscientiousness, but the main effects of manipulated implicit theory remained 
significant.  
Dot Probe Results 
The attentional probe task was designed to serve as a plausible measure of 
“emotional interference” for the participants, and group differences were not 
hypothesized a priori. Because past research has shown attentional biases in certain 
populations such as clinically anxious and depressed (e.g., Mogg & Bradley, 2005), 
however, I tested for any group differences in attentional biases that may have emerged 
due to implicit theories of emotion.  
Trials including incorrect responses, as well as trials in which a participant’s 
reaction time was greater or less than 3 SD’s from that participant’s mean, were excluded 
from analyses. Errors accounted for 1.2% of all trials, and  outliers accounted for 1.4%. 
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Attentional bias was calculated as the difference between incongruent trials (in which the 
dot is in the neutral location) and the congruent trials (in which the dot is in the emotional 
location). Bias scores were calculated separately for positive and negative blocks, as well 
as collapsing across all emotional trials, which yielded a general bias score. Calculated 
this way, a bias toward emotional stimuli is represented as a positive score (above zero), 
and a bias toward neutral stimuli is represented as a negative score (below zero). 
Experimental Conditions 
Participants in the entity condition did not significantly differ from participants in 
the incremental condition in their general attentional bias, or in their biases toward 
positive or negative stimuli. Entity participants (M = 1.79, SD = 2.14) made significantly 
more errors than incremental participants (M = 1.05, SD = 1.20), t(90) = -2.04, p < .05. 
Mean reaction times are presented in Table I1. Mean bias scores are presented in Table I2 
and in Figure I1. 
 
Table I1. Mean reaction times (in milliseconds) of entity and incremental groups 
 
 Positive-Neutral Negative-Neutral Total 
 Dot in 
positive 
location 
Dot in 
neutral 
location 
Dot in 
negative 
location 
Dot in 
neutral 
location 
Dot in 
emotion 
location 
Dot in 
neutral 
location 
Entity 228 (43) 229 (41) 240 (49) 242 (46) 234 (45) 235 (42) 
Incremental 233 (38) 236 (38) 252 (48) 243 (48) 243 (42) 244 (43) 
Total 230 (40) 232 (40) 246 (48) 247 (47) 239 (43) 239 (42) 
Note. Standard deviations (in milliseconds) are presented in parentheses.  
 I conducted a 2 (theory) x 2 (valence) ANOVA to see if there was an interaction. 
The main effect of theory was nonsignificant, F(1,90) = .01, p = .91, as was the main 
effect of valence, F(1,90) = .68, p = .41. The interaction between the two variables was 
nonsignificant as well, F(1,90) = 1.74, p = .19 (see Figure I1). 
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Table I2. Biases toward emotional stimuli as a function of implicit theory of emotion 
group 
 
Bias Entity  Incremental  t p d 
General bias toward 
   emotional stimuli 
1.00 (10.31) .66 (14.05) -.13 .89 .03 
Bias toward negative  
   stimuli 
1.76 (15.04) -1.00 (17.18) -.82 .41 .17 
Bias toward positive 
   stimuli 
.83 (13.17) 3.05 (15.32) .75 .46 -.16 
N 48 44    
 
 
Figure I1. Attentional bias towards emotional stimuli. 
 
 
Individual Difference Measures and Dot Probe Performance 
To examine the role of individual differences in attentional bias towards 
emotional stimuli, I correlated general, negative, and positive attentional bias scores with 
the individual difference scores measured in Part 1 (see Table 4.6). General attentional 
bias was strongly correlated with both negative bias (r = .83, p < .001) and positive bias 
(r = .77, p < .001), although the correlation between positive and negative biases was 
modest (r = .28, p = .006).  
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Table I3. Correlations between individual difference measures and attentional bias 
toward emotional stimuli. 
 
 Overall 
Attentional Bias 
Negative 
Attentional Bias 
Positive 
Attentional Bias 
Implicit theories of 
emotion 
-.11 -.22* .06 
Impulse Strength .10 -.04 .21* 
BFI Extraversion -.17 -.13 -.13 
BFI Neuroticism .30* .17 .32* 
BFI Openness .02 .05 .00 
BFI Conscientiousness  -.06 -.13 .05 
BFI Agreeableness -.10 -.15 -.01 
ERQ Reappraisal -.25* -.24* -.17 
ERQ Suppression .04 .02 .03 
Implicit theories of 
intelligence 
-.09 -.21* .09 
* p < .05. 
Implicit theories of emotion (r = -.22, p = .04) and implicit theories of intelligence 
(r = -.21, p = .04) were both related to weaker attentional bias toward negative stimuli. 
When entered simultaneously into a regression neither intelligence theories (B = -.11, SE 
= .07) nor emotion theories (B = -.22, SE = .13) were significant, t(89) = -1.58, p = .12 
for intelligence and t(89) = 1.67, p = .10 for emotion. The two implicit theories were 
correlated at r = .26, p = .01. 
Participants who scored higher on trait neuroticism showed greater attentional 
biases toward emotional stimuli (r = .30, p = .003) and to positive emotional stimuli (r = 
.32, p = .002). Neuroticism did not significantly predict greater bias toward negative 
stimuli (r = .17, p = .11), although the effect was in the same direction. Participants who 
scored higher on trait cognitive reappraisal showed smaller attentional biases toward 
emotional stimuli (r = -.25, p = .01) and negative emotional stimuli (r = -.24, p = .02). 
Reappraisal did not significantly predict less bias towards positive stimuli (r = -.17, p = 
.11), although the effect was in the same direction.  
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Attribution Factors 
I examined whether there was one dimension or several along which the 
attributions vary (e.g., the degree to which the variable is controllable, global, and/or 
stable). I therefore factor analyzed the 10 attributions, first for the entire sample, and then 
separately for those in the entity and incremental conditions. Mood, luck, and 
understanding of instructions did not load well on any of the factor solutions examined, 
and so were removed from analyses. I performed exploratory factor analysis using 
oblique rotation (Oblimin) on attributions to ability, effort, interest, task familiarity, task 
difficulty, concentration, and strategy. Factor loadings are presented in Table I4, and the 
correlations between factor scores and the dependent variables (affect and motivation) are 
presented in Table I5. 
 
Table I4. Factor loadings of attributions for whole sample 
 
Attribution Factor Loading Mean (SD) 
Ability .70 37.09 (28.47) 
Effort .77 37.64 (30.13) 
Interest .65 43.41 (25.78) 
Concentration .66 57.42 (29.22) 
Strategy .56 40.38 (31.35) 
Familiarity .54 33.24 (29.59) 
Difficulty .53 22.25 (25.67) 
  
Table I5. Correlations between attribution factor score and dependent variables. 
 Correlations 
 All Incremental Entity 
Negative Affect .06 .23 -.08 
Positive Affect .14 .00 .23 
Interest in emotion tutorial .21* .00 .38* 
Interest in unrelated task .16 .00 .19 
Emotion over unrelated .03 .00 .14 
N 92 44 48 
* p < .05. 
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I also examined the factor structure separately for entity and incremental groups. 
The factor structure in the entity subsample was a single factor that had loadings similar 
to the sample as a whole (see Table I6). Of the correlations, only the tendency to make 
attributions was significantly correlated with any of the other dependent variables: 
interest in the emotional tutorial. 
 
Table I6. Factor loadings and correlations for entity condition 
 
 Factor Loading 
Ability .82 
Effort .79 
Concentration .75 
Interest .71 
Difficulty .61 
Familiarity .56 
Strategy .51 
  
 Correlations 
Negative Affect -.09 
Positive Affect .22 
Interest in emotion tutorial .35* 
Interest in unrelated task .19 
Emotion over unrelated .11 
 
 The factor analysis for the incremental group yielded a two-factor structure (see 
Table I7). An initial interpretation of these two factors is person-oriented (Factor 1) vs. 
task-oriented (Factor 2). Effort, interest, ability, and concentration are variables related to 
the person engaging in the task, whereas task familiarity, task difficulty, and strategy are 
variables related to the task itself, or the person’s engagement with the particular task. 
Neither of the factor scores correlated significantly with affect of motivation. For entity 
participants, these variables all loaded onto a single factor. That is, entity participants 
seemed to vary on their tendency to make attributions, whereas incremental participants 
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seemed to differ on the extent to which they made attributions to both person- and task-
oriented attributions. 
Table I7. Factor loadings (pattern matrix) and correlations for incremental condition 
 Factor Loadings 
 Factor 1 Factor 2 
Effort .79 -.08 
Interest .69 .03 
Ability .61 .00 
Concentration .58 .02 
Familiarity -.03 -.86 
Difficulty -.03 -.79 
Strategy .07 -.67 
   
 Correlations 
Negative Affect .16 -.20 
Positive Affect -.13 -.24 
Interest in emotion task -.12 -.19 
Interest in unrelated task .06 .13 
Emotion over unrelated -.14 -.25 
Factor 1 -- -.32 
Note. None of the correlations between attribution factors and other dependent variables 
were significant. 
 
 
 When these two factors were scored for the entire sample, incremental 
participants were more likely to make attributions to self-related factors (M = 48.98, SD = 
21.34), compared to entity participants (M = 39.32, SD = 23.67), t(89) = 2.04, p < .05. 
Incremental participants were also marginally more likely to make attributions to task-
related factors (M = 36.24, SD = 24.99) compared to entity participants (M = 28.13, SD = 
21.38), t(89) = 1.67, p = .10.  
In a 2 (attribution) x 2 (theory) repeated measures ANOVA, there was a main 
effect of attribution, such that people were more likely to make attributions to self factors 
(M = 43.89, SD = 22.99) than to task factors (M = 31.96, SD = 23.38), F(1,89) = 22.52, p 
< .001. There was also a significant main effect of theory, such that incremental 
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participants were more likely to stronger attributions, F(1,89) = 5.73, p = .03. but there 
was no interaction with implicit theory manipulation, F(1,89) = .09, p = .76.  
Ipsatized Attributions 
Participants in the incremental condition showed a tendency to make higher 
attribution ratings on average, compared to those in the entity condition, which could 
represent an acquiescence bias. I therefore ipsatized attribution scores, which utilizes z-
scores instead of raw scores, and controls for acquiescence. Results are presented in 
Table I8. 
 
Table I8. Ipsatized attribution scores for entity and incremental groups.  
 
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Ability -.04 (.72) .17 (.84) 1.31 .20 .27 
Effort -.05 (.89) .20 (.77) 1.42 .16 .30 
Mood .28 (1.09) .05 (.92) -1.12 .27 -.23 
Interest .38 (.78) .28 (.74) -.65 .52 -.13 
Concentration .86 (.79) .84 (.78) -.10 .92 -.03 
Strategy .05 (.93) .31 (.80) 1.43 .16 .30 
Familiarity -.11 (.82) .05 (.90) .87 .39 .19 
Task difficulty -.36 (.73) -.57 (.59) -1.49 .14 -.32 
Luck -.91 (.70) -1.09 (.68) -1.24 .22 -.26 
Instructions -.11 (.98) -.24 (1.03) -.63 .53 -.13 
N 48 43    
Note. Effect sizes greater than .20 are in bold. 
 
 
 There were no significant differences in ipsatized attributions between entity and 
incremental participants, p’s = .14 to .92. There were, however, small effect sizes, such 
that those in the incremental condition were relatively more likely to attribute emotion 
regulation failure to ability (d = .27), effort (d = .30), and strategy (d = .30), whereas 
those in the entity condition were relatively more likely to attribute emotion regulation 
failure to mood (d = -.23), task difficulty (d = -.32), and luck (d = -.26). When attribution 
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scores were centered on the person (i.e., the person’s mean attribution score was 
subtracted from each item), the pattern was the same (see Table I9). In both cases, 
however, the effect sizes were small and statistically nonsignificant (see table at end of 
chapter). One option for future research would be to have participants assign weights to 
the various factors, allowing them to distribute 100% of their performance among the 
variables that most influenced their performance.  
 
Table I9. Person-centered attributions (personal mean subtracted from attribution) 
 
 Entity  Incremental  t p d 
Ability -.04 (.72) .24 (.93) 1.65 .10 .34 
Effort .02 (.77) .22 (.90) 1.14 .26 .23 
Mood .25 (1.17) -.01 (1.07) -1.14 .27 -.23 
Interest .38 (.71) .31 (.84) -.37 .71 -.09 
Concentration .85 (.80) .97 (.98) .59 .55 .13 
Strategy .08 (.99) .38 (.93) 1.49 .14 .31 
Familiarity -.13 (.84) .01 (.98) .71 .48 .15 
Task difficulty -.40 (.75) -.61 (.79) -1.36 .18 -.27 
Luck -.92 (.76) -1.20 (.82) -1.70 .09 -.35 
Instructions -.10 (.94) -.31 (1.15) -.96 .34 -.20 
N 48 43    
Note. Scores reflect original scale (1-5) rather than the rescaled 1-100.  
 
Inferential Statistics, Controlling for Persuasiveness 
 In the manipulation check, incremental participants rated the article as more 
persuasive than the entity participants. I therefore ran the analyses presented in Study 4 
using persuasiveness as a covariate. The pattern of results did not change (see Table I10). 
 
 166 
Table I10. Inferential statistics, controlling for manipulation persuasiveness. 
 
 Entity  Incremental  F p 
Attribution:     
   Ability 2.26 (1.12) 2.73 (1.07) 4.48 .04 
   Effort 2.35 (1.16) 2.73 (1.25) 3.11 .08 
   Mood 2.50 (1.26) 2.53 (1.19) .00 .99 
   Interest 2.61 (1.04) 2.83 (1.05) 1.42 .24 
   Concentration 3.09 (1.21) 3.51 (1.14) 3.14 .08 
   Strategy 2.37 (1.27) 2.98 (1.19) 4.00 .05 
   Familiarity 2.11 (1.08) 2.56 (1.29) 4.04 .05 
   Task Difficulty 1.91 (1.03) 1.90 (1.07) .01 .91 
   Luck 1.35 (.57) 1.34 (.73) .04 .85 
   Instructions 2.15 (1.10) 2.17 (1.43) .09 .76 
Affect     
   Positive 25.82 (15.29) 31.01 (18.64) 1.59 .21 
   Negative 9.24 (7.65) 9.70 (8.84) .17 .68 
Motivation     
   Interest in tutorial 2.83 (.95) 3.02 (1.12) .17 .68 
   Interest in other task 2.24 (1.04) 2.85 (1.20) 4.99 .03 
N 46 41   
Note: attributions and motivation are reported in the original 1-5 scale. 
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APPENDIX J 
 
FEEDBACK STIMULUS FOR STUDY 5 
 
(next page) 
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APPENDIX K 
 
FEEDBACK SCRIPT FOR STUDY 5 
 
This printout shows how you each did on the dot-probe task. This task measures how 
much emotions interfere with your cognitive processing. In other words, the better you 
are at controlling your emotions, the more quickly you can perform the task. It’s not so 
much about getting things right, but about how quickly you make your response. 
 
Let’s see how you did: Slower responses mean that your emotional interference score is 
higher. This bar graph shows your reaction times across three blocks of pictures [point to 
the bar graph]. [indicated the person in the success feedback condition] You did pretty 
well- your bars are low, which means that your reaction time was pretty good. [indicated 
the person in the failure feedback condition] Your scores were a little slower. This 
suggests that you were slower to respond when the pictures were emotional.  
 
You can see your reaction times for each set of pictures here [pointed to the big table], 
and over here it’s broken down by the tone of the picture [pointed to comparison table]. 
Down here you see your percentage- you [indicated success feedback participant] scored 
in the 81
st
 percentile of all people who completed this task, which means that your 
emotional interference score is lower than most people’s. You [indicated failure feedback 
participant] scored in the 27
th
 percentile of all the people who have completed this task, 
which means that your emotional interference score is higher than most people’s. [gave 
them a couple seconds to look it over, and answered any questions they might have, but 
did not give away the hypothesis.] Do you have any questions? [put away the feedback 
and have them sit back down at their computers.] 
 
Now you will be completing a couple of additional tasks. First, we have a couple of 
questions regarding the task you just completed. Then, you get one more shot at the 
emotional interference task. This will take about [filled in about as much time as is left in 
the session], and then you’re done. 
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APPENDIX L 
 
FOLLOW-UP ANALYSES FOR STUDY 5 
 
Trait Implicit Theories of Emotion 
I examined correlations between trait implicit theories of emotion, measured 
before participants came in to the lab, and the dependent variables—attributions, affect, 
and motivation after feedback. Analyses were conducted separately for success and 
failure feedback. 
Success Feedback  
Implicit theory of emotion was significantly correlated to positive affect after 
receiving success feedback, such that stronger incremental theorists reported higher 
positive affect (r = .31, p = .02) and also reported putting forth more effort in the second 
round (r = .26, p < .05). Incremental participants were also marginally more likely to 
attribute their success to their ability (r = .24, p = .07).  
Failure Feedback 
Implicit theory of emotion was not significantly related to any of the dependent 
measures after receiving failure feedback, though this may be due to low power. An 
incremental theory was nonsignificantly related to stronger attributions to understanding 
of the instructions (r = .21, p = .11), to positive affect (r = .21, p = .13), and to self-
perceived performance on the second round of the emotional interference task (r = .20, p 
= .14), as well as to mood after the second round (r = .21, p = .11). 
Trait Implicit Theories of Emotion as a Covariate  
For covariate analyses, trait implicit theories were entered as a covariate into the 2 
(manipulated implicit theory) x 2 (feedback condition) ANOVA. When controlling for 
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trait implicit theory of emotion, all of the 2 x 2 analyses reported above maintained the 
same level of significance. In addition, there were some main effects of trait implicit 
theory. Incremental theorists were higher on attributions to ability, F(1,109) = 5.58, p = 
.02, attributions to effort, F(1,109) = 3.56, p = .06, and on self-perceived performance on 
the second round of the emotional interference task, F(1,109) = 6.70, p = .01.  
Trait Implicit Theories of Emotion as a Moderator  
For moderation analyses, manipulated implicit theory and manipulated feedback 
were entered as between-subjects factors, and trait implicit theories was entered as a 
covariate, along with the interactions between trait implicit theories and manipulated 
implicit theories and between trait implicit theories and manipulated feedback. 
Trait implicit theories of emotion moderated the effect of failure vs. success 
feedback on effort put forth in the second round of the emotional interference task: There 
was a main effect of feedback, F(1,107) = 31.39, p < .001 , and a significant interaction 
between feedback and trait implicit theories of emotion, F(1,107) = 5.46, p = .02 (See 
Figure L1).  
When controlling for trait implicit theories of emotion, there was a marginal 
interaction between manipulated implicit theory and feedback, F(1,107) = 3.54, p = .06. 
There were no other significant interactions with trait implicit theories of emotion, and 
the pattern of significance found in the original analyses remained the same.  
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Figure L1. Interaction between trait implicit theories of emotion and feedback. 
 
 
Trait Implicit Theories and the Dot Probe Task 
Trait incremental theory was significantly correlated with a general tendency to 
attend to emotional stimuli over neutral stimuli, r = .20, p = .03, but was uncorrelated 
with any of the other biases. In a repeated measures ANOVA with trait EMS as a 
predictor and general emotional bias as the dependent variable, there was a main effect of 
trial round, such that bias tended to decrease from trial 1 (M = 1.67, SD = 41.17) to trial 2 
(M = 1.24, SD = 12.50), F(1,112) = 4.11, p < .05. There was also a significant interaction 
between trial round and EMS, F(1,112) = 4.40, p = .04. For tendency to attend to positive 
stimuli over neutral stimuli, there was a main effect of trial, such that people generally 
shifted from a bias towards neutral stimuli (M = -5.02, SD = .69) to a bias towards 
positive stimuli (M = 4.08, SD = .19), F(1,112) = 4.46, p = .04. There was also a marginal 
interaction between trial round and trait EMS, F(1,112) = 3.52, p = .06. There were no 
effects of trait EMS or time on bias toward negative stimuli over neutral stimuli.  
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Individual Differences in the Dot Probe Task 
To examine the role of individual differences in attentional bias towards 
emotional stimuli, I correlated general, negative, and positive attentional bias scores with 
the individual difference scores measured in Part 1 (see Table L1). Although round 1 
contained only a small number of trials (15 each for positive-neutral and negative-neutral 
pairings), neuroticism was correlated with greater attention to negative over neutral 
stimuli (r = .22, p = .02), and conscientiousness was correlated with greater attention to 
neutral over negative stimuli (r = -.22, p = .02). As in Study 4, agreeableness was 
correlated with greater attention to positive over neutral stimuli (r = .21, p .03). Implicit 
theories of emotion were related to bias, such that a higher incremental theory predicted 
greater attention to positive over neutral stimuli (r = .19, p < .05), and greater attention to 
emotional over neutral stimuli (r = .20, p = .03). In Round 2, there were no significant 
differences between individual difference measures and attentional bias, suggesting that 
the feedback manipulation overpowered the influence of any stable individual 
differences.  
 
Table L1. Correlations between individual difference measures and attentional bias. 
 
 Round 1 Attentional Bias 
 Overall Negative Positive 
Implicit theories of emo. .20* .04 .19* 
Impulse Strength .07 .12 .02 
BFI Extraversion .04 -.07 .07 
BFI Neuroticism .03 .22* -.07 
BFI Openness .10 -.08 .15 
BFI Conscientiousness  .00 -.22* .10 
BFI Agreeableness .15 -.09 .21* 
ERQ Reappraisal -.05 -.11 -.01 
ERQ Suppression .10 .12 .04 
Implicit theories of 
intelligence 
.15 .01 .16 
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Table L1 (continued). Correlations between individual difference measures and 
attentional bias. 
 
 Round 2 
 Overall Negative Positive 
Implicit theories of 
emotion 
-.05 -.05 -.02 
Impulse Strength .07 .00 .09 
BFI Extraversion .01 -.07 .09 
BFI Neuroticism .01 -.06 .05 
BFI Openness -.15 -.17 -.07 
BFI Conscientiousness  -.01 -.11 .07 
BFI Agreeableness -.02 -.07 .03 
ERQ Reappraisal -.09 -.09 -.07 
ERQ Suppression .04 .08 -.01 
Implicit theories of 
intelligence 
-.04 -.07 .00 
* p < .05. 
Attribution Factor Analysis 
As in Study 4, I examined the factor structure of attributions in the entire sample, 
as well as in the subsamples of entity, incremental, success, and failure conditions. In all 
subsamples, a single factor emerged. Factor loadings differed slightly from subsample to 
subsample, however (see Table L2). Since no consistent structure emerged, and the factor 
structure differed from that in Study 4, I did not perform additional analyses. 
Ipsatized Attributions 
The tendency of incremental participants to make more attributions than entity 
participants was not as pronounced in Study 5 as in Study 4. To perform parallel 
analyses, however, I ipsatized attribution scores in this sample, and examined any 
differences between conditions. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table L3, and 
inferential statistics are presented in Table L4.  
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Table L2. Factor loadings of attributions in entire sample and subsamples. 
 
 Condition 
Attribution All Entity Incremental Success Failure 
Effort .73 .68 .76 .80 .52 
Instructions .70 .66 .73 .68 .57 
Interest .68 .78 .62 .68 .52 
Concentration .63 .54 .68 .57 .72 
Strategy .48 .55 .45 .36 .48 
Difficulty .48 .54 .45 .27 .62 
Mood .44 .41 .45 .48 .36 
Ability .43 .56 .35 .51 .27 
Familiarity .33 .36 .32 .11 .73 
Luck .06 -.10 .16 -.23 .40 
 
Table L3. Descriptive statistics for ipsatized attribution scores 
 Entity Incremental Total 
Success feedback    
   Ability -.11 (.71) .02 (.82) -.03 (.78) 
   Effort .33 (.55) .28 (.73) .30 (.66) 
   Mood -.12 (.80) -.14 (.73) -.13 (.75) 
   Interest .71 (.69) .89 (.77) .79 (.72) 
   Concentration .16 (.73) .06 (.82) .10 (.78) 
   Strategy .02 (.98) .59 (.89)* .36 (.96) 
   Familiarity -.36 (.98) -.57 (.75) -.49 (.85) 
   Difficulty .00 (.75) -.07 (.96) -.04 (.88) 
   Luck -1.08 (1.08) -1.17 (.83) -1.13 (.93) 
   Instructions .27 (.87) .29 (.76) .28 (.80) 
   N 23 34 57 
Failure feedback    
   Ability .05 (.77) .30 (1.15) .15 (1.01) 
   Effort -.18 (.89) -.10 (.88) -.13 (.88) 
   Mood .06 (.99) .16 (.96) .12 (.96) 
   Interest .44 (1.04) .61 (.86) .54 (.93) 
   Concentration .57 (1.00) .19 (.73) .35 (.87) 
   Strategy .03 (.84) .31 (1.03) .19 (.95) 
   Familiarity .12 (.73) -.02 (.85) .04 (.80) 
   Difficulty .11 (.87) -.35 (.56)* -.14 (.74) 
   Luck -1.08 (.49) -.95 (.62) -1.00 (.57) 
   Instructions -.04 (.95) -.16 (.88) -.11 (.90) 
   N 24 33 57 
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Table L3 (continued). Descriptive statistics for ipsatized attribution scores. 
 Entity Incremental Total 
Total    
   Ability -.08 (.73) .16 (1.00) .06 (.90) 
   Effort .07 (.78) .09 (.83) .08 (.80) 
   Mood -.03 (.90) .01 (.86) -.01 (.87) 
   Interest .66 (.93) .66 (.78) .66 (.84) 
   Concentration .37 (.89) .13 (.78) .23 (.83) 
   Strategy .03 (.90) .45 (.96)* .28 (.96) 
   Familiarity -.11 (.89) -.30 (.84) -.22 (.86) 
   Difficulty .06 (.81) -.21 (.80) -.09 (.81) 
   Luck -1.09 (.82) -1.06 (.74) -1.07 (.77) 
   Instructions .11 (.92) .08 (.86) .09 (.87) 
   N 47 67 114 
* p < .05. 
 
Table L4. 2 (theory) x 2 (feedback) ANOVA results for ipsatized attribution scores 
 Main Effect:  
Theory 
Main Effect:  
Feedback 
Theory x Feedback 
Interaction 
Ability .20 1.97 .1.03 
Effort .01 8.81* .15 
Mood .05 2.16 .12 
Interest .00 3.01
† 
1.23 
Concentration 2.23 3.06
† 
.82 
Strategy 5.41*
 
.59 .66 
Familiarity 1.22 10.85* .05 
Difficulty 2.96
† 
.31 1.60 
Luck .01 .60 .55 
Instructions .08 5.49* .18 
†
 p < .08. * p < .05. 
 
 
There was a significant main effect of theory on attributions to strategy, such that 
incremental participants (M = .45, SD = .96) were relatively more likely to attribute their 
performance to strategy, compared to entity participants (M = .03, SD = .90), F(1,110) = 
5.41, p < .05. There was also a marginal main effect of theory on attributions to 
difficulty, such that incremental participants were relatively less likely to attribute their 
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performance to task difficulty (M = -.21, SD = .80) compared to entity participants (M = 
.06, SD = .81), F(1,110) = 2.96, p = .09. 
There were significant main effects of feedback on attributions to effort, 
familiarity, and instructions, and marginally significant effects of feedback on attributions 
to interest and concentration. People who received success feedback were relatively more 
likely to attribute their success to effort and understanding of instructions, and relatively 
less likely to attribute their success to familiarity. They were marginally more likely to 
make relatively stronger attributions to interest, compared to the failure group. People 
who received failure feedback were marginally more likely to attribute their failure to 
concentration.  
Correlations between ipsatized attributions and affect and motivation are 
presented in table L5. People who made relatively stronger attributions to effort reported 
more positive affect, whereas people who made relatively stronger attributions to 
familiarity and luck reported less positive affect. People who made relatively stronger 
attributions to effort reported less negative affect, whereas people who made relatively 
stronger attributions to mood reported more negative affect. Attributions to familiarity 
were correlated with greater effort and greater persistence in the second round of dot 
probe trials.  
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Table L5. Correlations between ipsatized attributions, affect, and motivation 
 Positive 
Affect 
Negative 
Affect 
Effort Performance 
Attributions     
   Ability -.05 .01 .06 .01 
   Effort .25* -.18
† 
-.07 -.16 
   Mood .01 .18
† 
.15 .08 
   Interest -.10 .02 -.11 .00 
   Concentration .14 -.08 .12 .03 
   Strategy .07 .02 -.10 -.17
† 
   Familiarity -.21* .11 .25* .23* 
   Difficulty -.06 .00 -.15 -.04 
   Luck -.22* .09 -.06 .02 
   Instructions .16 -.13 -.10 .00 
†
 p < .08. * p < .05. 
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